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Abstract	
This	 thesis	 aims	 to	 show	how	Plato	 attempts	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 immortal	 and	mortal	nature	in	the	Timaeus.	It	explores	the	similarities	and	dissimilarities	between	the	constitution	of	the	immortal	existents,	i.e.	the	cosmic	soul	and	human	immortal	souls,	and	the	mortal	existents,	i.e.	the	cosmic	body	and	the	human	bodies.	In	the	knowledge	of	the	similarities,	that	is,	the	soul	and	body	are	fashioned	using	the	Forms	and	Receptacle	as	common	components,	the	distinction	between	 the	 immortal	 souls	 and	 mortal	 bodies	 seems	 not	 to	 be	 an	 absolute	 one.	 The	dissimilarities	 lie	 in	 that	 the	 two	kinds	 of	 existents	 are	 created	 in	 different	ways,	which	 entail	that	they	differ	in	structures	and	modes	of	motion.	The	similarities	and	dissimilarities	altogether	explains	why	the	 immortal	souls	and	mortal	bodies	appear	 to	be	utterly	different	existents	but	can	be	connected	to	and	communicate	with	each	other.	The	embodiment	of	the	cosmic	soul	in	the	cosmic	body	yields	an	everlasting	creature	such	as	the	cosmos	itself.	Whereas	the	embodiment	of	the	 human	 immortal	 soul	 in	 the	physical	 body	 results	 in	 the	 former’s	 being	disrupted	 and	 the	generation	of	 two	kinds	of	mortal	 souls,	 i.e.	 spirited	and	appetitive	parts	of	 souls.	The	 spirited	part	of	soul	 is	designed	as	an	 intermediary	between	the	 immortal	soul	and	the	body	as	well	as	between	the	immortal	soul	and	the	appetitive	part	of	soul.	The	tripartite	soul	and	its	interaction	with	 the	 mortal	 body	 reveal	 Demiurgic	 concerns	 for	 humans.	 Humans	 are	 endowed	 with	mortality	 intentionally	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 cosmic	 completion	 and	 perfection.	 The	 Demiurgic	compensatory	 arrangement,	 i.e.	 the	 structural	 affinity	 between	 the	 cosmos	 and	 humans	 and	purposefully	 designed	 bodily	 parts	 and	 organs,	 allows	 humans,	 as	mortal	 creatures,	 to	 bridge	their	own	gap	with	the	everlasting	cosmos	by	imitating	the	latter.		
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Introduction	
This	 thesis	 studies	 how,	 according	 to	 Timaeus’	 cosmology,	 Plato	 bridges,	 or	 attempts	 to	bridge	the	gap	between	immortality	and	mortality.	The	subject	might	strike	one	as	odd.	Indeed,	it	might	seem	rather	plain,	first,	that	Plato	holds	a	dualistic	stand	on	the	relationship	between	soul	and	body;1	 second,	that	even	if	he	did	intend	to	reconcile	the	apparently	incompatible	nature	of	immortal	 soul	 and	 mortal	 body,	 a	 prima	 facie	 reading	 of	 the	 Timaeus	 would	 not	 disprove	 a	dualistic	interpretation,	let	alone	speak	in	favor	of	the	bridge-the-gap	theory.	Since	the	late	19th	century,	there	has	in	fact	a	revival	of	interest	in	the	Timaeus,	and	Plato’s	views	on	cosmology	and	psychology	 have	 drawn	 more	 and	 more	 attention	 of	 classical	 scholars.2	 However,	 the	 topics	pertinent	to	immortal	and	mortal	natures	are	usually	carried	out	in	isolation	from	each	other.	For	instance,	Thomas	Robinson’s	Plato’s	Psychology	consists	of	a	profound	study	of	Timaeus’	account	of	soul’s	constitution	and	nature,	but	virtually	 fails	 to	provide	a	clear	account	of	what	 it	 is	 that	binds	an	immortal	soul	to	a	mortal	body.3	Certainly,	 some	 scholars	 have	 noticed	 that	 the	 Timaeus	 has	 offered	 a	 complex	 and	constructive	account	of	 the	 soul-body	matter,	 and	Plato	 reveals	 a	 shifting	attitude	 towards	 the	role	 of	 body	 in	 that	 account.	 For	 example,	 Thomas	 Johansen,	 in	 his	 book	 Plato’s	 Natural	
Philosophy,	 notes	 that	 both	 soul	 and	 body	 enjoy	 spatial	 extension	 and	 their	 motions	 in	 space	enables	 the	 soul-body	 interaction.	But	most	of	 the	work	 focuses	on	 issues	of	 the	 interaction	of	soul’s	 circular	 and	 body’s	 rectilinear	 motions,	 and	 thus	 lacks	 explanation	 of	 how,	 based	 on	Timaeus’	account	of	space,	an	incorporeal	soul	would	possesses	spatial	attributes	that	allow	its	interaction	 with	 a	 physical	 body.4	 And	 more	 generally,	 Johansen	 places	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	dissimilarities	 of	 soul	 and	body	 rather	 than	 similarities,	 even	when	he	mentions	 that	 soul	 and	body	 share	 some	 spatial	 attributes	 in	 common.	 An	 extensive	 treatment	 of	 how,	 according	 to																																																									1	 The	impression	of	Plato’s	holding	a	dualistic	stand	on	the	relationship	between	soul	and	body	owes	mainly	to	his	remarks	in	the	Phaedo,	where	he	claims	that	the	body	is	a	prison	for	the	soul	and	the	latter	would	become	better	without	the	interference	from	the	former	(66b-c,67d,82d-e).	2	 For	generic	exegeses	of	the	Timaeus,	see	Archer-Hind	(1988),	Taylor	(1928),	Cornford	(1937).	For	cosmological	and	psychological	interpretation,	see	Mohr	(1985),	Robinson	(1995),	Johansen	(2004),	Carone	(2005),	Vlastos	(1995),	Mohr	&	Sattler	(2010),	Broadie	(2012).	3	 Cf.	Robinson	(1995).	4	 Cf.	Johansen	(2004)	138-142.	
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Timaeus’	account,	the	immortal	soul	and	mortal	body	form	a	union	and	are	able	to	communicate	with	each	other,	despite	their	salient	difference	in	nature,	is	lacking	to	this	day.5	Let	us	now	turn	to	the	Timaeus	itself.	In	Timaeus’	telling	of	the	cosmic	and	human	creation,	the	soul-body	problem	occupies	a	 large	and	 important	section.6	 I	believe	that	 this	 is	where	we	find	that	Plato	bridges,	or	at	least	attempts	to	bridge,	the	gap	between	immortal	soul	and	mortal	body.	It	is	my	aim	in	this	thesis	to	show	that	Plato	has	revealed	what	nature	immortal	soul	and	mortal	 body	 share	 in	 common	 that	 allows	 their	 communication	 both	 in	 the	 cosmos	 itself	 as	 a	whole	and	in	the	human	person.	It	is	also	my	goal	to	argue	that	my	bridge-the-gap	interpretation	will	 account	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 human’s	 imitation	 of	 the	 cosmos,	 which	 supports	 the	Demiurge’s	 ultimate	 goal	 of	 cosmic	 completion	 and	perfection.	 For,	 it	 is	 acknowledged	 that,	 in	Timaeus’	account,	Plato	demonstrates	a	larger	cosmological	framework	that	underpins	many	of	his	late	ethical	views.7	 Thus	the	cosmological	background	is	essential	for	an	understanding	of	the	meaning	of	 human	 life.	And	we	 can	 find	 answers	 about	human	happiness	 and	 the	best	way	 to	achieve	it	 in	Plato’s	appreciation	of	the	relation	between	humans	and	the	cosmos.	According	to	the	Timaeus,	as	we	shall	see,	human	happiness	resides	in	the	goodness	of	the	whole	cosmos	and	the	Demiurge.	As	I	shall	argue,	imitation	of	the	cosmos	is	the	most	practical	method	the	Demiurge	bestowed	 upon	 humans,	 which	 is	 grounded	 by	 the	 analogous	 origin	 and	 nature	 between	 the	cosmos	 and	 the	 human	 race,	 in	 order	 that	 the	 human	 race	 can	 bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 the	cosmos	that	is	a	divine	and	immortal	being	and	themselves	as	being	mortal	creatures.	I	will	approach	the	overall	subject	matter	of	how	Plato	bridges	the	gap	between	immortality	and	mortality	by	developing	a	comprehensive	interpretation	of	the	constitution	of	the	immortal	soul	and	mortal	body	as	well	as	how	these	two	are	bound	together	and	how	they	interact	with	each	other.	In	the	first	chapter,	I	will	give	a	sketch	of	the	cosmology	and	teleology	demonstrated	in	the	Timaeus	so	as	to	provide	the	context	in	which	immortality	and	mortality	is	examined.	I	will																																																									5	 Although	the	connection	and	interaction	between	immortal	soul	and	physical	body	receives	relatively	less	attention	in	the	studies	of	the	Timaeus,	there	is	some	good	literature	on	it.	Cf.	Brennan	(2012),	Brisson	(1997),	Carone	(2005),	Karfík	(2005),	Lorenz	(2012).	6	 Cf.	Tim.	27a-34b	The	creation	of	cosmic	body;	34c-37c	The	creation	of	the	cosmic	soul;	41d-42d	The	creation	of	human	individual	immortal	souls	and	the	embodiment	of	reincarnation	of	those	souls;	42e-44d	The	embodiment	of	immortal	souls;	44d-47d	The	creation	of	the	human	body;	64a-69a	Sense	perception	and	affection;	69a-72d	The	creation	of	the	mortal	souls;	72e-76e	The	creation	of	bodily	parts	and	organs;	78e-79e	The	process	of	respiration;	80a-81e	The	process	of	metabolism,	aging,	and	death;	82a-86a	The	nature	of	sickness	and	three	classes	of	diseases;	86b-87b	The	diseases	of	the	soul;	87c-90d	The	balance	between	the	soul	and	the	body.	7	 Cf.	Carone	(2005),	Johansen	(2004).	
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also	 lay	 some	 stress	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 Demiurge	 who	 actually	 performed	 the	 creative	activities	 according	 to	Timaeus’	 account.	 In	Chapter	2,	 I	will	 investigate	 the	 constitution	of	 the	cosmic	body	and	the	human	body	with	regard	to	the	materials,	i.e.	the	elemental	solids	that	the	Demiurge	used	to	compose	them.	It	will	contain	discussion	of	the	Forms	and	the	Receptacle	that	are	 the	components	 in	 fashioning	the	elemental	solids.	 In	Chapter	3,	 I	will	be	 talking	about	 the	constitution	 of	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 and	 individual	 immortal	 souls	 of	 humans.	 Chapter	 3	 will	demonstrate	that	the	distinction	between	immortal	soul	and	mortal	body	is	not	an	absolute	one	in	 that	 the	 Demiurge	 employed	 the	 Form	 and	 the	 Receptacle	 as	 integral	 components	 in	constructing	both	the	immortal	soul	and	mortal	body,	and	their	dissimilarity	lies	only	in	that	the	ways	 in	 which	 the	 Demiurge	 actually	 constructed	 them.	 In	 Chapter	 4,	 I	 will	 look	 at	 the	construction	of	the	two	mortal	kinds	of	soul,	i.e.	the	spirited	part	of	soul	and	the	appetitive	part	of	soul.	 By	 redefining	 the	 concept	 of	 πάθημα	 and	 αἴσθησις,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 the	 ingredients	 the	lesser	gods	used	to	create	the	mortal	souls	already	contain	the	participation	of	the	immortal	soul.	In	 this	way,	 the	mortal	kinds	of	soul	 function	as	 intermediaries	 in	 the	communication	between	the	immortal	soul	and	mortal	body.	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	spirited	and	appetitive	parts	of	soul	play	 different	 role	 in	 the	 process	 of	 communication.	 In	 Chapter	 5,	 I	 will	 explore	 the	 teleology	operating	 within	 immortality	 and	 mortality	 in	 the	 cosmological	 context.	 I	 will	 show	 that	mortality	is	inevitable	and	necessary	for	the	completion	and	continuous	goodness	of	the	cosmos	as	a	whole.	 For	humans,	mortality	 is	undesirable	on	 the	one	hand	and	necessary	on	 the	other,	since	 it	ensures	 the	opportunity	 for	every	 individual	 immortal	soul	 to	regain	 its	perfection	and	purity.	I	will	also	argue	that	there	is	affinity	in	the	structure	between	the	cosmos	and	the	humans.	And	such	affinity	promotes	the	imitation	that	the	structural	similarities	allow	humans	to	practice.	In	this	way,	the	gap	between	the	cosmos	that	is	a	divine	and	immortal	creature	and	the	human	race	that	is	a	mortal	kind	of	creature	is	bridged	by	humans	themselves.
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Chapter	1	Cosmology	and	teleology	
Introduction	
According	to	Timaeus’	cosmogonical	account,	 the	creation	of	 the	human	race	 is	part	of	 the	creation	of	the	cosmos	as	a	whole.	For	this	reason,	the	investigation	of	the	nature	of	human	race	cannot	be	conducted	without	a	brief	 introduction	of	 its	cosmological	 context.	Furthermore,	 the	origin	of	the	human	race	is	presented	as	the	result	of	deliberate	Demiurgic	creation	rather	than	natural	 evolution.	 Hence,	 to	 develop	 a	 comprehensive	 understanding	 of	 the	 distinctive	mortal-immortal	nature	of	the	human	race	requires	not	only	an	examination	of	the	constitution	of	the	soul	and	body	but	also	an	account	of	the	teleology	operating	behind	the	creation	of	human	beings.	And	the	latter	in	turn	also	calls	for	the	apprehension	of	the	cosmological	context	within	which	 the	 origin	 and	 nature	 of	 human	 beings	 is	 demonstrated.	 Additionally,	 the	 role	 the	Demiurge	 plays	 in	 Timaeus’	 cosmological	 monologue	 is	 indispensable	 to	 the	 study	 of	 the	cosmological	 context.	 Therefore,	 in	 this	 first	 chapter,	 Timaeus’	 cosmology,	 teleology,	 and	 the	concept	of	the	Demiurge	are	examined	in	order	to	characterize	Plato’s	account	of	cosmic	creation.	It	aims	to	provide	the	cosmological	framework	under	which	human’s	twofold	nature	of	mortality	and	 immortality	 are	 to	 be	 investigated	 in	 Chapter	 2	 and	 3,	 and	 also	 the	 teleology	 operating	behind	such	a	twofold	nature	in	Chapter	4.	I	first	give	a	sketch	of	what	the	Timaeus	is	about	and	examine	the	relation	of	the	account	of	the	 origin	 and	 nature	 of	 human	 beings	 to	 Timaeus’	 cosmology	 and	 furthermore	 to	 the	 whole	
Timaeus.	 The	 study	 of	 that	 relationship	 will	 reveal	 that,	 firstly,	 human’s	mortal	 and	 immortal	nature	 needs	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 a	 cosmological	 context;	 and	 secondly,	 the	 teleologies	 that	operate	behind	the	cosmic	creation	and	the	generation	of	the	human	race	are	consistent.	Having	shown	that	it	is,	I	will	then	scrutinize	what	we	should	make	of	this	teleology	in	the	context	of	the	
Timaeus.	 A	 specification	 of	 the	 teleology	 that	 Timaeus	 holds	 in	 his	 cosmological	 accounts	will	show	 that	 Timaeus’	 cosmological	 teleology	 is	 intentional	 rather	 than	 natural,	 that	 is,	why	 and	how	the	cosmos	came	into	being,	as	it	is,	is	subject	to	the	good	intention	and	creative	activities	of	the	 Demiurge.	 Finally,	 I	 will	 take	 a	 look	 at	 the	 Demiurge	 who	 performed	 the	 calculation	 and	
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deliberation	 so	 as	 to	 bring	 the	 cosmos	 into	 being	 as	 it	 is	 and	 who	 serves	 as	 an	 explanatory	principle	that	accounts	for	the	goodness	of	the	cosmos.	
1.1	Timaeus’	cosmology	and	the	Timaeus	
Plato’s	Timaeus1	 opens	with	Socrates’	recapitulation	of	a	discussion	from	the	previous	day,2	which	described	a	best	kind	of	political	constitution	and	citizen	quite	 familiar	 to	readers	of	 the	
Republic.3	 Today,4	 Socrates	wishes	to	be	entertained	in	return	and	wants	to	hear	how	a	city	such	as	that	depicted	in	yesterday’s5	 talk	would	fare	at	war	with	other	cities.6	 The	other	participants	of	 today’s	 conversation	 have	 worked	 out	 a	 plan	 for	 the	 reciprocal	 accounts.	 At	 Timaeus	20d7-26e1,	Critias	gives	a	 concise	version	of	his	 intended	account	about	ancient	Athens,	 a	 city	from	nine	thousand	years	ago	that	surprisingly	matches	the	 ideal	city7	 Socrates	has	portrayed,	and	 its	 wars	 against	 Atlantis.	With	 Socrates’	 approving	 the	 Athens-Atlantis	 story,	 Critias	 then	suggests	that	Timaeus	should	give	a	cosmological	account	before	he	gives	a	fully	detailed	account	of	the	warfare	between	the	two	cities.	Critias	sets	out	his	plan	as	follows	(27a2-b6):	All	right,	Socrates,	what	do	you	think	of	the	plan	we’ve	arranged	for	our	guest	gift	to	you?	We	thought	that	because	Timaeus	is	our	expert	in	astronomy	and	has	made	it	his	main	business	to	know	the	nature	of	the	universe,	he	should	speak	first,	beginning	with	the	origin	of	the	world	and	 concluding	 with	 the	 nature	 of	 human	 beings.	 Then	 I’ll	 go	 next,	 once	 I’m	 in	 possession	 of	Timaeus’	account	of	the	origin	of	human	beings	and	your	account	of	how	some	of	them	came	to	have	a	superior	education.	I’ll	introduce	them,	as	not	only	Solon’s	account	but	also	his	law	would	have	 it,	 into	our	 courtroom	and	make	 them	citizens	of	 our	 ancient	 city	 –	 as	 really	 being	 those	Athenians	of	old	whom	the	report	of	the	sacred	records	has	rescued	from	obscurity	–	and	from	then	on	I’ll	speak	of	them	as	actual	Athenian	citizens.8																																																									1	 The	argument	in	this	chapter	and	the	other	following	chapters	is	all	text-based,	including	the	Demiurge’s	work	of	cosmic	creation	and	the	reality	of	the	interlocutors.	That	means	I	will	not	be	talking	about	the	authenticity	of	the	character	Timaeus	or	the	difference	between	a	historical	Socrates	and	a	Platonic	fictitious	Socrates.	Because	there	is	no	historical	evidence	showing	the	existence	of	Timaeus	of	Locri,	I	will	simply	take	it	that	the	text	represents	its	author,	Plato’s	viewpoints.	For	discussion	of	the	identity	of	Timaeus,	see	Cornford	(1937)	2-3).	For	discussion	of	the	two	Socrates	figures,	see	Vlastos	(1971),	Kahn	(1992),	and	Benson	(1992).	2	 Cf.	Tim.	17c1-3	and	17c6-19b2.	3	 For	the	view	that	Socrates’	talk	refers	to	the	Republic,	see	Taylor	(1928)	13,	Johansen	(2004)	chapter	1.	For	objection,	see	Cornford	(1937)	4-5	and	Clay	(1997)	50-51.	4	 For	a	brief	introduction	of	the	debate	on	the	dramatic	date	of	the	Timaeus,	see	Zeyl	(2000)	xxvi-xxvii.	5	 For	the	frequency	of	the	word	‘yesterday’	(χθές)	in	the	Timaeus,	see	Osborne	(1996)	footnote	3.	6	 Cf.	Tim.	19b3-c8.	7	 Because	Socrates	calls	the	city	‘best	possible’	at	17c,	for	convenience	of	reference,	I	will	refer	to	it	as	‘ideal	city’	in	the	following	discussion.	8	 If	not	specified,	all	quotations	from	the	Timaeus	are	from	the	translation	by	Zeyl	(2000).	OTC	greek	text	of	the	Timaeus	is	used	in	this	thesis:	Σκόπει	δὴ	τὴν	τῶν	ξενίων	σοι	διάθεσιν,	ὦ	Σώκρατες,	ᾗ	διέθεμεν.	ἔδοξεν	γὰρ	ἡμῖν	Τίμαιον	μέν,	ἅτε	ὄντα	ἀστρονομικῶτατον	ἡμῶν	καὶ	περὶ	φύσεως	τοῦ	παντὸς	εἰδέναι	μάλιστα	ἔργον	πεποιημένον,	πρῶτον	λέγειν	ἀρχόμενον	ἀπὸ	τῆς	τοῦ	κόσμου	γενέσεως,	τελεωτᾶν	δὲ	εἰς	ἀνθρώπων	
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From	 this	 passage	we	 can	 tell	 that	 Timaeus’	 cosmology	 and	 Critias’	 Athens-Atlantis	 story	stand	 together	 in	 response	 to	 Socrates’	 request.	 Socrates	makes	 it	 clear	 that	what	he	wants	 to	hear	about	is	the	martial	performance	of	the	best	kind	of	city,	which	includes	the	citizens’	martial	behaviour	 and	negotiation	 skills	 that	would	 reflect	 positively	 on	 their	 education	 and	 training.9	Bearing	Socrates’	 request	 in	mind,	his	 interlocutors	 arrange	a	plan	of	 accounts	 that	 covers	 the	origin	of	the	cosmos,	the	nature	of	human	beings,	and	the	characteristics	of	the	ideal	citizens,	so	as	to	fulfill	Socrates’	wish.	It	is	understandable	that,	in	order	that	the	characteristics	of	the	ideal	citizens	should	be	fully	illustrated,	an	account	of	the	origin	of	human	beings	is	both	desirable	and	suitable	as	a	preliminary	to	the	account	of	how	the	ideal	citizens	possessing	such	a	nature	were	educated,	trained	and	would	fare	in	war.	However,	does	such	a	preliminary	account	necessarily	have	to	include	the	origin	of	the	cosmos	as	in	Timaeus’	cosmology?	Considering	the	fact	that	the	cosmos	has	come	into	being	a	long	time	ago	before	the	existence	of	ancient	Athens,	what	does	the	origin	of	the	cosmos	have	to	do	with	the	characteristics	of	the	ancient	Athenian	citizens	and	their	corresponding	performance	in	war?	Before	 answering	 this	 question,	 one	 point	 worth	 stressing	 is	 that,	 at	 the	 moment	 when	Critias	introduces	the	overall	plan,	Timaeus’	cosmology	is	yet	to	be	delivered,	which	means	that,	within	the	dialogue,	the	structure	and	content	of	Timaeus’	cosmology	seems	to	be	determined	by	the	purpose	it	sets	out	to	serve,	not	the	other	way	round.	That	is	to	say,	Timaeus’	cosmology	does	not	aim	at	developing	an	account	of	the	origin	of	the	cosmos	per	se,	but	rather	is	motivated	by	the	construction	of	a	complete	demonstration	of	the	ideal	city	and	citizens	in	action	from	the	outset.	This	being	 the	case,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	suggest	 that,	 through	Critias’	 introduction	of	 the	overall	plan,	Plato	is	encouraging	his	readers	to	understand	the	cosmology	Timaeus	is	about	to	present	not	 only	 as	 an	 account	 of	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 entire	 cosmos	 but	 also	 as	 an	 account	 that	 is	fundamentally	 politically	 oriented	 in	 terms	of	 its	 connection	 to	Critias’	 and	 Socrates’	 accounts.	More	importantly,	Socrates’	comments	on	Critias’	plan,	i.e.	‘a	complete	(τελἐως),	brilliant	banquet	of	speeches	(τῶν	λὀγων),’10	 indicate	that	a	demonstration	of	a	mobile	political	constitution	that																																																																																																																																																															φύσιν.	ἐμὲ	δὲ	μετὰ	τοῦτον,	ὡς	παρὰ	μὲν	τούτου	δεδεγμένον	ἀνθρώπους	τῷ	λόγῳ	γεγονότας,	παρὰ	σοῦ	δὲ	πεπαιδευμένους	διαφερόντως	αὐτῶν	τινας,	κατὰ	δὲ	τὸν	Σόλωνος	λόγον	τε	καὶ	νόμον	εἰσαγαγόντα	αὐτοὺς	ὡς	εἰς	δικαστὰς	ἡμᾶς	ποιῆσαι	πολίτας	τῆς	πόλεως	τῆσδε	ὡς	ὄντας	τοὺς	τότε	Ἀθηναίους,	οὕς	ἐμήνυσεν	ἀφανεῖς	ὄντας	ἡ	τῶν	ἱερῶν	γραμμάτων	φήμη,	τὰ	λοιπὰ	δὲ	ὡς	περὶ	πολιτῶν	καὶ	Ἀθηναίων	ὄντων	ἤδη	ποιεῖσθαι	τοὺς	λόγους.	9	 Cf.	Tim.	19b3-c8.	10	 Cf.	Tim.	27b7-8.	
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contains	 cosmology	 is	 to	 be	 regarded	 as	 ‘complete’.	 In	 other	 words,	 if	 Timaeus	 and	 Critias	provide	 Socrates	with	 a	discourse	of	 the	 ideal	 city	 in	 action	without	 a	 cosmological	 account,	 it	might	be	possible	that	such	a	discourse	is	not	complete.11	 This	is	also	a	claim	that	cosmology	is	essential	to	the	overall	demonstration.	The	essential	status	of	a	cosmological	account,	I	think,	lies	in	 the	 fact	 that	 Plato	wants	 the	 nature	 of	 human	 beings	 to	 be	 examined	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	origin	of	the	cosmos	as	a	whole.	That	is,	to	develop	a	sufficiently	comprehensive	understanding	of	 the	nature	of	human	beings	requires	the	 investigation	not	only	of	what	the	nature	of	human	beings	is	but	also	of	why	and	how	the	nature	of	human	beings	became	as	it	is.	And	the	knowledge	of	 the	 latter	can	only	be	grasped	by	the	 inspection	of	 the	origin	of	 the	human	race,	which	 is	an	integral	part	of	the	origin	of	the	cosmos	as	a	whole.	That	is	to	say,	the	nature	of	human	beings	is	rooted	 in	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 cosmos	 and	 thus	 a	 cosmological	 account	 is	 indispensable	 in	understanding	the	coming-into-being	of	such	a	nature.	According	 to	Critias’	plan,	 the	origin	of	human	beings	serves	as	a	connecting	 link	between	Timaeus’	 cosmology	 and	 Critias’	 Athens-Atlantis	 story.	 Timaeus’	 cosmology	 fits	 in	 the	 overall	demonstration	 in	 that	 the	origin	of	 the	cosmos	as	a	whole	contains	 the	origin	of	human	beings	and	the	nature	of	human	beings	needs	to	be	understood	under	the	framework	of	cosmogony.	And	the	 Athens-Atlantis	 story	 can	 only	 be	 presented	 after	 Timaeus’	 cosmology,	 for	 the	 education,	training,	and	warfare	of	the	ideal	citizens	should	be	presented	in	the	context	of	an	understanding	of	 the	nature	of	human	beings.	The	reason	 for	such	an	arrangement	of	 speeches	 is	 that	a	good	political	constitution	should	be	established	as	aiming	at	the	best	 interest	of	 its	citizens,	and	the	best	interest	of	the	citizens	is	decided	by	the	very	nature	of	them	as	human	beings,	which	has	its	origin	 in	the	origin	of	the	cosmos	as	a	whole.	Therefore,	 the	origin	of	the	cosmos	is	necessarily	significant	 for	 the	 Athens-Atlantis	 story	 in	 that	 the	 knowledge	 of	 cosmogony	 provides	 a	cosmological	perspective	 for	 the	understanding	of	 the	nature	of	human	beings,	 the	very	nature	that	underpins	the	political	structure	of	a	good	city	such	as	ancient	Athens.																																																									11	 The	Timaeus	is	seen	as	part	of	the	Timaeus-Critias	trilogy,	which	is	in	fact	unsatisfactorily	incomplete.	The	Critias	was	left	unfinished	(breaking	off	in	mid-sentence	after	14	Stephanus	pages)	and	the	Hermocrates	was	never	composed	(not	mentioned	in	the	prelude	in	the	Timaeus	but	in	the	Critias	108a-b).	Here	I’m	not	saying	that	the	dialogue	would	be	complete	as	long	as	it	includes	Timaeus’	cosmology;	rather	my	point	is	that	as	introduced	in	the	prelude,	the	demonstration	(Timaeus’	and	Critias’)	is	expected	to	be	complete	and	such	completion	cannot	be	fulfilled	without	Timaeus’	cosmological	monologue.	Furthermore,	if	the	dialogue	were	ever	to	be	complete,	it	had	to	include	Timaeus’	cosmology,	but	not	the	other	way	round.	But	the	theme	of	my	thesis	is	not	about	politics	after	all,	so	I	will	not	be	talking	about	the	Atlantis	story	told	in	the	Critias	in	detail	but	rather	mention	it	as	reference	wherever	it	is	necessary.	
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On	 the	basis	of	 the	above	observations,	we	can	now	claim	that	 the	 teleology	operating	at	the	level	of	Demiurgic	creation	is	congruous	with	the	political	orientation	at	the	level	of	Timaeus’	cosmological	narration.	This	 is	because	human	beings	are	 integral	 to	 the	 cosmos,	 and	 thus	 the	kind	 of	 goodness	 the	 cosmos	was	 created	 to	 strive	 for	 is	 also	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 for	which	 the	human	race	was	constructed.	In	this	case,	a	political	constitution	aiming	at	goodness	for	human	beings	is	equally	aiming	to	contribute	to	overall	goodness.	It	follows	that	not	only	the	nature	of	human	beings	but	also	the	nature	of	a	political	constitution	should	be	understood	in	the	context	of	 cosmogony	 and	 cosmology,	 for	 the	 ends	 of	 an	 ideal	 city	 consist	 in	 its	 contribution	 to	 the	realization	of	overall	cosmic	goodness.	As	I	have	pointed	out	at	the	very	beginning	of	this	chapter,	the	study	of	the	mortal-immortal	nature	 of	 human	 beings	 requires	 the	 understanding	 of	 both	 the	 cosmological	 context	 within	which	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 human	 race	 is	 demonstrated	 and	 the	 political	 context,	 i.e.	 the	Timaeus	discourse	as	a	whole,	to	which	the	account	of	human	origin	and	nature	is	integral.	Now	with	the	foregoing	observations	in	place,	we	can	conclude	that,	first	of	all,	the	investigation	of	the	cosmic	and	 political	 teleology	 behind	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 human	 race	 is	 of	 benefit	 to	 the	 study	 of	 the	immortal-mortal	 nature	 of	 human	 beings.	 Secondly,	 the	 account	 of	 the	 origin	 and	 nature	 of	human	 beings	 may	 in	 turn,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 reflect	 on	 the	 teleology	 underlying	 the	 creative	decisions	of	the	Demiurge,	and	on	the	other	hand,	be	indicative	of	the	natural	characteristics	of	the	 ideal	 citizens.	 This	 is	 because,	 firstly,	 the	 cosmic	 teleology	 demonstrated	 in	 Timaeus’	cosmology	 is	congruous	with	the	political	 teleology	underlying	his	narration.	And	secondly,	 the	origin	 and	 nature	 of	 the	 human	 race	 is	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 Timaeus’	 cosmological	 discourse.	Bearing	 those	 conclusions	 in	 mind,	 I	 now	 proceed	 to	 look	 at	 the	 teleology	 illustrated	 in	 the	
Timaeus	 that	 underlies	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 cosmos	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 political	constitution.	
1.2	Αἰτία	and	intentional	teleology	
Timaeus’	 cosmology	 is	 teleological,	 of	 the	 sort	 that	 is	 called	 intentional	 teleology	 or	unnatural	 teleology,12	 for,	 throughout	 his	 cosmogonic	 monologue,	 Timaeus	 has	 repeatedly																																																									12	 Cf.	Lennox	(1985).	
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demonstrated	 that	 the	 Demiurge	 or	 the	 lesser	 gods	 endowed	 a	 cosmic	 part	 with	 this	 or	 that	attribute	in	order	that	such-and-such	a	certain	end	should	be	met.	Τhis	end	is	regarded	as	αἰτία	of	 the	 coming-into-being	 of	 that	 cosmic	 part,	 in	 a	 sense	 that	 the	 structure	 or	 property	 of	 that	cosmic	part	 is	coming	to	be	for	the	sake	of	the	results.13	 In	this	section,	I	want	to	consider	and	distinguish	 the	 specification	 of	 the	 causal	 accounts	 Plato	 offers	 in	 Timaeus’	 cosmological	monologue	 by	 making	 a	 comparison	 with	 those	 in	 the	 Phaedo.14	 The	 justification	 for	 making	such	 a	 comparison	 between	 the	Phaedo	 and	 the	Timaeus	 is	 that	 the	 two	 dialogues	 differ	 from	each	other	in	perspectives	and	emphases,	so	that	the	comparison	between	them	will	help	us	to	discover	 if	 Plato	 had	 ever	 endowed	 the	 word	 αἰτία	 with	 a	 distinctive	 connotation	 under	 the	framework	of	cosmological	teleology.	In	the	Timaeus,	Plato	distinguishes	two	kinds	of	causes,	primary	causes	(αἰτία)	and	auxiliary	causes	 (ξυναίτια).	 The	 primary	 causes	 are	 those	 which	 possess	 intelligence	 and	 thus	 fashion	what	is	beautiful	and	good,	and	the	auxiliary	causes	are	those	which,	without	the	persuasion	and	guidance	 of	 intelligence,	 produce	 only	 random	 and	 disorderly	 effects	 every	 time. 15 	 The	distinction	made	in	the	Timaeus,	 I	 think,	echoes	what	is	said	in	the	Phaedo.	 In	Socrates’	 famous	autobiography,	he	distinguishes	the	cause	(τὸ	αἴτιον)	from	that	without	which	the	cause	would	not	 be	 able	 to	 act	 as	 a	 cause	 (ἐκεῖνο	 ἄνευ	 οὖ	 τὸ	 αἴτιον	 οὐκ	ἄν	ποτ᾽εἴη	 αἴτιον)	 (99b).	 Socrates	explains	his	distinction	by	pointing	out	that	it	is	not	his	physical	constitution	(bones,	sinews,	and	so	on)	that	is	causing	him	to	sit	in	the	prison;	but	instead,	his	belief	that	to	stay	in	prison	is	more	right	and	honorable	than	to	escape	and	run	away.	The	latter	is	the	correct	answer	to	the	question	why	 Socrates	 is	 sitting	 in	 the	 prison.	 Here	 Socrates	makes	 a	 very	 clear	 statement	 about	what	cannot	be	counted	as	causes:	when	he	says	that	those	that	can	both	serve	as	the	explanation	of	one	thing	and	of	its	opposite	should	not	be	regarded	as	the	cause	of	that	thing,16	 that	is,	Socrates’	bodily	 constitution	of	bones	and	 sinews	would	have	helped	him	run	away	 to	Megara	 if	he	had	decided	against	staying.	This	requirement	for	what	makes	a	satisfactory	causal	account	became	clear	to	Socrates	as	he	sought	for	a	true	teleological	or	causal	account	in	his	study	of	the	natural																																																									13	 Cf.	Furley	(1996)	60.	14	 I	personally	take	the	viewpoint	that	the	Timaeus	is	later	than	the	Phaedo.	For	the	debate	about	the	place	of	the	Timaeus	in	the	order	of	Platonic	dialogues,	see	Zeyl	(2000)	xvi-xx,	Cooper	(1997)	xii-xviii,	Owen	(1965),	Cherniss	(1965),	and	Brandwood	(1992).	15	 Cf.	Tim.	46e.	16	 Cf.	Sedley	(1998)	121.	
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philosophers.	 Unfortunately,	 according	 to	 Socrates,	 these	 natural	 philosophers	 generally	 take	physical	and	material	phenomena,	sounds,	air,	hearing	and	so	on,	as	true	causes	(ἀληθῶς	αἰτίας).	The	 same	 worry	 is	 described	 in	 the	 Timaeus,	 where	 it	 is	 said	 that	 most	 people	 think	 those	phenomena	that	produce	effects	like	cold	or	heat,	compactness	or	dispersal,	are	the	true	causes	of	all	things	(46a-d).	T.	 K.	 Johansen	 has	 noticed	 a	 difference	 of	 terminology	 between	 the	 Phaedo	 and	 the	
Timaeus.17	 In	 the	 Phaedo,	 Socrates	 claims	 that	 it	 is	 absurd	 to	 call	 those	 material	 or	 physical	explanations	 causes	 (Phd.	 99a).	 On	 the	 contrary,	 later	 in	 the	Timaeus,	 Plato	 indeed	 calls	 those	material	 or	 physical	 explanations	 ‘co-causes’	 (ξυναίτια).	 The	 reason	 for	 the	 terminological	change,	 is	 because	 in	 the	 Phaedo,	 before	 Socrates	 moves	 on	 to	 his	 second	 journey	 (δεὐτερον	πλοῦν),	he	 fails	 to	 find	out	 the	true	causes,	and	without	the	attendance	of	any	true	causes,	 it	 is	problematic	 to	 call	 those	 material	 explanations	 causes	 of	 anything,	 since	 they	 are	 necessary	conditions	which	 serve	 the	 achievement	 of	 the	 true	 cause.	Whereas,	 in	 the	Timaeus,	 Plato	 has	explicitly	explained	what	the	true	causes	are.	Therefore,	calling	those	that	are	under	the	guidance	of	true	causes	and	assist	in	fulfilling	the	true	causes	‘co-causes’	will	not	provoke	any	confusion,	as	long	as	one	bears	in	mind	a	very	clear	understanding	of	the	difference	between	primary	causes	and	auxiliary	causes.	Besides	 Johansen’s	plausible	 explanation,	 I	want	 to	 add	 that	different	 terminologies	might	also	 be	 rooted	 in	 the	 different	 emphases	 and	 contexts	 of	 the	 Phaedo	 and	 the	 Timaeus.	 In	 the	
Phaedo,	 in	Socrates’	 first	 journey,	as	he	studies	Anaxagoras’	natural	philosophy,	he	moves	from	expecting	 some	 satisfactory	 explanation	 through	 mind	 to	 becoming	 disappointed	 about	Anaxagoras’	 descent	 to	 material	 causes	 (97c-98e).	 In	 fact,	 before	 he	 continues	 his	 reading	 of	Anaxagoras,	Socrates	has	already	presumed	some	criteria	for	establishing	true	causes.	All	things	are	 under	 the	 arrangement	 of	 Intelligence	 (νοῦς)	 (97c),	 and	 a	 true	 cause	 should	 be	 able	 to	explain	why	something	is	as	it	is	of	necessity	(ἀνάγκην)	and	why	it	is	better	(ἄμεινον)	for	it	to	be	so	(97e).	And	when	he	finds	that	Anaxagoras’	causes	fall	back	to	the	material	level	and	turn	out	to	fail	to	meet	his	criteria,	Socrates	decides	to	assert	that	they	are	not	true	causes	at	all:	to	call	those	
things	causes	 is	 too	absurd	 (99a).	The	example	given	by	Socrates	himself,	 that	his	 sitting	 in	 the	prison	 rather	 than	 running	 away	 is	 not	 the	 result	 of	 his	 bodily	 constitution	but	 because	of	 his																																																									17	 Cf.	Johansen	(2008)	104.	
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intelligent	 decision,	 shows	 us	 his	 preference	 for	 intelligent	 explanations	 as	 true	 causes	 over	physical	 ones.	 But	we	 still	 cannot	 confirm	what	 true	 causes	 really	 are,	 because	 from	 Socrates’	preference	we	can	only	 learn	 that	he	 thinks	 true	causes	must	relate	 to	 intelligence,	and	rejects	the	use	of	material	or	physical	explanations	as	 true	causes.	 I	 think	 the	significance	of	Socrates’	first	journey	into	Anaxagoras’	natural	philosophy	is	not	to	actually	develop	any	causal	theory	but	rather	to	rule	out	bewildering	elements;	that	is	to	say,	its	real	achievement	is	to	eliminate	natural	philosophy’s	 explanations	 from	 being	 real	 or	 true	 causes.	 And	 only	 with	 such	 a	 premise	 can	Socrates	 begin	 his	 second	 ‘sailing’,	 seeking	 for	 a	 causal	 account	 among	non-material	 elements.	That	is	why	he	does	not	call	the	things	without	which	a	cause	would	not	be	able	to	act	as	a	cause	‘causes’,	for	he	is	rejecting	them.	The	context	is	utterly	different	in	the	Timaeus.	The	subject	of	the	Timaeus	is	cosmic	creation,	and	for	an	integrated	story	of	cosmic	creation	it	is	not	sufficient	only	to	present	what	has	come	to	be	out	of	the	causative	activity	of	the	Demiurge,	but	a	comparable	exposition	of	how	things	have	come	 to	 be	 as	 such	 physically	 is	 also	 required.	 Thus	 the	 accounts	 in	 the	Timaeus	 contain	 the	formation	 of	 immortal	 souls	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 physical	 things.	 Furthermore,	 fully	 half	 of	Timaeus’	monologue	 is	 concerned	with	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 cosmos’	 physical	 body,	which	 clearly	shows	that	the	material	account	has	equal	importance	with	the	intelligent	account.	So	it	is	not	a	surprise	that	when	he	comes	to	analyze	the	causal	account	of	something,	both	its	intellectual	and	material	aspects	should	be	taken	into	consideration.	Another	difference	between	the	Phaedo	and	the	Timaeus	with	regard	to	the	causal	account	is	in	 their	 emphases.	 In	 the	 Phaedo,	 the	 specification	 of	 causes	 is	 under	 discussion,	 and	 the	emphasis	 of	 this	 discussion	 is	 on	 categorizing	 various	 kinds	 of	 explanations	 and	 finding	 out	among	 them	which	 kind	 is	 qualified	 to	 be	 considered	 a	 true	 cause,	 while	 in	 the	 Timaeus,	 the	distinction	 of	 causes	 is	 straightforwardly	 offered	 without	 any	 further	 discussion	 about	 the	distinction	itself.	Previous	to	the	distinction,	Timaeus	explains	in	detail	how	the	eyes	possess	the	physical	 power	 of	 sight	 (45b-46a).	 Immediately	 following	 his	 introduction	 of	 the	 difference	between	primary	and	auxiliary	causes,	he	analyzes	the	intelligent	purpose	of	sight	as	the	primary	cause.	Furthermore,	Timaeus	reminds	his	audience	that	other	bodily	functions	have	come	to	be	out	of	similar	causes:	that	is,	the	pursuit	of	the	good.	In	my	opinion,	Timaeus’	introduction	of	the	distinction	of	causes	 is	not	merely	 for	 the	sake	of	making	such	a	distinction.	Despite	setting	up	
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the	pursuit	of	the	good	as	the	general	primary	cause	of	everything,	a	particular	bodily	organ	has	its	 own	 corresponding	 function,	 and	 through	 the	 assistance	 of	 such	unique	 functions	 a	 human	being	 shall	 enjoy	 his	 own	 appropriate	 way	 of	 pursuing	 the	 general	 good.	 That	 the	 Demiurge	endowed	bodily	organs	with	particular	functions	so	that	they	can	contribute	to	fulfill	the	greater	goodness	should	also	be	accounted	as	a	true	cause.	Take	eyes	and	ears	for	instance:	through	the	function	 of	 sight	 and	 hearing,	men	 can	 learn	 harmony	 from	 observing	 the	 orbits	 of	 stars	 and	listening	to	proper	music.	That	eyes	and	ears	have	particular	ways	of	achieving	the	good	should	also	be	regarded	as	true	causes	of	why	the	god	created	the	human	race	with	eyes	and	ears.	I	shall	talk	about	this	in	more	detail	in	the	following	discussion.	In	brief,	in	the	Phaedo,	Plato’s	aim	is	to	find	out	what	a	 true	cause	 is,	whereas	 in	 the	Timaeus	he	already	has	 the	answer	and	wants	 to	enquire	 further	 into	 the	 particular	 causes	 of	 a	 certain	 thing	 from	 both	 primary	 and	 auxiliary	perspectives.	This	is	why	it	is	fine	to	have	auxiliary	causes	in	the	Timaeus	but	not	in	the	Phaedo.	As	 to	 the	discussion	of	primary	 (or	 ‘true’)	 causes,	 I	 think	 the	emphasized	aspects	 are	also	slightly	different	when	we	compare	the	Phaedo	and	of	the	Timaeus.	In	the	Phaedo,	Socrates	in	his	‘second	journey’	defines	a	‘true	cause’	as	follows:	‘if	F	things	are	(or	become)	F	because	of	F’	—	or	as	more	 subtly	 formulated	by	D.	N	 Sedley,	 ‘that	 F	 things	 should	be	made	F	by	 the	presence	of	something	which	essentially	brings	the	Form	F-ness	with	it’.18	 I	 think	the	Phaedo	 focuses	more	on	the	‘formal’	aspect	of	causation.	That	is	to	say,	the	proposition	‘F	things	are	F	because	of	F’	is	based	 on	 two	 premises:	 1)	 F	 things	 are	 or	 exist	 or	 have	 come	 to	 be	 already,	 and	 2)	 F	 things	manifest	the	properties	that	qualify	them	to	be	named	F	after	the	Form	of	F-ness.	For	example,	snow	and	fire	exist,	and	snow	is	cold	and	fire	hot.	The	question	the	Phaedo	asks	is	why	snow	is	cold	and	fire	is	hot,	but	the	existence	itself	of	snow	and	fire	remains	outside	its	area	of	concern.	Instead,	 the	 existence	 of	 snow	 and	 fire	 is	 taken	 for	 granted	 by	 Socrates	 and	 his	 companions.	Throughout	 the	 entire	 Phaedo,	 the	 creative	 agency	 or	 action	 is	 absent.	 This	 absence	 might	suggest	 that	 in	 the	 Phaedo	 there	 is	 no	 need	 to	 discuss	 the	 existence	 of	 things.	 	 This	 may	 be	because	 the	objects	 that	 the	Phaedo	wants	 to	discuss	all	 exist	already,	and	 thus	any	discussion	concerning	the	causes	of	those	things	 is	based	on	the	fact	that	they	are	being	as	such,	not	 from	the	perspective	 that	 they	 come	 to	 be	 as	 such	 from	non-existence.	 	 On	 the	 contrary,	 that	 other	perspective	is	the	very	one	from	which	the	Timaeus	expounds	its	account	of	creation.	At	Timaeus																																																									18	 Cf.	Sedley	(1998)	115.	
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28a4-6	Plato	says	that	‘everything	that	comes	to	be	must	of	necessity	come	to	be	by	the	agency	of	some	 cause	 (ὑπ᾽αἰτίου),	 for	 it	 is	 impossible	 for	 anything	 to	 come	 to	 be	without	 a	 cause’.	 The	
Timaeus	focuses	on	answering	the	question	why	and	how	things	come	to	be:	the	emphasis	there	is	 on	 the	process	 of	 creation.	Taking	 the	 snow	and	 fire	 example	 again,	 the	 causal	 question	 the	
Timaeus	would	ask	is	why	such	things	as	snow	and	fire	should	be	created	and	come	to	be	as	they	are.	 As	I	have	argued	above,	I	think	that	Plato’s	unique	perspective	on	causes	in	the	Timaeus	 is	founded	on	the	idea	that	the	particular	good	something	being	designed	to	pursue	should	also	be	categorized	as	a	primary	cause	of	that	thing.	Like	I	mentioned	in	previous	discussion,	both	eyes	and	 ears	 serve	 the	 purpose	 of	 discovering	 the	 harmony	 from	 the	world	 in	which	we	 live	 and	applying	 it	 to	 the	 transformation	of	 our	 own	understanding.	Nevertheless,	 eyes	 and	 ears	were	created	differently.	Eyes	were	given	the	capacity	of	sight,	by	which	we	might	observe	the	orbits	of	intelligence	in	the	heavens	(47b).	And	then	we	could	invent	number	and	the	idea	of	time	and	begin	inquiring	about	the	universe:	a	pursuit	that	 leads	us	eventually	to	philosophy	(47a).	Ears	were	 assigned	 the	 capacity	 of	 hearing,	 by	 which	 we	might	 listen	 to	 logos,	 music,	 and	 rhythm	(47c-d).	 And	 then	we	 could	 learn	harmony	 from	 sounds	 and	 express	 harmony	 through	 sound,	and	by	such	means	we	could	find	an	ally	in	sound	who	assists	us	in	stablizing	our	own	internal	orbits	(47d-e).	This	example	of	eyes	and	ears	may	suggest	that,	from	the	perspective	of	creation,	especially	when	explaining	a	certain	thing’s	coming	to	be,	it	may	not	be	sufficient	merely	to	say	that	the	creation	of	something	is	for	the	pursuit	of	the	good;	instead,	the	explanation	needs	to	be	specific.	 While	 the	 pursuit	 of	 good	 is	 no	 doubt	 the	 true	 cause	 of	 eyes,	 and	 does	 explain	 the	purpose	the	existence	of	eyes	serves,	still	it	fails	to	give	an	explanation	why	eyes	were	created	as	eyes,	not	ears,	since	the	same	cause	can	well	explain	the	existence	of	ears	and	other	bodily	organs.	My	point	is	that	the	pursuit	of	good	is	unquestionably	the	primary	and	true	cause,	but	that	when	it	comes	to	seeking	a	causal	account	for	a	particular	thing	a	satisfactory	answer	needs	to	be	more	precise.	Now	based	on	the	unique	perspective	of	the	Timaeus	that	I	have	analyzed	previously,	I	want	to	 investigate	 what	 primary	 causes	 and	 auxiliary	 causes	 are,	 using	 the	 example	 of	 eyes	 and	eyesight.	 Let’s	 begin	with	 auxiliary	 causes.	 If	 we	 eliminate	 the	 creative	 activities	 of	 the	 lesser	gods	 from	 Timaeus’	 description	 of	 the	 construction	 of	 eyes	 (45b-46a),	 the	 whole	 account	
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becomes	a	mere	collection	of	mechanical	principles	describing	how	the	gods	took	advantage	of	diverse	 properties	 of	 solids	 to	 make	 them	 serve	 the	 function	 of	 sight:	 the	 properties	 which	explain,	 for	 example,	 how	 images	 are	 produced	 in	mirrors	 or	 in	 any	 other	 reflecting	 surfaces	(46a-c).	 The	 explanation	 of	 images	 is	 a	 very	 good	 example	 that	 shows	 the	 mechanical	 and	automatic	processes	at	work	in	cases	of	interaction	between	physical	properties.	Such	a	process	itself	lacks	a	purpose	and	has	no	essentially	different	effects	on	the	results.	The	images	of	object	A	and	object	B	produced	in	a	mirror	are	essentially	the	same,	since	they	are	both	the	reflections	of	 something.	 Likewise,	 Socrates’	 bodily	 constitution	 can	 be	 employed	 in	 the	 service	 both	 of	staying	in	prison	sitting	and	running	away	to	Megara.	Nevertheless,	it	is	at	least	fair	to	claim	that	it	 is	 the	mechanical	process	that	produces	the	 images	of	object	A	and	B,	and	that	 it	 is	Socrates’	bodily	 constitution	 that	 enables	 him	 to	 remain	 sitting.	 As	 Plato	 admits,	 the	 auxiliary	 causes	(ξυμμεταίτια)	give	the	eyes	the	power	of	sight	(46e).	I	think	the	auxiliary	causes	of	a	thing	being	F	in	the	Timaeus	refer	to	those	that	at	the	material	level,	or	physically,	enable	the	existence	of	a	thing	as	F	and	the	manifestation	of	its	F-ness.	A	corresponding	question,	taking	for	instance	the	example	of	the	eyes,	is	what	the	physical	constitution	of	eyes	might	be,	and	what	the	mechanical	principle	 of	 eyesight	 is.	 According	 to	 the	 Timaeus,	 the	 auxiliary	 causes	 are	 ‘employed	 in	 the	service	 of	 the	 god	 as	 he	 does	 his	 utmost	 to	 bring	 to	 completion	 the	 character	 of	what	 is	most	excellent’	 (56c-d).	As	 I	have	argued	previously,	 the	pursuit	of	good	 is	 the	primary	cause	 for	all	things	in	a	general	sense,	but	when	it	comes	to	inquiry	about	a	certain	object,	the	causal	account	should	be	 able	 to	 explain	what	 specific	purpose	 the	 coming-to-be	of	 this	object	 is	 supposed	 to	fulfill	 in	order	 to	 achieve	 the	ultimate	purpose	of	making	 the	 cosmos	as	 good	and	excellent	 as	possible.	If,	therefore,	we	are	to	ask	a	corresponding	question	about	the	primary	cause,	taking	the	sight	example	again,	it	may	be	what	the	particular	good	that	eyes	bring	forth	was	for	the	god	who	created	them.	
1.3	The	conception	of	divine	craftsmanship	
In	 the	 above	 section,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 αἰτία	 denotes	 not	 only	 cosmic	 goodness	 as	 the	ultimate	 cause	 of	 and	 purpose	 for	 the	 coming-into-being	 of	 things	 but	 also	 the	 particular	explanatory	account	of	how	things	come	to	be	as	things	which	could	fulfill	their	particular	roles	
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in	contributing	to	cosmic	goodness.	And	we	can	notice	that	there	is	always	a	creative	agency19	 in	the	causal	account.	In	this	section,	I	will	focus	on	discussing	the	concept	of	divine	craftsmanship.	As	we	can	see,	 in	Timaeus’	 cosmological	monologue,	he	offers	a	discourse	of	how	a	divine	craftsman	 or	 the	 Demiurge	 (ὁ	 δημιουργός)	 created	 the	 cosmos	 by	 endowing	 the	 pre-cosmic	chaos	with	goodness	and	order.	He	 transformed	 the	pre-cosmic	disorder	 into	materials	 for	 the	construction	of	 corporeal	entities,	 that	 is,	 the	whole	cosmic	body	 to	which	an	 immortal	 cosmic	soul,	 constructed	by	 the	Demiurge	himself,	was	bound.	Thus	came	 into	being	 the	cosmos	as	an	eternal	 living	creature.	And	the	Demiurge	also	created	the	celestial	stars	and	the	 lesser	gods	to	whom	he	then	gave	the	task	of	creating	the	human	race	and	other	mortal	creatures	to	house	the	individual	 immortal	 souls	 he	 himself	 constructed.	 Readers	 since	 Plato’s	 own	 time	 have	 been	arguing	 whether	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 divine	 craftsman	 is	 indispensable	 in	 Timaeus’	 cosmological	framework.	Some	scholars	suggested	that	 the	Demiurge	can	be	equated	with	other	elements	 in	Timaeus’	 cosmology,20	 since	 some	 of	 the	 terminologies	 employed	 by	 Timaeus	 to	 portray	 the	Demiurge’s	 creative	 actions,	 for	 example,	 that	 the	 Demiurge	 used	 a	 mixing	 bowl	 (ἐπὶ	 τὸν	πρότερον	κρατῆρα)	to	create	the	immortal	souls,21	 if	read	literally,	which	would	entail	that	the	Demiurge	used	a	bowl	as	the	container	to	create	the	cosmic	soul,	would	only	produce	absurdities,	whereas	a	metaphorical	reading	can	explain	away	such	absurdities.	Thus	how	far	are	we	to	take	the	conception	that	the	cosmos	was	created	by	the	Demiurge	seriously?	Was	there	really	a	divine	craftsman	 at	 all,	 the	 one	who	 brought	 the	 cosmos	 into	 being	 a	 certain	 numbers	 of	 years	 ago,	along	 with	 time	 itself?	 Or	 is	 the	 Demiurge	 merely	 a	 metaphorical	 figure	 Timaeus	 employs	 to	serve	a	pedagogical	purpose22	 so	 that	readers	might	understand	more	easily	 the	causal	role	of	Intelligence	in	the	cosmos	that	has	existed	always	and	will	exist	for	an	infinite	time	span?	The	 exposition	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 Demiurge	 brings	 about	 the	 investigation	 of	 another	controversial	issue,	that	is,	whether	the	cosmos	was	created	chronologically	as	having	a	temporal																																																									19	 Timaeus	has	used	the	singular	‘god’	in	describing	the	creation	of	the	cosmic	body	(27a-34b),	cosmic	soul	(34c-37c),	and	individual	immortal	souls	(41a-b).	And	he	has	made	it	really	clear	in	41a-d	that	the	agency	who	created	the	human	body	was	the	lesser	gods.	However,	he	uses	indiscriminately	the	singular	‘god’	and	plural	‘gods’	as	the	creator/creators	of	the	human	body.	Cf.	singular	46e,	71a,	74d;	plural	47c,	75b,	77a.	Cf.	Gerson	(1990),	pp268,	note	87.	20	 For	the	view	that	the	Demiurge	is	reducible	to	one	of	the	other	elements	in	Timaeus’	cosmology,	see	Archer-Hind	(1888)	38-40,	to	the	cosmic	soul;	Cornford	(1937)	37-38,	to	the	Reason;	Perl	(1998);	for	an	argument	that	the	Demiurge	represents	no	more	than	an	impersonal	intelligent	causation,	see	Carone	(2005)	chapter	2.	For	the	arguments	for	the	Demiurge’s	irreducibility,	see	Robinson	(1993),	Broadie	(2012)	chapter	1.	 	21	 Cf.	Tim.	41d4.	22	 Cf.	Aristotle,	On	the	Heavens	279b32-280a1.	
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beginning.23	 That	 the	 cosmos	 has	 a	 genetic	 origin	 is	 significant	 for	 the	 conception	 of	 divine	craftsmanship	in	that,	as	Sedley	concludes,	the	former	serves	as	an	indispensable	premise	for	the	latter.24	 Sedley	 takes	 Timaeus’	 words	 at	 28c2-3	 as	 specific	 to	 the	 coming-into-being	 of	 the	cosmos	and	 infers	 from	 it	 that	 the	cosmos	having	a	beginning	 is	 the	 sufficient	 condition	of	 the	cosmos	having	a	craftsman.	And	whether	or	not	the	former	is	also	a	necessary	condition	of	the	latter,	the	same	conclusion	can	be	reached.	I	agree	with	Sedley’s	interpretation.	And	additionally,	I	 want	 to	 lay	 some	 emphasis	 on	 the	 intentional	 perspective	 of	 the	 teleology	 illustrated	 by	Timaeus.	 In	 my	 view,	 Timaeus’	 words	 at	 28c2-3	 cannot	 be	 read	 alone	 but	 belong	 to	 his	comprehensive	 reasoning	 from	 28a4	 to	 29a6.	 And	 the	main	 point	 Timaeus	 tries	 to	 convey	 in	those	 lines	 is	not	merely	that	the	cosmos	having	a	genetic	origin	entails	 its	having	a	craftsman,	but	 more	 importantly	 that	 a	 beautiful	 cosmos	 such	 as	 ours	 coming	 into	 being	 at	 a	 temporal	beginning	 entails	 that	 the	 well-intentioned	 Demiurge	 implanted	 goodness	 and	 order	 to	 the	pre-cosmic	 chaos	 modelling	 after	 the	 Forms.25	 I	 shall	 elaborate	 my	 point	 in	 the	 following	discussion.	For	the	sake	of	clarity,	I	quote	Timaeus’	words	at	28a4-29a6	in	full.	Now	everything	that	comes	to	be	must	of	necessity	come	to	be	by	the	agency	of	some	cause,	for	it	is	impossible	for	anything	to	come	to	be	without	a	cause.	So	whenever	the	craftsman	looks	at	what	is	always	changeless	and,	using	a	thing	of	that	kind	as	his	model,	reproduces	its	form	and	character,	then,	of	necessity,	all	that	he	so	completes	is	beautiful.	But	were	he	to	look	at	a	thing	that	has	been	begotten,	his	work	will	lack	beauty.	Now	as	to	the	whole	heaven,	or	world	order	–	let’s	just	call	it	by	whatever	name	is	most	acceptable	in	a	given	context	–	there	is	a	question	we	need	 to	 consider	 first.	 This	 is	 the	 sort	 of	 question	one	 should	begin	with	 in	 inquiring	 into	 any	subject.	Has	it	always	been?	Was	there	no	origin	from	which	it	came	to	be?	Or	did	it	come	to	be	and	take	its	start	from	some	origin?	It	has	come	to	be.	For	it	is	both	visible	and	tangible	and	it	has	a	body	–	and	all	things	of	that	kind	are	perceptible.	And,	as	we	have	shown,	perceptible	things	are	grasped	by	opinion,	which	 involves	sense	perception.	As	such,	 they	are	 things	 that	come	to	be,	things	 that	 are	 begotten.	 Further,	we	maintain	 that,	 necessarily,	 that	which	 comes	 to	 be	must	come	to	be	by	the	agency	of	some	cause.	Now	to	find	the	maker	and	father	of	this	universe	is	hard	enough,	 and	even	 if	 I	 succeeded,	 to	declare	him	 to	everyone	 is	 impossible.	And	 so	we	must	 go	back	and	raise	this	question	about	the	universe:	which	of	the	two	models	did	the	maker	use	when	he	fashioned	it?	Was	it	the	one	that	does	not	change	and	stays	the	same,	or	the	one	that	has	come	to	be?	Well,	if	this	world	of	ours	is	beautiful	and	its	craftsman	good,	then	clearly	he	looked	at	the	eternal	model.	But	if	what	it’s	blasphemous	to	even	say	is	the	case,	then	he	looked	at	one	that	has																																																									23	 For	a	discussion	of	Neoplatonic	exegeses	of	cosmogony,	see	Phillips	(1997).	For	a	discussion	of	difficulties	raised	by	a	literal	chronological	reading,	see	Dillon	(1997)	and	Tarán	(1972).	24	 Cf.	Sedley	(2007)	105-106.	25	 In	this	chapter,	I	will	not	be	talking	about	the	nature	of	the	Forms	per	se,	but	only	the	paradigmatic	function	of	the	Forms	in	Timaeus’	cosmology.	For	discussion	of	the	nature	of	the	Forms	in	the	Timaeus	particularly,	see	Ostenfeld	(1997)	and	Ferber	(1997).	
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come	to	be.	Now	surely	it’s	clear	to	all	that	 it	was	the	eternal	model	he	looked	at,	 for,	of	all	the	things	that	have	come	to	be,	our	world	is	the	most	beautiful,	and	of	causes	the	craftsman	is	the	most	excellent.26	From	this	passage	we	can	see	that	Timaeus’	argument	is	as	follows.	First	of	all,	he	comes	up	with	 a	 generic	 reasoning27	 about	 the	 cause	 of	 things	 that	 come	 to	 be	 (28a4-b2),	 that	 is,	everything	that	comes	to	be	must	have	a	cause,	and	those	whose	cause	is	a	craftsman	looking	at	the	 changeless	 model	 and	 reproducing	 them	 are	 of	 necessity	 beautiful,	 otherwise	 not.28	 This	serves	as	a	paradigm	for	the	later	argument	of	the	specific	case	of	cosmic	creation.	As	for	the	cosmos,	there	are	two	statements	Timaeus	takes	as	self-evident	facts	that	he	uses	as	the	premises	of	his	reasoning.	One	is	that	the	cosmos	is	visible,	tangible,	and	has	a	body,	and	thus	 is	perceptible	 (28b7-c1).	The	other	 is	 that	 the	 cosmos	within	which	he	and	his	 audiences	live	 is	 the	 most	 beautiful	 (29a5),	 which	 is	 a	 plain	 fact	 to	 Timaeus.	 From	 the	 first	 statement	Timaeus	infers	that	the	cosmos	has	an	origin	from	which	it	came	to	be	(28b7,	28c2-3),	based	on	the	distinction	he	makes	between	being	and	becoming	and	their	respective	methods	of	cognition	at	27d6-28a4.	That	is	to	say,	things	that	come	to	be	are	grasped	by	opinion,	and	the	development	of	 opinions	 involves	 sense	 perception	 (28a2-3),	 which	means	 that	 things	 that	 come	 to	 be	 are	perceptible.	Now	since	the	cosmos	 is	perceptible,	 it	must	belong	to	things	that	come	to	be,	and	thus	has	come	to	be	having	a	cause.	At	this	point,	we	cannot	yet	claim	that	the	cosmos	came	to	be																																																									26	 πᾶν	δὲ	αὖ	τὸ	γιγνόμενον	ὑπ΄	αἰτίου	τινὸς	ἐξ	ἀνάγκης	γίγνεσθαι·	παντὶ	γὰρ	ἀδύνατον	χωρὶς	αἰτίου	γένεσιν	σχεῖν.	ὅτου	μὲν	οὖν	ἂν	ὁ	δημιουργὸς	πρὸς	τὸ	κατὰ	ταὐτὰ	ἔχον	βλέπων	ἀεί͵	τοιούτῳ	τινὶ	προσχρώμενος	παραδείγματι͵	τὴν	ἰδέαν	καὶ	δύναμιν	αὐτοῦ	ἀπεργάζηται͵	καλὸν	ἐξ	ἀνάγκης	οὕτως	ἀποτελεῖσθαι	πᾶν·	οὗ	δ΄	ἂν	εἰς	γεγονός͵	γεννητῷ	παραδείγματι	προσχρώμενος͵	οὐ	καλόν.	ὁ	δὴ	πᾶς	οὐρανὸς	ἢ	κόσμος	ἢ	καὶ	ἄλλο	ὅτι	ποτὲ	ὀνομαζόμενος	μάλιστ΄	ἂν	δέχοιτο͵	τοῦθ΄	ἡμῖν	ὠνομάσθω	-	σκεπτέον	δ΄	οὖν	περὶ	αὐτοῦ	πρῶτον͵	ὅπερ	ὑπόκειται	περὶ	παντὸς	ἐν	ἀρχῇ	δεῖν	σκοπεῖν͵	πότερον	ἦν	ἀεί͵	γενέσεως	ἀρχὴν	ἔχων	οὐδεμίαν͵	ἢ	γέγονεν͵	ἀπ΄	ἀρχῆς	τινος	ἀρξάμενος.	γέγονεν·	ὁρατὸς	γὰρ	ἁπτός	τέ	ἐστιν	καὶ	σῶμα	ἔχων͵	πάντα	δὲ	τὰ	τοιαῦτα	αἰσθητά͵	τὰ	δ΄	αἰσθητά͵	δόξῃ	περιληπτὰ	μετ΄	αἰσθήσεως͵	γιγνόμενα	καὶ	γεννητὰ	ἐφάνη.	τῷ	δ΄	αὖ	γενομένῳ	φαμὲν	ὑπ΄	αἰτίου	τινὸς	ἀνάγκην	εἶναι	γενέσθαι.	τὸν	μὲν	οὖν	ποιητὴν	καὶ	πατέρα	τοῦδε	τοῦ	παντὸς	εὑρεῖν	τε	ἔργον	καὶ	εὑρόντα	εἰς	πάντας	ἀδύνατον	λέγειν·τόδε	δ΄	οὖν	πάλιν	ἐπισκεπτέον	περὶ	αὐτοῦ͵	πρὸς	πότερον	τῶν	παραδειγμάτων	ὁ	τεκταινόμενος	αὐτὸν	ἀπηργάζετο͵	πότερον	πρὸς	τὸ	κατὰ	ταὐτὰ	καὶ	ὡσαύτως	ἔχον	ἢ	πρὸς	τὸ	γεγονός.	εἰ	μὲν	δὴ	καλός	ἐστιν	ὅδε	ὁ	κόσμος	ὅ	τε	δημιουργὸς	ἀγαθός͵	δῆλον	ὡς	πρὸς	τὸ	ἀίδιον	ἔβλεπεν·	εἰ	δὲ	ὃ	μηδ΄	εἰπεῖν	τινι	θέμις͵	πρὸς	γεγονός.	παντὶ	δὴ	σαφὲς	ὅτι	πρὸς	τὸ	ἀίδιον·	ὁ	μὲν	γὰρ	κάλλιστος	τῶν	γεγονότων͵	ὁ	δ΄	ἄριστος	τῶν	αἰτίων.	οὕτω	δὴ	γεγενημένος	πρὸς	τὸ	λόγῳ	καὶ	φρονήσει	περιληπτὸν	καὶ	κατὰ	ταὐτὰ	ἔχον	δεδημιούργηται·	27	 I	hold	the	view	that	when	ὁ	δημιουργός	and	παράδειγμα	are	first	introduced	here	at	28a4-b2,	the	distinction	between	a	craftsman’s	using	a	changeless	and	a	generated	paradigm	is	to	be	a	generic	consideration	with	no	specific	reference	to	the	Demiurge,	the	cosmic	creator.	Cf.	Dillon	(1997)	28	and	Broadie	(2012)	27-28.	28	 On	a	nuance	of	the	reading	of	28a4-b2	that	whether	the	cause	of	things’	coming-into-being	refers	to	a	craftsman	exclusively,	I	consult	and	agree	with	Johansen’s	interpretation.	Cf.	Johansen	(2004)	70-71.	When	and	only	when	the	cosmos	exhaustively	contains	all	those	come	to	be	can	the	cause	of	things	coming	to	be	and	a	craftsman	(the	Demiurge)	exclusively	refer	to	each	other.	However	at	the	time	when	Timaeus	is	making	this	generic	reasoning,	the	argument	of	the	cosmos	being	the	exhaustive	All	is	yet	to	be	developed.	For	the	view	that	the	cosmos’	being	the	All	is	an	unspoken	premise	throughout	the	Timaeus,	see	Broadie	(2012)	8.	
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by	a	craftsman.	This	 is	because,	 in	his	generic	reasoning,	Timaeus	does	not	say	that	everything	that	comes	to	be	must	come	to	be	by	a	cause,	where	this	cause	is	necessarily	a	craftsman	doing	such	 and	 such.	 Rather,	 he	 only	 says	 that	when	 the	 cause	 is	 a	 craftsman	 doing	 such	 and	 such,	things	would	 come	 to	 be	 accordingly.	 Therefore	what	 Timaeus	 has	 confirmed	 so	 far	 is	merely	that	 the	cosmos	has	a	genetic	cause	rather	 than	 that	 the	cosmos	has	a	craftsman	as	 its	genetic	cause.	One	point	worth	stressing	is	that	the	significance	of	Timaeus’	generic	reasoning	at	28a4-b2	is	 that	he	emphasizes	 the	relationship	between	 the	craftsmanship	and	 the	outcome	 in	 the	case	where	the	cause	is	a	craftsman.	That	is,	first	of	all,	only	when	the	craftsman	looks	at	the	kind	of	model	 that	 is	 always	 changeless	 can	 the	 product	 he	 reproduces	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 beautiful.	 By	contrast,	if	the	craftsman	chooses	the	kind	of	model	that	belongs	to	the	realm	of	coming	to	be,	the	outcome	would	necessarily	turn	out	to	be	lacking	in	beauty.	The	point	here	is	that	the	craftsman	gets	 to	 choose	 between	 two	 alternatives,	which	means	 the	 intention	 of	 the	 craftsman	matters.	Secondly,	 the	 craftsman	 also	 has	 to	 reproduce	 the	 form	 and	 character	 (28a8)	 of	 the	model	 he	looks	at	so	that	what	he	creates	would	resemble	the	model	and	become	beautiful.	This	means	the	calculation	and	deliberation	of	the	craftsman	matters	during	the	creation.	In	a	word,	when,	and	only	 when,	 a	 craftsman	 chooses	 the	 changeless	 model	 to	 look	 at	 and	 reproduce	 its	 form	 and	character	in	his	product	can	the	outcome	turn	out	to	be	beautiful.	Now	since	the	cosmos	within	which	Timaeus	and	his	audience	live	is	the	most	beautiful,	the	coming-into-being	of	the	cosmos	must	then	be	the	result	of	the	Demiurge’s	creating	it	looking	at	the	eternally	changeless	model	(29a6-b1).29	 What	the	Demiurge	confronted	before	his	creation	was	 the	 pre-cosmic	 chaos,	 which	 was	 in	 discordant	 and	 disorderly	 motion	 (30a4-5).	 But	 the	Demiurge	wanted	everything	to	be	good	and	nothing	to	be	bad	so	 far	as	possible	 (30a2-3),	so	he	chose	 to	 implant	 order	 in	 the	 pre-cosmic	 disorder.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 is	 because	 of	 the	 good	intention	 of	 the	 Demiurge	 that	 he	 chose	 what	 is	 eternally	 changeless	 as	 the	 model	 for	 the	creation	 of	 the	 cosmos.	 And	 it	 was	 through	 careful	 calculation	 that	 the	 Demiurge	 decided	 to	create	the	cosmos	as	a	living	creature	with	intelligence	(30b1-6).																																																									29	 This	argumentation	is	valid	only	when	everything	coming	to	be	by	the	hand	of	a	craftsman	looking	at	the	changeless	model	is	the	sufficient	and	necessary	condition	of	it	coming	to	be	as	beautiful.	However,	Timaeus’	reasoning	at	28a6-b1	only	confirms	that	the	former	is	the	sufficient	condition	of	the	latter	and	is	implicit	about	whether	or	not	it	is	also	a	necessary	condition.	 	
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From	 this	 argument,	 we	 can	 claim	 that	 the	 cosmos’	 having	 a	 generic	 origin	 is	 indeed	required	for	the	conception	of	a	divine	craftsmanship.	And	through	further	inspection,	I	point	out	that	the	coming-into-being	of	the	cosmos	as	the	most	beautiful	living	creature	is	the	result	of	the	Demiurge’s	 good	 intention	 of	 hoping	 everything	 to	 be	 as	 good	 as	 possible	 and	 his	 creative	activities	 accordingly.	 In	 short,	 Timaeus’	 teleology	 is	 intentional,	 in	 a	 sense	 that	 the	 goodness	throughout	 the	 cosmic	 creation	 and	 within	 the	 cosmos	 itself	 as	 a	 whole	 is	 endowed	 by	 the	intention	 of	 the	 Demiurge.	 And	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 Demiurge	 itself	 is	 granted	 by	 the	 cosmos’	having	a	temporal	beginning.	Thus	we	can	say	that	the	Demiurgic	teleology	demands	a	temporal	beginning,	in	other	words,	the	cosmos’	having	a	temporal	beginning	is	needed	in	order	to	ground	the	 teleological	 structure	 of	 the	 cosmos,	 in	 which	 a	 good	 Demiurge	 aiming	 for	 goodness	 is	essential.	Yet	an	objection	arises	from	the	very	idea	that	the	cosmos	has	a	temporal	beginning.	That	is,	if	 time	 came	 to	 be	 along	 with	 the	 cosmos	 and	 before	 the	 cosmos	 came	 to	 be	 there	 was	 the	pre-cosmic	 chaos,	 then	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 pre-cosmic	 chaos	 existed	 at	 a	 time	 before	 time.	 By	showing	 that	 the	 time	created	by	 the	Demiurge	can	be	understood	as	measurable	 time,	Vlastos	has	plausibly	explained	away	this	incompatibility.30	 It	is	worth	adding	to	Vlastos’	viewpoint	that	the	creation	of	time	itself	is	indicative	of	the	Demiurge’s	creative	decision.	For,	on	the	one	hand,	time	came	into	being	as	an	earthly	moving	image	of	the	eternal	nature	of	the	changeless	model	the	Demiurge	looked	at	(37d5).	On	the	other	hand,	time	was	made	according	to	number	(37d6),	which	 was	 bestowed	 by	 the	 Demiurge	 upon	 pre-cosmic	 matter	 (53b4-5)	 in	 order	 to	 replace	disorder	 with	 order.	 Therefore,	 the	 creation	 of	 time	 exemplifies	 the	 Demiurge’s	 intention	 of	making	the	cosmos	resemble	the	eternal	model	as	closely	as	possible	(37d2).	The	 good	 intention	 of	 the	Demiurge	 is	 challenged	 by	Tarán.31	 He	 asks	why	 the	Demiurge	would	allow	the	existence	of	the	pre-cosmos,	and	why,	if	time	is	associated	with	number	marked	by	 celestial	 motions,	 the	 Demiurge	 imposed	 order	 on	 pre-cosmic	 disorderly	 motions	 at	 that	specific	point	of	 their	motive	 succession?	Why	not	 another	 ‘time’	 so	 that	 time	 could	begin	 five	minutes	 earlier	 or	 later.	 I	 shall	 use	 an	 analogy	 to	 answer	 this	 question.	 Imagine	 drawing	 a	coordinate	 in	void	space.	After	drawing	the	coordinate,	 there	 is	a	point	 in	this	space	which	 is	a																																																									30	 Cf.	Vlastos	(1939)	and	(1964).	31	 Cf.	Tarán	(1972)	381.	
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starting	 point	 (0,	 0,	 0)	 and	 every	 position	 in	 this	 space	 is	 then	 defined	 accordingly.	 Tarán’s	question,	if	applied	in	this	coordinate	analogy,	is	like	this:	why	didn’t	we	choose	the	point	(2,	2,	2)	to	be	the	starting	point	(0,	0,	0)?	And	the	answer	simply	is	because	there	was	no	point	(2,	2,	2)	or	any	other	point	at	all	in	this	space	because	no	position	was	differentiated	before	the	coordinate	came	into	being.	Likewise,	there	could	not	be	another	point	of	time	that	was	five	minutes	earlier	than	the	beginning	of	time	before	there	was	a	beginning	of	time	as	being	a	reference.	And	this	is	the	 very	 reason	 why	 the	 cosmos’	 having	 a	 temporal	 beginning	 is	 so	 significant,	 because	 it	necessitates	the	causal	role	of	the	Demiurge	who	introduced	order	and	beauty	to	the	pre-cosmos,	which	is	in	turn	essential	to	the	teleological	framework	of	Timaeus’	cosmology.	
1.4	Conclusion	
In	this	chapter,	I	have	looked	at	the	cosmological	background	the	Timaeus	shows	from	the	perspectives	 of	 cosmology,	 teleology,	 and	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 Demiurge.	 First	 of	 all,	 from	 the	cosmological	 perspective,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 since	 the	 creation	 of	 human	 race	 is	 part	 of	 the	creation	 of	 the	 cosmos	 as	 a	 whole,	 the	 study	 of	 human’s	 twofold	 nature	 of	 mortality	 and	immortality	 must	 be	 undertaken	 in	 its	 cosmic	 context.	 In	 other	 words,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	discussion	of	the	constitution	of	human’s	body	and	soul	and	the	interaction	between	those	two	in	Chapter	2	and	3,	the	relationship	between	the	creation	of	human	race	and	that	of	the	cosmos	as	a	whole	 will	 necessarily	 be	 taken	 into	 consideration.	 Furthermore,	 I	 have	 also	 argued	 that	 the	teleology	operating	behind	the	creation	of	human	race	is	consistent	with	that	behind	the	creation	of	the	cosmos	as	a	whole.	So	we	can	claim	that	the	creation	of	the	human	race	is	essentially	in	the	service	of	 the	cosmic	goodness.	For	this	reason,	when	it	comes	to	Chapter	4’s	discussion	of	 the	teleology	of	the	creation	of	human	race	with	regard	to	Plato’s	account	of	human’s	twofold	nature	of	mortality	 and	 immortality	 and	 his	 attempt	 at	 bridging	 the	 gap	 between	 those	 two	 natures,	cosmic	 goodness	 as	 the	 ultimate	 creative	 purpose	 ought	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 an	 indispensable	contextual	element.	Secondly,	I	have	also	demonstrated	Timaeus’	distinctive	causal	account.	Timaeus’	teleology	is	 intentional	 and	Demiurgic,	 in	 a	 sense	 that	 all	 the	 cosmic	 creation	 is	 to	 serve	 the	purpose	 of	cosmic	goodness	and	perfection.	And	a	salient	feature	about	Timaeus’	teleology	is	that,	not	only	
	 24	
is	the	cause	why	something	comes	into	being	important,	but	the	creative	process	of	how	it	comes	into	being	in	order	to	fulfill	its	cause	of	being	created	is	also	significant.	It	is	because	the	creative	process	 of	 something	 reveals	 the	 particular	 good	 it	 is	 designed	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 overall	goodness.	Bearing	this	 in	mind,	Chapter	2	and	3	will	explore	how	the	Demiurge	bestowed	both	mortal	and	immortal	nature	upon	the	human	race,	and	Chapter	4	will	 investigate	the	particular	good	with	which	the	human	race	has	been	endowed	by	possessing	such	a	twofold	nature.	Thirdly,	 I	have	argued	 that	 the	Demiurge	plays	an	 indispensable	 role	 in	Timaeus’	account,	for	it	guarantees	that	the	result	of	cosmic	creation	is	good	and	perfect.	One	thing	to	be	stressed	is	that	I	have	not	and	will	not	discuss	what	the	Demiurge	is.	So	far,	I	have	confined	my	argument	to	that	there	is	and	needs	to	be	a	Demiurgic	element	in	Timaeus’	cosmic	creation,	because,	on	the	one	hand,	intentional	teleology	calls	for	a	premise	such	as	the	Demiurge,	and	on	the	other	hand,	that	the	cosmos	has	a	generic	origin	is	a	sufficient	condition	of	the	cosmos	having	a	craftsman.	In	Chapter	2	and	3,	the	discussion	of	the	materials	employed	to	be	the	component	of	humans’	body	and	 soul	 will	 also	 involve	 and	 further	 explore	 the	 necessity	 of	 the	 Demiurge	 in	 Timaeus’	cosmology.
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Chapter	2	The	physical	account	of	mortality	in	the	Timaeus	
Introduction	
The	main	question	of	the	overall	thesis	is	how	Plato	collapses	the	distance	between	human’s	mortal	and	immortal	nature.	To	answer	this	question,	it	requires	the	investigation	of	not	only	the	nature	of	mortality	but	also	 that	of	 immortality,	 and	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 two	as	well.	This	chapter	will	contribute	to	answering	the	main	question	by	looking	at	human’s	mortal	nature.	Since	it	is	obvious	that	the	immortal	nature	is	attributed	to	the	soul1	 and	the	mortal	nature	to	the	body	 due	 to	 the	 soul’s	 being	 indissoluble	 and	 the	 body’s	 being	 the	 very	 opposite,2	 then,	 to	develop	an	account	of	mortality	 is	 to	 look	at	 the	physical	 aspect	of	 a	human	being,	 that	 is,	 the	human	body	and	its	dissolubility.	Furthermore,	as	I	have	argued	in	the	first	chapter,	the	creation	of	the	human	race	is	an	essential	part	of	the	creation	of	the	cosmos	as	a	whole,	which	means	that	the	 investigation	 of	 the	 physicality	 of	 human	 body	 should	 not	 be	 conducted	 without	 the	consideration	 of	 its	 cosmological	 context.	 So,	 in	 short,	 this	 chapter	 aims	 to	 explore	 the	mortal	nature	of	human	race	 from	the	physical	perspective	of	 the	body.	The	 investigation	 involves	the	human	body’s	constitution,	exploring	how	the	mortal	nature	is	bestowed	to	the	human	race,	and	its	decomposition,	explaining	how	the	mortal	nature	manifests	itself	in	a	human	being.	 	As	 to	 the	 manifestation	 of	 mortality,	 it	 is	 commonly	 known	 that	 the	 mortal	 nature	 is	manifested	as	the	death	of	a	human	being.	And	death,	by	definition	(the	definition	according	to	Timaeus’	description	at	81b4-e5),	is	nothing	other	than	the	separation	of	the	soul	from	the	body.	That	 is	 to	say,	 to	understand	human	mortality	 thoroughly	also	calls	 for	 the	 investigation	of	 the	soul’s	departure	from	the	body,	which	in	turn	is	grounded	in	the	examination	of	the	relationship	between	the	soul	and	the	body.	Thus,	before	the	matter	of	immortality,	that	is,	the	constitution	of	the	 soul,	 is	 covered	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 in	 this	 chapter,	 I	 will	 confine	 my	 interpretation	 to	 matters	relating	only	to	the	physical	aspect	of	the	process	of	death,	and	leave	the	discussion	of	how	the	
																																																								1	 In	this	chapter,	I	speak	of	the	soul	indistinctively	(without	any	specific	reference	to	either	the	immortal	part	of	soul	or	the	tripartite	soul	as	a	whole)	only	for	the	sake	of	explanatory	purpose.	The	tripartite	nature	of	the	soul	illustrated	in	Timaeus’	cosmology	shall	be	discussed	in	Chapter	3	and	4.	2	 Cf.	Tim.	41b7-d3.	
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immortal	soul	interacts	with	the	mortal	body	in	the	following	chapter.	I	shall	start	with	a	brief	discussion	regarding	the	necessity	of	having	a	detailed	and	lengthy	account	of	mortality	 in	Timaeus’	narration,	by	comparing	Plato’s	 shifting	attitudes	 towards	 the	body	of	humans	in	the	Phaedo	and	Timaeus’	cosmology.	I	then	approach	the	matter	of	mortality	from	two	perspectives.	Firstly,	I	shall	examine	the	constitution	of	the	human	body,	in	terms	of	the	nature	of	the	materials	out	of	which	and	the	manner	in	which	the	human	body	was	constructed	as	dissoluble.	Since	the	materials	used	to	construct	the	human	body	are	the	same	as	those	of	the	cosmic	 body,	 that	 is,	 the	 four	 elemental	 solids,	 the	 investigation	 will	 turn	 to	 demonstrate	 the	constitution	of	the	elemental	solids	so	as	to	show	how,	at	the	micro-level,	mortality	is	bestowed	to	the	human	body	at	the	very	beginning.	Secondly,	I	investigate	the	physical	process	of	death	so	as	to	see	how	the	embodiment	and	departure	of	the	soul	relates	to	the	inevitable	dissolubility	of	the	human	body	and	the	subsequent	death.	
2.1	Mortality	in	the	Phaedo	and	the	Timaeus	
In	the	Phaedo,	apart	from	defining	death	as	the	body’s	coming	to	be	separated	by	itself	apart	from	 the	 soul	 and	 the	 soul’s	 coming	 to	be	 separated	by	 itself	 apart	 from	 the	body	 (64c),	 Plato	offers	no	further	details	about	how	such	separation	of	the	soul	and	the	body	happens	and	why	it	happens.	For	Socrates	in	the	Phaedo,3	 the	body	is	rather	a	concern,	for	it	might	very	likely	bring	contamination	to	the	soul	and	is	an	obstacle	for	the	soul	in	learning	the	truth.4	 He	encourages	his	audience	to	disdain	the	body	and	refrain	from	associating	themselves	with	it,	because	the	body	is	merely	 a	 disposable	 container	 for	 the	 soul.	 However,	 years,	 or	 perhaps	 decades	 later,	 in	 the	
Timaeus,	Plato	makes	a	very	explicit	explanation	of	the	physical	constitution	of	the	body5	 as	well	as	what	 happens	 before	 the	 dying	 process	 finally	 reaches	 the	 point	where	 the	 soul	 leaves	 the	body	(81b4-e5).	Then,	why	does	the	problem	of	mortality	suddenly	become	worth	discussing	in	the	Timaeus?	The	question,	I	suggest,	can	be	answered	from	two	perspectives,	that	is,	firstly,	from	the	perspective	that	concerns	the	cosmological	context	within	which	the	description	of	the	body																																																									3	 For	discussion	about	the	historical	vs.	Platonic	Socrates,	see	Chapter	1,	footnote	1.	4	 Cf.	Phd.	65b-67a.	5	 Cf.	Tim.	42e8-a4	and	44d3-45b2,	a	summary	of	the	lesser	gods’	constructing	the	human	body;	45b2-c2,	the	construction	of	the	eyes;	70a7-72d3,	the	construction	of	some	bodily	organs	that	house	the	mortal	parts	of	soul;	72e1-81e5,	the	construction	of	the	rest	of	the	body,	such	as	the	bowel,	the	marrow,	bones,	flesh,	sinew,	etc.	and	the	process	of	respiration	and	metabolism,	ageing	and	death.	
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and	 death	 is	 offered,	 and	 secondly,	 from	 the	 perspective	 that	 concerns	 the	 explanation	 of	mortality	 in	 its	 own	 right.	 The	 Phaedo’s	 entire	 discussion	 emphasizes	matters	 concerning	 the	soul.	Hence,	it	 looks	like	the	purpose	of	talking	about	death	is	only	to	introduce	the	key	subject	matter,	i.e.	the	immortality	of	the	soul	and	its	reincarnation,	along	with	the	problem	of	the	purity	of	the	soul	associated	with	it.	 In	this	case,	matters	concerning	the	body	or	death	by	themselves	are	 irrelevant	 and	 thus	 Plato	 is	 in	 no	 need	 of	 analyzing	 them	 in	 their	 own	 right.	 In	 contrast,	Timaeus’	 monologue	 is	 a	 discourse	 of	 cosmogony	 and	 cosmology	 and	 is	 thus	 composed	 of	accounts	concerning	the	coming	to	be	of	various	entities,	among	which	the	creation	of	the	human	race	is	one	of	the	indispensable	parts.	That	is	to	say,	it	is	rather	reasonable	that	Timaeus	includes	at	length	in	his	demonstration	the	construction	of	the	human	body,	along	with	its	birth,	growth,	and	 decay,	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 human	 race	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	 completed	 creation	 of	 the	cosmos	as	a	whole.6	 Furthermore,	as	I	have	pointed	out	in	Chapter	1,	to	develop	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	human	race,	it	calls	for	investigations	not	only	of	its	immortal	features	but	also	of	 its	mortal	 ones.	This	means	a	physical	 account	of	mortality	 is	necessary	 for	 the	overall	
Timaeus.	It	is	noticeable	that	Socrates’	attitude	of	contempt	towards	the	human	body	could	appear	to	discourage	interest	in	research	on	the	body.	And	Timaeus	also	claims	that	the	soul	feels	pleasure	when	it	 flies	away	from	the	body	(81d7-e1).	Socrates’	attitude	and	Timaeus’	assertion	together	prompt	the	following	question:	if	the	body	is	of	least	importance	and	it	would	be	a	better	thing	for	 the	soul	 to	be	 free	 from	the	connection	to	 the	body,	why	would	the	Demiurge,	who	wanted	everything	to	be	good	and	nothing	to	be	bad	if	possible	(30a2-3),	have	the	soul	embodied	in	the	first	place?	Is	it	possible	that	this	is	an	exemplification	of	the	limitation	of	the	Demiurge’s	creative	power	when	he	dealt	with	the	pre-cosmic	chaos?	Or	is	it	indicative	of	the	possibility	that	the	body	is	in	fact	of	some	use	to	the	soul	after	all?	But	if	it	is,	why	was	the	human	race	created	such	that	the	soul	would	eventually	 fly	away	 from	the	body	and	 leave	 it	 to	decompose?	Those	questions	cannot	be	answered	without	 the	knowledge	of	 the	constitution	of	 the	body,	 the	constitution	of	the	 soul	 (with	 reference	 to	 the	 elaboration	 in	 Chapter	 3),	 and	 the	 connection	 and	 the	disconnection	between	the	soul	and	the	body.	In	a	word,	in	order	to	understand	comprehensively	for	 what	 reasons	 the	 Demiurge	 endowed	 the	 human	 race	 with	 mortality,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to																																																									6	 Cf.	Tim.	41b7-c2.	
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develop	a	physical	account	of	mortality.	Nevertheless,	 from	the	above	argument,	we	can	see	that,	although	Timaeus	does	not	claim	that	the	body	is	as	significant	as	the	soul	to	a	human	being,	it	is	at	least	reasonable	to	suggest	that	Plato	has	changed	his	view	that	the	body	is	nothing	but	a	hindrance	to	the	soul.	This	means	that	the	 body	 might	 be	 of	 benefit	 to	 an	 embodied	 soul	 at	 some	 point,	 and	 might	 be	 able	 to	communicate	 with	 the	 soul	 and	 thus	 provides	 either	 help	 or	 harm	 to	 the	 soul.	 In	 conclusion,	Plato’s	 shifting	 attitude	 towards	 the	 mortal	 nature	 of	 human	 race	 in	 the	 Timaeus	 might	 be	indicative	that	he	does	not	declare	for	the	idea	that	there	is	an	utterly	unbridgeable	gap	between	the	body	and	soul,	not	at	least	in	Timaeus’	cosmological	context.	
2.2	The	constitution	of	the	human	body	
At	 the	 command	of	 the	Demiurge,7	 the	 lesser	 gods	 took	 over	 the	 task	 of	 constructing	 the	body	of	human	beings.	The	materials	they	used	to	create	the	human	body	were	borrowed	from	the	cosmic	body,	that	is,	the	elementary	solids	of	fire,	water,	air,	and	earth,	which	the	lesser	gods	intended	 to	 pay	 back	 at	 the	 very	 beginning.8	 This	 means	 that	 the	materials	 out	 of	 which	 the	human	 body	was	 constructed	 are	 the	 very	 same	materials	 out	 of	 which	 the	 cosmic	 body	was	created.	Consequently,	the	properties	that	are	attributed	to	the	cosmic	materials	can	equally	be	ascribed	to	the	materials	of	the	human	body.	This	being	the	case,	it	is	reasonable	to	suggest	that	the	physical	principles	operating	behind	the	cosmic	body	are,	 to	a	certain	degree,	applicable	 to	the	human	body.	This	suggestion	finds	supporting	evidence	in	the	fact	that	Timaeus	employs	the	inter-transformation	 of	 the	 four	 kinds	 of	 elementary	 solids	 as	 the	 most	 basic	 explanatory	principle	 not	 only	 to	 demonstrate	 various	 cosmic	 phenomena	 but	 also	 to	 account	 for	 the	construction	 and	 functions	 of	 different	 bodily	 organs	 and	 parts,	 along	 with	 their	 respective	physical	 processes. 9 	 That	 the	 explanation	 of	 the	 elementary	 solids	 and	 their	inter-transformation	 is	 applied	 consistently	 throughout	 Timaeus’	 cosmological	 account	 is	understandable,	for	everything	that	possesses	a	physical	body	is	integral	to	the	cosmic	body	and	
																																																								7	 Cf.	Tim.	41a-d.	8	 Cf.	Tim.	42e-43a.	9	 Cf.	Tim.	61e-63e,	the	perception	of	hot,	cold,	hard,	soft,	light,	and	heavy,	along	with	the	concept	of	down	and	up;	64a-65b,	the	nature	of	pleasure	and	pain;	77c-78e,	veins	and	irrigation	in	body;	78e-79e,	respiration;	80a-81e,	metabolism,	ageing,	and	death;	82a-86a,	diseases.	
	 29	
thus	is	necessarily	subject	to,	at	the	elemental	level,	the	very	same	physical	principles	operating	behind	the	cosmic	body.	For	this	reason,	it	is	justifiable	to	suggest	that	to	examine	the	materials	of	 the	 human	 body	 is	 to	 examine	 the	 materials	 of	 cosmic	 body,	 that	 is,	 the	 four	 kinds	 of	elementary	solids.	According	to	Timaeus’	demonstration	at	53c-55c,	the	four	kinds	of	elemental	solids,	i.e.	fire,	water,	 air,	 and	 earth,	 can	 be	 further	 separated	 into	more	 basic	 constituent	 parts,	 that	 is,	 two	kinds	 of	 triangles.	 This	means,	 the	 triangles	 are	 the	 originating	 principles	 of	 the	 four	 kinds	 of	elemental	 solids,	 and	 thus	 the	 ultimate	 constituent	materials	 of	 the	 cosmic	 and	 human	 bodies	alike.	 Considering	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 elemental	 triangles	 and	 solids,	 I	 shall	 not	offer	 a	 full	 and	 thorough	 discussion	 of	 the	 coming-into-being	 and	 nature	 of	 the	 elemental	triangles	 and	 solids.	 But	 instead,	 I	 shall	 confine	 my	 investigation	 to	 matters	 that	 provide	necessary	background	knowledge	to	the	examination	of	the	physical	account	of	bodily	mortality,	that	 is,	 the	destructibility,	 the	materiality,	and	the	structure	of	 the	triangles	and	four	elemental	solids.	I	will	explain	in	the	following	discussion	why	I	take	those	matters	as	most	important	and	essential	to	the	understanding	of	mortality.	Are	 the	 triangles	destructible	or	not?	This	question	naturally	 follows	on	 the	description	at	
Timaeus	 81d	 ‘they	 themselves	 (the	 triangles)	 are	 easily	 divided	 by	 those	 entering	 from	without’,10	 which	 seems	 to	 imply	 that	 the	 triangles	 can	 be	 further	 broken	 up	 and	 thus	 are	destructible.	 If	 they	 are,	 this	 might	 seem	 to	 lead	 to	 an	 inconsistency	 in	 the	 account.	 This	 is	because,	Timaeus’	 account	 (53c-54b)	 is	 not	 specific	whether	 or	not	 triangles	 can	be	 reborn	or	replenished.	So	the	triangles	were	presumably	perishable	and	there	were	no	new-born	triagnles,	then	the	sum	of	the	triangles	and	solids	would	get	smaller	and	smaller	as	the	result	of	their	being	destroyed	 by	 other	 triangles	 and	 solids,	 and	 given	 a	 long	 enough	 period	 of	 time,	 all	 triangles	would	 eventually	perish.	At	 last,	without	 any	 triangles	 and	 solids	 left,	 the	physical	 body	of	 the	cosmos	 would	 perish	 as	 well.	 This	 is	 however	 obviously	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 assumption,	expressed	 at	Timaeus	 36e,11	 that	 the	 cosmos	 as	 a	whole	 is	 imperishable.	 In	 that	 case,	 that	 the	triangles	are	destructible	disagrees	with	the	fact	that	the	cosmos	is	an	everlasting	creature	unless	of	course	the	triangles	are	somehow	to	be	reborn	or	replenished	to	compensate	for	earlier	losses.																																																									10	 αὐτὰ	δὲ	ὑπὸ	τῶν	ἔξωθεν	ἐπεισιόντων	εὐπετῶς	διαιρεῖται	11	 …	it	initiated	a	divine	beginning	of	unceasing,	intelligent	life	for	all	time.	
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Another	problem	raised	by	the	possibility	that	the	triangles	are	destructible	is	to	be	found	in	the	phrase	 ‘the	originating	principle	 (ἀρχἠν)	of	 fire	and	of	 the	other	bodies’	 (53d),	which	 I	 take	 to	imply	 that	 the	 triangles	 are	 indestructible	with	 reference	 to	 some	 similar	 usages	 of	 this	word	ἀρχή	 elsewhere	 in	 Timaeus	 and	 Phaedrus.	 At	 Phaedrus	 245d,	 Socrates	 says	 that	 an	 ἀρχή	 is	something	that	 is	without	coming	to	be	from	anything	else,	 it	 is	thus	necessarily	 indestructible,	for	otherwise	 the	mortal	 things	which	come	 to	be	 from	 it	would	eventually	cease	 to	come	 into	existence.	 And	 in	 the	 Timaeus,	 when	 using	 ἀρχή	 in	 just	 this	 sense,	 Plato	 uses	 it	 to	 indicate	indestructible	 entities,	 such	 as	 the	 model	 the	 cosmos	 comes	 to	 be	 after	 (28b),	 the	 God	 who	created	 the	 cosmos	 (29e),	 the	 subjugation	 of	 Necessity	 to	wise	 persuasion	 (48a),	 and	 so	 on.12	Therefore,	 ‘the	originating	principle’	 in	53d	can	be	meant	in	the	same	way	and	implies	that	the	triangles	 are	 indestructible,	 since	 there	 is	 nothing	 to	 show	 that	 ἀρχή	 in	 53d	 is	 being	 used	differently	from	the	other	cited	context.	But,	 is	 it	possible	that	Plato	could	really	be	making	the	opposite	 implication	 in	 the	 Timaeus?	 Or	 is	 there	 any	 interpretation	 that	 might	 reconcile	 our	reading	of	53d	and	81d?	R.	 J.	 Hankinson’s	 interpretaion	 of	 ἀρχή	 in	 the	 Phaedrus	 will	 be	 useful	 here.13	 Hankinson	offers	a	solution	to	the	problem	that	an	ἀρχή	itself	may	possibly	come	to	be	from	another	source.	He	suggests	 if	we	understand	the	ἀρχή	as	strictly	speaking	the	ἀρχή	of	some	property	or	some	particular	thing,	then	as	long	as	the	property	or	thing	exists,	this	ἀρχή	will	be	the	ultimate	cause	for	its	existence,	beyond	which	there	is	no	other	source.	This	definition	satisfies	the	description	in	 the	 Phaedrus.	 And,	 if,	 in	 the	 meantime,	 we	 see	 this	 ἀρχή	 not	 strictly	 but	 as	 something	individual	in	itself,	then	the	ἀρχή	can	indeed	come	to	be	from	another	source.	Here	is	an	analogy	to	help	understand	Hankinson’s	suggestion.	If	we	draw	a	straight	line	extending	from	a	point	on	a	coordinate	map,	 this	point	 then	can	be	 regarded	as	 the	ἀρχή	of	 this	 line	because	 it	defines	 the	starting	point	for	this	line,	and	as	long	as	we	have	this	line,	this	point	will	always	be	the	start	for	it	and	will	not	vanish.	And	as	to	the	point	itself,	it	comes	to	be	from	our	random	choice	of	position	on	the	coordinate	map.																																																									12	 Tim.	48b,	the	four	elemental	solids	in	the	sense	that	they’ve	been	mistaken	to	be	the	ἀρχή;	48c,	origin	or	ultimate	source	of	all	things.	The	Greek	word	ἀρχή	appears	in	the	Timaeus	28	times,	including	28b	(3	times),	29e,	48a,	48b	(4	times),	48c	(twice),	and	53d	(twice).	And	at	42e	and	79c,	ἀρχή	indicates	the	soul	particularly,	while	at	17b,	20a,	21d,	24b,	24b,	36e,	44a,	48d	(3	times),	48e,	55e,	57d,	69a,	69b,	73b,	73c,	79c,	80b,	89c,	90e,	it	simply	means	the	beginning.	13	 Cf.	Hankinson	(1988)	98-101.	
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Thus,	 when	 Plato	 presumes	 the	 triangles	 to	 be	 the	 ἀρχή	 of	 elemental	 solids,	 I	 think	 he	probably	means	that	the	triangles	are	indestructible	only	in	a	limited	sense,	that	is,	as	long	as	a	solid	 exists,	 its	 triangles	 are	 indestructible.	 In	 other	words,	 if	we	 imagine	 the	 triangles,	 in	 the	strict	sense,	as	the	ἀρχή	of	the	elemental	solids,	as	long	as	the	elemental	solids	exist,	the	triangles	will	be	the	ultimate	source	for	their	existence,	beyond	which	there	is	no	other	source.	In	this	case,	the	triangles	are	indestructible,	and	we	can	only	analyze	a	solid	into	triangles,	regardless	of	the	possibility	that	there	might	be	some	more	ultimate	component	(Tim.	53d).	But	in	the	meantime,	if	we	look	at	the	triangles	from	the	perspective	of	their	own	individual	existence	rather	than	as	the	originating	principle	of	elemental	solids,	 it	will	do	no	harm	to	the	prior	interpretation	if	we	admit	 that	 the	 triangles	 themselves	are	created	and	can	possibly	be	destroyed.	 In	 this	way,	we	eliminate	the	problem	of	potential	inconsistency	in	the	Timaeus,	that	is,	it	is	not	contradictory	to	think	of	 the	 triangles	as	 the	ἀρχή	of	 the	elemental	 solids	and	as	 to	be	destructible	at	 the	same	time.	That	the	triangles	are	indestructible	only	in	a	limited	sense,	i.e.	in	terms	of	being	the	ἀρχή	of	elemental	 solids,	 is	 not	 a	 strong	 claim	 in	 that	we	 are	 still	 confronted	with	 the	matter	 that	 the	triangles,	 being	 seen	 on	 their	 own,	 are	 indeed	 perishable.	 This	 entails	 that	 the	 cosmos	would	maintain	eternal	existence	if	only	the	triangles	could	be	reborn	or	repleanished.	I	will	deal	with	that	matter	by	examining	the	materiality	of	the	triangles	with	regard	to	how	the	triangles	came	to	be	in	the	first	place.	The	 reason	 why	 I	 think	 the	 triangles’	 materiality	 worth	 discussing	 is	 because,	 as	 I	 have	argued	above,	the	triangles	are	the	basic	components	of	the	human	body,	hence	it	is	the	triangles’	materiality	that	determines	the	materiality	of	the	human	body.	Since,	the	investigation	of	humans’	mortality	relies	on	the	study	of	 the	physicality	of	human	body,	 it	 is	 then	also	reasonable	to	say	that	the	understanding	of	the	physical	aspect	of	humans’	mortal	nature	is	grounded	in	that	of	the	triangles’	materiality.	Furthermore,	the	materiality	of	the	triangles	determines	the	materiality	of	the	marrow,	which	is	the	medium	that	binds	the	soul	to	the	body	(73b-c).	Our	understanding	of	the	 triangles’	materiality	will	 therefore	affect	 the	 future	discussion	of	how	the	soul	 is	bound	to	the	marrow,	whose	nature,	particularly	as	it	impacts	on	the	problem	of	the	body’	decomposition,	is	to	be	understood	in	the	light	of	how	we	understand	the	triangles’	materiality.	Many	 interpretations	 can	be	 sustained	 in	 the	debate	about	 the	materiality	of	 the	 triangles	
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and	thus	it	has	been	examined	from	various	perspectives.14	 It	will	become	a	digression	if	I	try	to	cover	all	the	perspectives	existing	literature	has	demonstrated.	But	from	the	point	of	view	of	my	overall	 argument,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 state	 my	 position	 on	 this	 issue	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 such	 a	statement	can	at	 least	help	to	solve	the	two	problems	raised	at	the	end	of	the	discussion	of	the	triangles’	 destructibility,	 and	 provides	 a	 coherent	 background	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	triangles’	nature,	and	how	they	 fit	 into	our	discussion	of	human	mortality.	Furthermore,	as	 the	triangles	are	also	the	materials	of	the	cosmic	body,	a	discussion	of	the	materiality	of	the	triangles	will	prepare	us	for	an	investigation	into	the	relationship	bwteen	human	beings	and	the	cosmos	and	the	teleology	operating	behind	the	human	race’s	being	created	as	both	mortal	and	immortal.	In	the	context	of	the	Timaeus,	what	does	it	mean	to	say	that	something	is	material?	Before	exploring	the	answer	to	that	question,	a	more	fundamental	problem	needs	to	be	dealt	with,	that	is,	is	it	even	approporiate	to	employ	the	concept	of	materiality	in	intepreting	Timaeus’	cosmology?	For,	 Timaeus’	 discourse	 does	 not	 involve	 the	 concept	 of	 materiality	 by	 itself.	 Instead,	 Plato	merely	claims	that	the	four	elemental	solids	have	bodily	form	(Tim.53c),	and	that	the	cosmos	as	a	whole	 is	 visible	 and	 tangible	 and	has	 a	body,	 in	other	words,	 perceptible	 (Tim.	 28b-c).	And	he	attributes	those	features	to	thing	that	comes	to	be	so	as	to	distinguish	it	from	those	which	always	is.	 ‘Materiality’,	 I	 think,	 is	merely	a	term	interpreters	employ	to	denote	those	features,	so	when	we	employ	this	term	in	the	discussion	related	to	the	Timaeus	we	should	refer	to	it	as	cautiously	in	a	restricted	sense	as	the	cosmological	context	allows.	Furthermore,	it	is	worth	emphasizing	that	it	is	not	the	same	to	say	that	the	elemental	solids	are	material	and	that	a	human	body	is	material.	As	we	can	see,	at	61e-63e	and	65c-68d,	Plato	elucidates	the	principle	of	sense	perception	using	the	 explanation	 of	 triangles	 and	 solids.	 From	his	 exposition	we	 can	 learn	 that	 sensation	 is	 the	result	of	the	movement	of	interaction	of	elemental	solids.	This	means	that	a	single	solids	does	not	possess	either	the	nature	of	being	perceptible	or	the	capacity	of	perceiving	on	the	one	hand	and	it	is	 the	movement	of	many	 triangles	and	solids	 that	enables	 the	act	of	 sense	perception	and	 the	attribute	of	being	perceptible	on	the	other.15	 This	being	the	case,	we	can	conclude	that	when	we	say	 that	 elemental	 solids,	 the	 human	 body,	 and	 the	 cosmos	 as	whole	 are	 all	material	 things	 it	means	that	they	all	possess	bodily	forms.	And	the	nature	of	being	perceptible	can	be	seen	as	the																																																									14	 For	various	interpretations	of	what	the	triangles	are	since	Antiquity,	see	Miller	(2003)	173-179.	 	15	 For	an	elaborate	argument	on	the	mechanical	principles	of	perceiving	and	being	perceptible,	see	Chapter	4,	4.1	Πάθημα	and	αἴσθησις.	
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movements	 of	 elemental	 solids	 on	 a	micro	 level	manifesting	 themselves	 in	 human	 and	 cosmic	body	on	a	macro	 level.	Then,	bearing	 in	mind	 that	 the	components	of	human	body	and	cosmic	body	arise	in	the	same	source,	that	anything	that	 is	made	out	of	the	same	source	as	the	human	body	can	interact	with	the	body,	and	thus	can	be	counted	as	visible,	tangible,	and	has	a	body,	in	other	words,	perceptible.	So	far,	I	have	argued	that	the	elemental	solids	being	material	means	they	have	bodily	forms,	and	 human	 body	 is	 also	 material	 since	 it	 is	 composed	 of	 elemental	 solids.	 And	 due	 to	 the	movement	of	 the	 interaction	of	elemental	solids,	human	body	then	possesses	sense	perception,	and	 thus	 the	 nature	 of	 being	 visible,	 tangible,	 and	 perceptible	 embodies	 the	materiality	 of	 the	elemental	 solids	 on	 a	 macro	 level.	 Now	 that	 we	 have	 defined	 materiality	 in	 Timaeus’	cosmological	context,	 it	seems	to	be	 inappropriate	 to	say	 that	 the	 triangles	are	material	 in	 that	sense,	since	Plato	does	not	mention	whether	or	not	the	triangles	themselves	possess	bodily	form	(53c).	This	being	the	case,	we	are	confronted	with	a	question:	is	it	possible	for	Timaeus	that	the	basis,	 i.e.	 the	 triangles,	 of	material	 existence,	 i.e.	 the	 four	 elemental	 solids,	 humans,	 etc.	 is	 not	themselves	exactly	material?	In	other	words,	is	it	possible	that,	in	the	Timaeus,	Plato	is	trying	to	blur	 the	 boudary	 line	 between	material	 and	 non-material	 existence	 by	 constructing	 elemental	solids	 that	 has	 depth	 out	 of	 the	 triangles?	 For	 Plato	 does	 not	 confirm	 that	 the	 triangles	constituting	 the	 elemental	 solids	 are	 two-dimensional	 existence	 but	 he	 use	 the	word	 ‘surface’	(βάσις,	53c)	to	refer	to	them.	Thus	it	is	open	to	discussion	whether	the	triangles	have	depth,	just	as	those	elemental	solids	the	former	constitute.	According	to	Timaeus,	the	Demiurge	gave	the	Receptacle	distinctive	shapes,	using	forms	and	numbers	to	create	the	triangles	and	solids	(53b).16	 This	seems	to	imply	that	the	Receptacle	is	the	substratum	 of	 the	 triangles	 and	 solids.	 From	 the	 description	 at	 52c,	 we	 can	 learn	 how	 the	Receptacle	 received	 the	 shapes,	 and	 thus	 understand	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 Receptacle	and	the	triangles	and	solids:	Since	 an	 image	 does	 not	 have	 as	 its	 own	 that	 which	 it	 has	 come	 to	 signify	 (an	 image	 is	invariably	 borne	 along	 to	 depict	 something	 else),	 it	 stands	 to	 reason	 that	 the	 image	 should																																																									16	 I	do	realize	that	the	description	of	52d-53a,	according	to	which	the	Receptacle	has	become	watery	and	fiery	and	received	the	character	of	earth	and	air	and	thus	been	agitating	itself	may	provoke	disagreement	on	the	understanding	of	what	the	nature	of	the	Receptacle	is	when	it	receives	the	distinctive	shapes	given	by	the	God.	However,	whatever	its	nature,	it	is	still	out	of	the	Receptacle	that	the	God	created	the	triangles	and	the	solids.	 	
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therefore	come	to	be	in	something	else,	somehow	clinging	to	being,	or	else	be	nothing	at	all.17	Plato	 himself	 employs	 the	 gold-moulding	 analogy	 (Tim.	 50a-b)	 to	 help	 his	 reader	 to	understand	how	it	works	to	create	a	triangle	out	of	the	Receptacle.18	 A	triangular	shape	modeled	(μεταπλάττων)	 cannot	 truly	be	a	geometrical	 figure,	 just	as	 there	 is	no	 such	 thing	as	a	perfect	geometrical	circle	in	the	world.	If,	however,	the	gold	did	not	exist	as	a	substrate	for	the	triangular	image	to	imprint	on,	the	modeled	triangular	shape	in	gold	could	not	have	come	to	be.	In	this	way,	the	 triangular	 shape	 requires	 a	 substance	 in	 order	 to	 fulfill	 its	 coming-into-being.	 I	 agree	with	most	of	Miller’s	 interpretation	of	 the	relation	between	the	 triangles	and	the	Receptacle,	 that	 is,	the	Receptacle	 is	both	 that	out	of	which,	 and	 in	which,	 the	 triangles	 come	 to	be.19	 To	be	more	precise,	when	 the	Demiurge	 used	 forms	 and	 numbers	 to	 shape	 the	 Receptacle,	 the	 Receptacle	turns	 out	 to	 have	 proportion	 and	 measure	 in	 itself,	 which	 manifests	 as	 distinct	 shapes	 like	triangles	and	solids,	but	also	be	at	the	same	time	intrinsically	itself,	the	Receptacle.20	 Hence,	the	Receptacle	 is	 that	out	of	which	 the	 triangles	 come	 to	be,	or	 the	 triangles	are	generated	 ‘in’	 the	Receptacle.	And	the	Receptacle	also	provides	a	fixed	site	(52b)	for	triangles	and	solids	that	come	to	be	since	the	Receptacle	receives	the	impressions	of	triangle	and	solids	by	its	being	shaped.21	However,	I	disagree	with	Miller’s	view	that	the	triangles	are	three-dimensional	existence,22	simply	because	such	view	is	contradictory	to	Timaeus’	claim	that	bodily	 form	has	depth,	depth	must	has	surface,	and	surface	is	bounded	by	triangles	(53c).	That	is,	admitting	the	triangles	have	depth	equates	with	saying	that	the	triangles	(the	most	elementary	ones,	not	those	composed	by	the	former)	consist	of	triangles,	which	is,	firstly,	in	opposition	to	the	claim	that	the	triangles	are	the	 ἀρχή;	 and	 secondly,	 in	 danger	 of	 endless	 regression	 in	 analyzing	 the	 coming-to-be	 of	 the	triangles.	My	point	of	 view	 is	 that,	 first	 of	 all,	 the	 triangles	Timaeus	 talks	 about	 are	not	 geometrical	figures;	 rather,	 they	 are	 the	 impression	of	 form	on	 the	Receptacle.	 For	 instance,	whenever	 the																																																									17	 ὡς	εἰκόνι	μέν͵	ἐπείπερ	οὐδ΄	αὐτὸ	τοῦτο	ἐφ΄	ᾧ	γέγονεν	ἑαυτῆς	ἐστιν͵	ἑτέρου	δέ	τινος	ἀεὶ	φέρεται	φάντασμα͵	διὰ	ταῦτα	ἐν	ἑτέρῳ	προσήκει	τινὶ	γίγνεσθαι͵	οὐσίας	ἁμωσγέπως	ἀντεχομένην͵	ἢ	μηδὲν	τὸ	παράπαν	αὐτὴν	εἶναι.	18	 For	a	reading	of	the	gold	analogy,	see	Mohr	(1978).	19	 Cf.	Miller	(2003)	186-195.	20	 For	more	discussion	on	the	nature	of	the	Receptacle,	see	Chapter	3,	3.1	The	construction	of	cosmic	souls.	21	 For	a	brief	introduction	of	the	Receptacle	and	space,	see	Zeyl	(2000)	lxi-lxiv;	for	the	discussion	of	it,	see	Archer-Hind	(1888)	182-187;	for	an	introduction	of	various	interpretations	of	Receptacle	and	space	among	ancient	and	modern	scholarship,	see	Miller	(2003)	19-36.	For	an	extensive	account	of	Receptacle,	see	Miller	(2003).	22	 Cf.	Miller	(2003)	178-185.	
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Receptacle	 receives	 an	 image,	 e.g.	 that	 of	 one	of	 the	 elementary	 triangles,	 a	 certain	part	 of	 the	Receptacle	has	been	occupied	by	this	image	and	has	thus	become	a	relative	fixed	or	determined	part	with	respect	to	other	parts.	And	it	is	situated	next	to	other	five	images	of	the	same	triangle	so	 as	 to	 constitute	 an	 image	 of	 an	 equilateral	 triangle,	 and	 this	 equilateral	 triangle	 image	neighbours	other	three	same	images	so	as	to	constitute	an	image	of	a	solid	of	fire.	This	is	how	the	Receptacle	receives	the	images	of	forms	of	triangles	and	solids,	and	then	the	impression	of	those	images	is	the	generation	of	triangles	and	solids	in	the	corporeal	realm.	In	the	fire	solid	case,	we	can	indeed	say	that	this	fire	solid	enjoys	bodily	form	and	has	depth	because	the	impression	of	the	image	 of	 the	 fire	 solid	 occupies	 a	 three-dimensional	 site.	 But	we	 cannot	 simply	 claim	 that	 the	triangles	are	two-dimensional	existence	because	they	also	occupy	space	of	the	Receptacle,	and	on	the	other	hand,	neither	can	we	simply	claim	that	 the	triangles	are	three-dimensional	existence,	for	 that	 is	 in	 opposition	 to	 Plato’s	 own	 demonstration	 of	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 triangles	 and	solids.	 So,	by	 saying	 that	 the	 triangles	are	 the	 impression	of	 forms	out	of	 the	Receptacle,	Plato	blurs	 the	boundary	between	 two-dimensional	 and	 three-dimensional	 existence.	 That	 is,	 on	 the	one	 hand,	 the	 triangles	 are	 neither	 geometrical	 figures	 nor	 three-dimensional	 existence	 in	 the	strict	sense,	while	on	the	other	hand,	the	triangles	are	the	embodiment	of	geometrical	triangles	in	the	Receptacle	and	can	be	seen	as	the	surface	of	elemental	solids	and	also	occupy	space	within	the	Receptacle.	As	to	whether	the	triangles	are	able	to	be	reborn	or	replenished,	according	to	Timaeus	50c,	the	image	of	form	enters	and	leaves	the	Receptacle,	making	the	impression	of	it	appear	different	at	different	times.	This	seems	to	imply	that	the	generation	of	the	triangles	does	not	happen	once	only,	 at	 the	 time	when	 the	Demiurge’s	 first	 creation	 of	 the	 triangles	 (53d)	 took	place;	 instead,	such	impressions	on	the	Receptacle	continuously	occur.	If	this	is	so,	even	though	some	triangles	will,	 after	 a	while,	 cease	 to	 be,	more	will	 generate	 by	 impression,	 and	 so	 the	 cosmos	will	 not	perish.	One	 thing	 worth	 emphasizing	 is	 that	 we	 can	 see	 Plato’s	 intention	 of	 collapsing	 the	 gap	between	 the	 Forms	 and	 the	 corporeal	 realm	 by	 introducing	 the	 conception	 of	 the	 Receptacle.	With	the	interference	from	the	Demiurge,	the	Receptacle	is	able	to	receive	images	of	the	Forms	and	 thus	 the	 impression	 of	 those	 images	 appears	 as	 things	 that	 come	 to	 be.	 However,	 Plato’s	language	is	rather	obscure	when	it	comes	to	the	description	of	the	Receptacle.	This	is	because,	I	
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think,	the	conception	of	the	Receptacle	is	very	difficult	to	grasp	in	its	own	right,23	 and	also	how	the	Demiurge	 enabled	 the	 impression	of	 images	 of	 the	 Forms	out	 of	 the	Receptacle,	 is	 beyond	human	reason,24	 as	we	can	find	no	trace	in	passages	relating	to	the	Receptacle.	I	have	so	far	argued	that	although	the	triangles,	taken	individually,	are	destructible,	they	as	a	whole	will	never	run	out	as	a	source	for	what	comes	to	be.	This	is	because	of	their	relationship	with	 the	 Receptacle.	 As	 for	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 elemental	 solids,	 I	 will	 attempt	 a	 detailed	description,	taking	the	solids	of	fire	as	my	example,	in	the	following	section.	
2.3	The	physical	process	of	death	
It	is	worth	looking	at	the	Timaeus’	description	of	death	(81b-e):	In	 every	 case,	whenever	 there	 is	more	 leaving	 a	 body	 than	 flowing	 in	 [to	 replenish	 it],	 it	diminishes;	whenever	 less,	 the	body	grows.	 So	while	a	 living	 thing’s	 constitution	 is	 still	 young,	and	 its	 elemental	 triangles	 are	 ‘fresh	 from	 the	 slips,’	 as	 it	were,	 the	 triangles	 are	 firmly	 locked	together,	 even	 though	 the	 frame	of	 its	 entire	mass	 is	pliable,	 seeing	 that	 it	has	 just	 lately	been	formed	from	marrow	and	nourished	with	milk.	Now	when	the	triangles	that	constitute	the	young	living	 thing’s	 food	 and	 drink	 enter	 its	 body	 from	 the	 outside	 and	 are	 enveloped	within	 it,	 the	body’s	 own	new	 triangles	 cut	 and	prevail	 over	 these	 others,	which	 are	 older	 and	weaker	 than	they	are.	The	living	thing	is	thus	nourished	by	an	abundance	of	like	parts,	and	so	made	to	grow	big.	But	when	the	roots	formed	by	the	triangles25	 are	slackened	as	a	result	of	numerous	conflicts	they	have	waged	 against	 numerous	 adversaries	 over	 a	 long	period	of	 time,	 they	 are	no	 longer	able	to	cut	up	the	entering	food-triangles	into	conformity	with	themselves.	They	are	themselves	handily	destroyed	by	the	invaders	from	outside.	Every	living	thing,	then,	goes	into	decline	when	it	loses	this	battle,	and	it	suffers	what	we	call	 ‘old	age.’	Eventually	the	interlocking	bonds	of	the	triangles	around	the	marrow	can	no	longer	hold	on,	and	come	apart	under	stress,	and	when	this	happens	they	let	the	bonds	of	the	soul	go.	The	soul	is	then	released	in	a	natural	way,	and	finds	it	pleasant	to	take	its	flight.26																																																									23	 Cf.	Tim.	48b-53b.	For	discussion	of	why	it	is	so	difficult	to	grasp	the	conception	of	the	Receptacle,	cf.	Miller	(2003)	p.213-220.	24	 Cf.	Tim.	53d.	Principles	yet	more	ultimate	than	these	are	known	only	to	the	god,	and	to	any	man	he	may	
hold	dear.	25	 I	follow	Taylor’s	translation	here	and	will	explain	why	I	choose	his	version	in	the	following	discussion.	26	 Translation	is	from	Zeyl	(2000)	with	slight	modification.	Greek:	ὅταν	μὲν	δὴ	πλέον	τοῦ	ἐπιρρέοντος	ἀπίῃ,	φθίνει	πᾶν,	ὅταν	ἔλαττον,	αὐξάνεται.	νέα	μὲν	οὖν	ξύστασις	ποῦ	παντὸς	ζῴου,	καινὰ	τὰ	τρἰγωνα	οἷον	έκ	δρυόχων	ἔτι	ἔχουσα	τῶν	γενῶν,	ίσχυρὰν	μὲν	τὴν	ξὐγκλεισιν	αὐτῶν	πρὸς	ἄλληλα	κἐκτηται,	ξυμπἐπηγε	δὲ	ὁ	πᾶς	ὄγκος	αὐτῆς	ἁπαλὀς	ἅτ᾽ἐκ	μυελοῦ	μὲν	νεωστὶ	γεγονυἰας,	τεθραμμἐνης	δὲ	έν	γἀλακτι.	τὰ	δὴ	περιλαμβανὀμενα	ἐν	αὐτῇ	τρίγωνα	ἔξωθεν	ἐπεισελθόντα,	ἐξ	ὧν	ἂν	ᾖ	τά	τε	σιτία	καὶ	ποτά,	τῶν	ἑαυτῆς	τριγώνων	παλαιότερα	ὄντα	καὶ	ἀσθενέστερα	καινοῖς	ἐπικρατεῖ	τέμνουσα,	καὶ	μέγα	ἀπεργάζεται	τὸ	ζῷον	τρέφουσα	ἐκ	πολλῶν	ὁμοίων.	ὅταν	δ᾽ἡ	ῥίζα	τῶν	τριγώνων	χαλᾷ	διὰ	τὸ	πολλοὺς	ἀγῶνας	ἐν	πολλῷ	χρόνῳ	πρὸς	πολλὰ	ἠγωνίσθαι,	τὰ	μὲν	τῆς	τροφῆς	εἰσιόντα	οὐκέτι	δύναται	τέμνειν	εἰς	ὁμοιότητα	ἑαυτοῖς,	αὐτὰ	δὲ	ὑπὸ	τῶν	ἔξωθεν	ἐπεισιόντων	εὐπετῶς	διαιρεῖται.	φθίνει	δὴ	πᾶν	ζῷον	ἐν	τούτῳ	κρατούμενον,	γῆράς	τε	ὀνομάζεται	τὸ	πάθος.	τέλος	δέ,	ἐπειδὰν	τῶν	περὶ	τὸν	μυελὸν	τριγώνων	οἱ	ξυναρμοσθέντες	μηκέτι	ἀντέχωσι	δεσμοὶ	τῷ	πόνῳ	διιστάμενοι,	μεθιᾶσι	τοὺς	τῆς	ψυχῆς	αὖ	δεσμούς,	ἡ	δὲ	λυθεῖσα	κατὰ	φύσιν	μεθ᾽ἡδονῆς	ἐξέπτατο.	 	
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The	quoted	passage	tells	us	that	death	of	a	human	body	is	the	result	of	the	bodily	triangles	being	cut	and	prevailed	by	external	triangles.	And	the	dying	process	starts	with	the	 ‘ἡ	ῥίζα	τῶν	τριγῶνων	 χαλᾷ’	 (root	 formed	 by	 the	 triangles	 being	 slackened).	 The	 phrase,	 ‘ἡ	 ῥίζα	 τῶν	τριγῶνων,’	 Plato	 uses	 here	 is	 rather	 odd,	 for,	 in	 previous	 sections,	 including	 where	 the	introduction	of	the	solids’	construction	and	interaction	is	described,	and	where	Plato	applies	the	explanation	of	 triangles	 and	 solids	 to	 explain	natural	phenomena,	 there	 is	no	mention	at	 all	 of	such	a	 thing	as	 ‘the	 root	 formed	by	 the	 triangles’.	The	 interpretation	of	 the	phrase	 ‘ἡ	ῥίζα	τῶν	τριγῶνων’	is	important,	because,	it	answers	the	question	whether	Plato	introduces	new	features	of	 the	 triangles	by	employing	 those	 terms.	 If	 the	answer	appears	 to	be	affirmative,	we	need	 to	explore	what	 new	 features	 of	 the	 triangles	 ‘ἡ	 ῥίζα	 τῶν	 τριγῶνων’	 implies,	 and	moreover,	 how	those	features	reflect	on	the	mortal	nature	of	human	race.	If	the	employment	of	the	phrase	‘ἡ	ῥίζα	τῶν	 τριγῶνων’	 is	merely	 a	matter	 of	wording,	we	 then	 need	 to	 examine	what	 features	 of	 the	triangles	those	words	describe	that	are	known	to	us	according	to	Timaeus’	earlier	account	of	the	constitution	 of	 triangles	 and	 solids	 (53c-56c),	 and	 how	 those	 features	 relates	 to	 the	decomposition	of	human	body.	There	are	two	kinds	of	interpretation	regarding	the	phrase	‘ἡ	ῥίζα	τῶν	τριγῶνων	χαλᾷ’.	One	is	that,	some	scholars	treat	the	phrase	‘ἡ	ῥίζα	τῶν	τριγῶνων	χαλᾷ’	as	a	metaphorical	expression.	For	 instance,	 Cornford	 argues	 that	 the	metaphor	 is	 taken	 from	 a	 tree’s	 roots.27	 Pender	 thinks	that	 the	word	 ‘ἡ	 ῥίζα’	 in	 81c	 and	 84a-b	 are	 used	 in	 exactly	 the	 same	way,	 that	 is,	 ‘the	 root	 of	triangles’	is	like	‘gums	for	teeth.’28	 I	disagree	with	metaphorical	reading	and	will	argue	later	that	how	 it	 will	 bring	 about	 inconsistency	 in	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	triangles	 and	 the	 Receptacle.	 Another	 kind	 of	 interpretation	 is	 geometrical.	 For	 example,	Archer-Hind	conceives	ῥίζα	 to	be	 the	 fundamental	structure	of	 the	 triangles,	 that	 is,	 their	sides	and	angles.29	 Taylor,	also	using	84a-b	as	reference,	suggests	 that	 the	root	of	 triangles	refers	 to	the	 sides,	 the	 edges	 of	 various	 solids.	 My	 interpretation	 is	 also	 a	 geometrical	 reading,	 but	 I	disagree	with	both	Archer-Hind’s	and	Taylor’s	view	on	what	ῥίζα	means.	I	reach	the	conclusion	that	‘ἡ	ῥίζα	τῶν	τριγῶνων	χαλᾷ’	means	‘the	base	or	foundation	formed	by	the	triangles	loosens	or	is	slackened	by,	firstly,	considering	what	the	word	‘ῥίζα’	means	in	ancient	texts	and	how	Plato																																																									27	 Cf.	Cornford	(1937)	p.	329,	note	2.	28	 Cf.	Pender	(2000)	p.167.	29	 Cf.	Archer-Hind	(1888)	p.306,	note	8.	
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uses	it	the	Timaeus,	and	then	testing	different	meanings	of	ῥίζα	in	the	context	of	Timaeus	to	see	if	any	of	them	would	make	sense	and	lead	to	a	plausible	interpretation.	LSJ	 list	 several	meanings	 for	 the	 Greek	word	 ῥίζα30:	 1.	 ‘the	 root	 of	 plants’;	 2.	 ‘the	 root	 of	something,	like	eyes,	feathers,	hair,	teeth,	etc.’;	3.	‘from	or	out	of	the	root’,	used	with	preposition	ἐκ;	4.	‘that	from	which	anything	springs	as	from	a	root’;	5.	‘base,	foundation’;	6.	‘mathematically	used	to	refer	to	root	or	base	of	a	series’.	The	word	‘ῥίζα’	appears	twice	in	the	Timaeus	other	than	at	81c,	 that	 is,	84b	(αἱ	δ᾽ἐκ	τῶν	ῥιζῶν	 ξυνεκπίπτουσαι,	 ‘and	the	 flesh	falling	out	of	 their	roots’)	and	90b	 (τὸ	θεῖον	 τὴν	κεφαλὴν	καὶ	ῥίζαν	 ἡμῶν	ἀνακρεμαννὺν	ὀρθοῖ	πᾶν	τὸ	σῶμα,	 ‘the	divine	part	suspends	our	head,	like	the	root,	and	so	keeps	our	whole	body	erect’).	As	to	the	‘root’	at	90b,	Plato	uses	it	to	indicate	the	relation	between	human	soul	and	the	heaven.	He	describes	how	the	mortal	human	race	was	linked	to	the	heaven:	the	first	born	was	our	soul	(ἡ	πρώτη	τῆς	ψυχῆς),	which	was	then	placed	in	our	head,	and	just	as	a	tree	is	connected	to	the	earth	by	its	root,	we	are	linked	towards	the	heaven	by	our	soul,31	 only	in	the	contrary	direction,	and	this	is	how	the	god	made	the	human	race	erect.	It	 is	 obvious	 that	 ‘root’	 in	 the	 phrase	 ‘ἡ	 ῥίζα	 τῶν	 τριγῶνων’	 cannot	 mean	 1.	 ‘the	 root	 of	plants’,	or	3.	‘from	or	out	of	the	root’,	used	with	preposition	ἐκ,	or	6.	‘mathematically	used	to	refer	to	root	or	base	of	a	series’.	The	‘root’	that	appears	at	84b	and	90a	corresponds	to	metaphorical	meaning	2	and	4.	I	now	proceed	to	test	them	with	regard	to	Timaeus’	account	of	triangles.	At	Timaeus	84b,	Plato	uses	‘root’	to	describe	the	fresh	attachment	to	the	bones.	It	is	obvious	that	both	Pender	and	Taylor	think	that	84b	applies	meaning	2,	the	root	of	something,	only	that	they	 differ	 in	 what	 the	 root	 indicates.	 Considering	 this	 meaning	 can	 also	 be	 used	 to	 describe	things	such	as	 feather,32	 we	can	say	 that	 the	metaphorical	meaning	2	of	 ‘root’	applies	 to	 those	physical	entities	whose	bodies	are	partially	rooted	in	something	else,	like	a	feather	in	skin,	hair	in	skin,	 and	 teeth	 in	 the	 gums,	 with	 the	 rest	 growing	 independently	 upon	 separation	 from	 this	something,	 just	 like	 a	 plant	 and	 its	 root.33	 Then	 ἡ	 ῥίζα	 τῶν	 τριγῶνων	 χαλᾷ,	 ‘the	 root	 of	 the																																																									30	 Cf.	A	Greek-English	Lexicon,	1570.	I	am	aware	that	the	meanings	of	ῥίζα	listed	by	the	LSJ	might	not	be	able	to	cover	the	philosophical	nuance	of	Plato’s	thoughts.	However,	I	think	the	subtleness	of	a	word	is	due	to	its	context	rather	than	its	own.	Therefore,	I	will	choose	a	suitable	meaning	first	and	then	examine	its	respective	preciseness	with	the	help	of	the	context	in	which	it	lies.	31	 Cf.	Johansen’s	translation:	from	there	our	divine	part	attaches	us	by	the	head	to	heaven,	like	a	plant	by	its	roots,	and	keep	our	body	upright.	32	 Cf.	Phaedrus	251b,	ᾤδησέ	τε	καὶ	ὥρμησε	φύεσθαι	ἀπὸ	τῆς	ῥίζης	ὁ	τοῦ	πτεροῦ	καυλὸς	ὑπὸ	πᾶν	τὸ	τῆς	ψυχῆς	εἶδος,	the	feather	shafts	swell	and	rush	to	grow	from	their	roots	beneath	all	forms	of	the	soul.	33	 One	might	speculate	we	don’t	have	to	strictly	follow	the	manner	in	which	84b	uses	the	word	
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triangles’,	can	be	 interpreted	as	the	triangles’	being	partially	rooted	in	something,	 just	as	when	the	 roots	 of	 a	 tooth	 are	 not	 securely	 rooted	 in	 the	 gums.	 This	 intepretation	 is	 problematic	because	it	implies	another	existence,	that	is,	the	entity	in	which	the	triangles	are	partially	rooted.	If	we	think	of	 ‘the	root	of	the	triangles’	as	the	triangles’	attachment	to	the	elemental	solids,	it	is	contradictory	to	the	fact	that	elemental	solids	consist	of	the	triangles	and	thus	that	the	triangles	are	components	of	the	solids.	For,	like	earth	to	a	plant,	skin	to	feather	or	hair,	or	gum	to	teeth,	the	thing	 in	which	 the	 triangles	 are	 rooted	 should	 be	 something	 that	 is	 utterly	 different	 from	 the	triangles.	And	now	we	 try	 to	 read	 ‘the	 root	 of	 the	 triangles’	 to	mean	 the	 relation	 in	which	 the	triangles	 stand	 to	 the	 Receptacle.	 But	 according	 to	my	 previous	 discussion	 of	 the	 relationship	between	the	triangles	and	the	Receptacle,	the	Receptacle	is	that	both	out	of	which	the	triangles	come	to	be	and	in	which	the	triangles	come	to	be.	Then,	 insofar	as	the	Receptacle	is	that	out	of	which	the	triangles	come	to	be,	it	is	identical	with	the	triangles.	And	insofar	as	the	Receptacle	is	that	 in	which	 the	 triangles	 come	 to	be,	 the	 triangles	are	completely	within	 the	Receptacle.	The	fact	that	the	Receptacle	is	the	triangles	themselves	contradicts	the	criterion	that	this	something	the	triangles	are	rooted	in	should	be	utterly	different	from	them,	and,	the	fact	that	the	triangles	are	 completely	within	 the	Receptacle	 contradicts	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 triangles	 should	 be	partially	 rooted	 in	 this	 something	 and	 partially	 not.	 In	 short,	 ‘the	 root	 of	 the	 triangles’	 cannot	describe	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 triangles	 and	 the	 Receptacle.	 Since	 Plato	 is	 very	 clear	about	that	the	triangles	are	the	most	basic	and	sufficient	principle	in	his	account	(53d),	it	seems	very	 unlikely	 that	 he	 would	 allow	 any	 implication	 that	 there	 were	 something,	 other	 than	 the	elemental	 solids	 or	 the	 Receptacle,	 in	which	 the	 triangles	 could	 be	 rooted,	which	would	 bring	unnecessary	 confusion	 to	 his	 account.	 Therefore,	 I	 think	 the	 metaphorical	 usage	 of	 ῥίζα34	 is	inappropriate	to	this	particular	context,	and	that	is	why	I	say	Pender’s	interpretation	of	‘root’	is	problematic	at	the	beginning	of	this	section,	 for,	she	argues	that	the	 ‘root	of	triangles’	 indicates	that	 which	 links	 the	 triangles	 together,35	 however	 Timaeus’	 account	 does	 not	 afford	 further	complexity	by	allowing	any	third	kind	between	the	triangles	and	the	Receptacle	(the	Forms	will																																																																																																																																																															metaphorically.	But,	in	my	opinion,	since	the	Timaeus	has	offered	an	example	of	how	Plato	uses	this	word	metaphorically	and	no	other	evidence	supports	any	alternative	possibility,	it	would	be	better	to	interpret	in	this	way.	34	 Cornford’s	interpretation	takes	the	view	that	Plato	employed	a	metaphorical	usage	of	‘root’	taking	from	the	loosening	of	a	tree’s	roots.	Cf.	Cornford	(1937)	329,	note	2.	35	 Cf.	Pender	(2000)	167.	
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never	actively	interact	with	the	Receptacle).	Entry	4,	‘that	from	which	anything	springs	as	from	a	root’	is	likely	to	be	applied	to	abstract	ideas,	that	is,	this	‘anything’	that	springs	from	the	‘ῥίζα’,	like	a	plant	from	a	root,	tends	to	indicate	abstract	objects,	such	as	a	certain	virtue	(Plutarch)	and	a	family	tree	(Aristotle).36	 Timaeus	90b	is	an	example	of	how	Plato	uses	 the	abstract	meaning	of	 ‘ῥίζα’.	However,	as	 I	have	said	 in	earlier	discussion	 the	 triangles	 are	not	merely	 abstract	 ideas	or	mathematical	 figures.	 Furthermore,	 if	ῥίζα	is	used	in	this	sense,	that	is,	if	the	triangles	might	originally	have	sprung	from	some	sort	of	root,	it	seems	to	imply	that	there	exists	some	sort	of	more	ultimate	principle	than	the	triangles.	Therefore,	 the	 ῥίζα	 in	 ἡ	 ῥίζα	 τῶν	 τριγῶνων	 cannot	 carry	 the	 meaning	 of	 that	 from	 which	anything	springs	as	from	a	root.	With	 all	 the	 other	 entries	 being	 ruled	 out,	 ῥίζα	 as	 base	 or	 foundation	 becomes	 the	 last	possible	 reading.	Other	 examples37	 of	 this	usage,	 such	as	Proclus,	Hypotyposis	 astronomicarum	
positionum	 3.23,38	 and	 Onasander,	 Strategicus	 10.6,39	 suggest	 that	 the	 word	 can	 be	 used	 to	indicate	 the	 base	 or	 foundation	 of	 something	 concrete,	 such	 as	 sundial	 (Proclus)	 or	 a	 hill	(Onasander).	 If	 we	 apply	 this	 meaning	 to	 the	 phrase,	 it	 will	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 ‘the	 base	 or	 the	foundation	of	the	triangles	is	slackened’.	In	this	case,	there	is	no	need	for	the	base	or	foundation	of	 the	 thing	 in	 question	 to	 be	 separate	 from	 the	 thing	 itself,	 for	 the	 base	 or	 foundation	 is	considered	 to	 be	 a	 part	 of	 the	 thing	 of	 which	 it	 is	 a	 base	 or	 foundation,	 as	 show	 the	 above	examples.	As	I	have	mentioned	above,	in	the	metaphorical	reading,	scholars	are	likely	to	translate	the	phrase	‘ἡ	ῥίζα	τῶν	τριγῶνων’	as	‘the	root	of	the	triangles’.	I	follow	Taylor’s	suggestion	to	take	τῶν	 τριγῶνων	 as	 a	 defining	 genitive,40	 ‘ἡ	 ῥίζα	 formed	 by	 the	 triangles’,41	 for	 it	 avoids	 the	implication	that	the	‘root’	of	triangles	indicates	something	independent	of	the	triangles.42	 Then,																																																									36	 Cf.	Plutarch,	De	Liberis	Educandis,	section	7,	πηγὴ	γὰρ	καὶ	ῥίζα	καλοκαγαθίας	τὸ	νομίμου	τυχεῖν	παιδείας;	And	Aristotle,	Nicomachean	Ethics,	1161b,	…	ἡ	γὰρ	πρὸς	ἐκεῖνα	ταυτότης	ἀλλήλοις	ταυτὸ	ποιεῖ;	ὅθεν	φασὶ	ταυτὸν	αἶμα	καὶ	ῥίζαν	καὶ	τὰ	τοιαῦτα.	I	am	aware	that	Plutach	might	not	be	a	good	example	here,	since	he	might	have	been	influenced	by	Plato’s	style,	not	the	other	way	round,	and	the	difference	of	several	hundred	years	might	also	matter.	Nevertheless	I	cite	the	passage	here	for	the	purpose	of	reference.	37	 These	examples	are	much	later	than	the	Timaeus.	I	realize	this	may	lower	their	value	as	supportive	evidence.	But	considering	that	these	examples	dated	much	closer	than	us	to	the	Timaeus’	date	and	they	were	using	still	basically	the	same	language,	they	at	least	prove	that	ῥίζα	can	be	used	in	this	way	in	ancient	Greek.	38	 Ἡ	δὲ	μεσημβρινὴ	γραμμὴ	λαμβᾶνεται	γνώμονος	ὀρθοῦ	στάντος	ἐπὶ	τῆς	πλακὸς	ταύτης	καὶ	κύκλου	γραφέντος	περὶ	τὴν	ῥίζαν	τοῦ	γνώμονος	ὡς	περὶ	κέντρον	καὶ	τηρησάντων	ἡμῶν,	......	39	 ……καὶ	περὶ	αὐτὰς	τὰς	ῥίζας	τῶν	λόφων,	εφ᾽ὅσον	δυνατόν	ἐστι	καὶ	τραχέων	ἐπιψαύειν.	40	 Cf.	Taylor	(1928)	585.	41	 For	another	interpretation	of	‘root’	cf.	Martin	(1841)	217.	42	 I	have	not	mentioned	the	translation	issue	in	the	previous	discussion	because	both	entries	have	already	implied	something	independent	of	the	triangles	by	their	own	right.	
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we	 can	 translate	 the	 phrase	 ‘ἡ	 ῥίζα	 τῶν	 τριγῶνων’	 as	 ‘the	 base	 or	 foundation	 formed	 by	 the	triangles’.	And	it	 is	reasonable	to	suggest	this	base	or	foundation	refers	to	the	elemental	solids’	plane	 surface	 that	 is	 composed	 by	 the	 triangles,	 for,	 according	 to	Timaeus	 53c,	 ἡ	 δὲ	 ὀρθὴ	 τῆς	ἐπιπέδου	 βάσεως	 ἐκ	 τριγώνων	 συνέστηκε,	 the	 plane	 base	 (or	 foundation)	 is	 composed	 of	triangles.	Plato	here	speaks	of	the	facets	of	the	elemental	solids	as	a	βάσις,	a	word	which	appears	eight	 times	 in	 the	contexts	where	he	 talks	about	 the	 triangles	and	 the	solids,	 including	 the	one	quoted	above:	53c,	55b	(εἴκοσι	βάσεις	ἔχον	ἰσοπλεύρους	τριγώνους	γέγονεν),	55c	(ἔξ	ἐπιπέδους	τετραγώνους	 ἰσοπλεύρους	 βάσεις	 ἔχον),	 55e	 (μάλιστα	 δὲ	 ἀνάγκη	 γεγονέναι	 τοιοῦτον	 τὸ	 τὰς	
βάσεις	ἀσφαλεστάτας	ἔχον!	βάσις	δὲ	ἥ	τε	τῶν	κατ´ἀρχὰς	τριγώνων	ὑποτεθέντων	ἀσφαλεστέρα),	56a	(τὸ	μὲν	ἔχον	ὀλιγίστας	βάσεις	εὐκινητότατον	ἀνάγκη	πεφυκέναι),	59d(μαλακόν	τε	αὖ	τῷ	τὰς	
βάσεις	ἥττον	ἑδραίους	οὔσας	ἢ	τὰς	γῆς	ὑπείκειν),	and	62c	(τετραγώνων	ὂν	βάσεων,	ἅτε	βεβηκὸς	σφόδρα).	Now	we	have	 learned	 that	 the	 elemental	 solids’	 facets,	 composed	 of	 the	 triangles,	 is	also	 called	 base	 or	 foundation	 in	 Timaeus’	 account,	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 plausible	 to	 take	 ῥίζα	analogously,	as	another	word	for	‘base’	or	‘foundation’,	and	τῶν	τριγῶνων	as	a	defining	genitive	interpreting	the	phrase	as	‘the	base	or	the	foundation	formed	by	the	triangles	slackened’,	that	is,	the	facets	of	the	solids	are	slackened.	Then,	what	does	this	mean?	To	 understand	 this	 process	 by	which	 the	 base	 or	 the	 foundation	 formed	 by	 the	 triangles	‘slackens’	or	‘is	slackened’,	I	suggest	we	should	first	investigate	how	it	is	formed.	Let	us	take	the	construction	of	the	solids	of	fire	as	an	example:	Leading	the	way	will	be	the	primary	form,	the	tiniest	structure,	whose	elementary	triangle	is	the	 one	 whose	 hypotenuse	 is	 twice	 the	 length	 of	 its	 shorter	 side.	 Now	 when	 a	 pair	 of	 such	triangles	are	juxtaposed	along	the	diagonal	[i.e.,	their	hypotenuses]	and	this	is	done	three	times,	and	their	diagonals	and	short	sides	converge	upon	a	single	point	as	center,	the	result	is	a	single	equilateral	triangle,	composed	of	six	such	triangles.	When	four	of	these	equilateral	triangles	are	combined,	a	single	solid	angle	is	produced	at	the	junction	of	three	plane	angles.	This,	it	turns	out,	is	the	angle	that	comes	right	after	the	most	obtuse	of	the	plane	angles.	And	once	four	such	solid	angles	have	been	completed,	we	get	the	primary	solids	form,	which	is	one	that	divides	the	entire	circumference	[sc.	of	the	sphere	in	which	it	is	inscribed]	into	equal	and	similar	parts.	(54d-55a)43	When	 six	 triangles	 bond	 firmly	 together	 in	 a	 particular	 way	 they	 compose	 a	 facet,	 an																																																									43	 ἄρξει	δὴ	τό	τε	πρῶτον	εἶδος	καὶ	σμικρότατον	συνιστάμενον͵	στοιχεῖον	δ΄	αὐτοῦ	τὸ	τὴν	ὑποτείνουσαν	τῆς	ἐλάττονος	πλευρᾶς	διπλασίαν	ἔχον	μήκει·	σύνδυο	δὲ	τοιούτων	κατὰ	διάμετρον	συντιθεμένων	καὶ	τρὶς	τούτου	γενομένου͵	τὰς	διαμέτρους	καὶ	τὰς	βραχείας	πλευρὰς	εἰς	ταὐτὸν	ὡς	κέντρον	ἐρεισάντων͵	ἓν	ἰσόπλευρον	τρίγωνον	ἐξ	ἓξ	τὸν	ἀριθμὸν	ὄντων	γέγονεν.	τρίγωνα	δὲ	ἰσόπλευρα	συνιστάμενα	τέτταρα	κατὰ	σύντρεις	ἐπιπέδους	γωνίας	μίαν	στερεὰν	γωνίαν	ποιεῖ͵	τῆς	ἀμβλυτάτης	τῶν	ἐπιπέδων	γωνιῶν	ἐφεξῆς	γεγονυῖαν·	τοιούτων	δὲ	ἀποτελεσθεισῶν	τεττάρων	πρῶτον	εἶδος	στερεόν͵	ὅλου	περιφεροῦς	διανεμητικὸν	εἰς	ἴσα	μέρη	καὶ	ὅμοια͵	συνίσταται.	
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equilateral	 triangle,	 and	 four	 of	 such	 facets	 combine	 tightly	 together	 to	 form	 a	 solid	 of	 fire,	shaping	 it	 like	 a	 pyramid.	 A	 newly	 formed	 solid	 thus	 has	 edges	 and	 points	 of	 true	 sharpness	because	of	 its	good	structure,	 and	 it	will	be	very	easy	 for	 this	 solid	 to	overcome	and	cut	other	ones	with	 inferior	sharpness	or	with	 lesser	bulk.	However,	due	 to	a	 long	period	of	 time’s	wear	and	tear,	the	bond	among	the	triangles	is	no	longer	as	firm	as	it	used	to	be,	that	is,	the	diagonals	or	short	sides	of	the	triangles	no	longer	juxtapose	one	another,	and	the	sixty-degree	angles	of	the	triangles	no	longer	converge	upon	one	single	point	as	center,	and	the	facets	therefore	no	longer	form	 equilateral	 triangles;	 we	 have	 arrived,	 I	 think,	 at	 the	 scenario	 that	 χαλᾷ	 (is	 slackened)	describes.	 Since	 the	 facets	are	now	not	 in	 the	 condition	 they	used	 to	be	 in,	 the	 combination	of	them	will	be	consequently	not	be	as	good	either,	and	the	sharpness	of	the	edges	and	points	less	good.	In	this	way,	this	solid	is	then	more	easily	decomposed.	On	the	basis	of	this	interpretation,	the	process	of	growth	and	decay	of	the	human	body	is	as	follows:	When	first	born	and	when	the	living	creature	is	still	young,	the	entire	bodily	formation,	the	facets	of	 the	triangles	and	the	solids	of	 the	 facets,	 is	as	new	and	good	as	possible,	compared	to	which	 those	of	 food	and	drink	coming	 from	outside	appear	 to	be	old	and	weak.	Thus	 it	 is	very	easy	 for	 the	 bodily	 triangles	 to	 overcome	 and	 dissolve	 the	 external	 ones,	 and	 absorb	 those	decomposed	 parts	 into	 their	 own	 sorts.	 This	 is	when	 the	 bodily	 triangles	 prevail	 in	 the	 battle	(ἀγῶνας)	 against	 the	 external	 ones.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 body	 grows.	 However,	 this	 situation	will	change.	When	having	 cut	 and	prevailed	over	 a	 long	period	of	 time,	 the	 triangles	 are	no	 longer	able	to	hold	together	as	firmly	as	they	used	to,	and	the	consequence	is	that	the	facets	they	form	are	not	in	the	same	condition	as	they	used	to	be,	no	longer	forming	perfect	equilateral	triangles	or	squares	(if	it	is	a	solid	of	earth).	And	further,	the	entire	formation	of	the	solids	is	damaged.	In	this	 way,	 the	 bodily	 solids	 are	 gradually	 decomposed	 by	 the	 external	 ones.	 And	 the	decomposition	does	not	just	happen	in	one	place	in	the	body,	rather	it	will	spread	to	the	entire	body,	and	this	change	will	manifest	itself	as	ageing.	Finally	it	happens	to	the	marrow,	where	the	soul	 is	 bound	 to	 the	 body.	 Once	 marrow,	 the	 medium	 that	 binds	 the	 soul	 to	 the	 body,	 is	decomposed,	 the	bonds	(δεσμοί)	between	the	soul	and	the	body	will	definitely	be	undermined.	When	the	soul	is	not	bound	to	the	body,	it	will	leave,	that	is,	the	separation	of	the	soul	from	the	body	occurs,	and	this	is	how	death	occurs.	
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Conclusion	
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 have	 studied	 the	 mortal	 nature	 of	 the	 human	 race	 by	 examining	 the	constitution	 of	 human	 body.	 The	 body	 of	 the	 human	 race	 consists	 of,	 on	 the	 elementary	 level,	triangles.	 Thus	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 triangles	 determines	 the	 mortality	 of	 human	 body,	 and	furthermore,	 a	 whole	 human	 being.	 The	 coming-to-be	 of	 the	 triangles	 themselves	 are	impressions	 of	 the	 images	 of	 the	 Forms	 out	 of	 the	 Receptacle.	 Thus,	 the	 triangles	 are	indestructible	 in	 terms	 of	 being	 as	 the	 originating	 principle	 of	 elemental	 solids	 and	 thus	 of	 all	things	coming	to	be,	whilst	 it	 is	also	true	that	the	triangles	keep	being	reborn	and	perishing	all	the	time	out	of	and	in	the	Receptacle.	With	regard	to	the	relation	between	the	triangles	and	the	Receptacle,	 I	 have	 also	 argued	 that	 the	 triangles	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 possessing	 both	 physical	 and	non-physical	nature,	 that	 is,	 being	 the	basis	of	material	 existence	while	not	 themselves	exactly	material.	 It	 follows	 that	 in	 the	Timaeus	 Plato	might	 be	 seeking	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 the	Forms	and	the	corporeal	realm44	 by	blurring	the	boundary	between	material	and	non-material	existence.	This	expands	the	scope	of	the	overall	aim	of	the	thesis	in	that	not	only	does	Plato	try	to	bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 the	mortal	 body	 and	 immortal	 soul	 of	 the	 human	 race,	 but	 also,	 from	merely	the	perspective	of	mortality,	he	is	attempting	to	lessen	the	difference	between	corporeal	and	incorporeal,	at	least	on	the	elementary	level.	I	 have	 also	 given	 detailed	 discussion	 on	 how	 the	 binding	 and	 disconnection	 of	 triangles	actually	work.	 The	 binding	 and	 disconnection	 process	 offers	 explanation	 for	 the	 grow,	 ageing,	and	death	of	a	human	being	from	a	physical	perspective,	which,	together	with	the	discussion	of	the	constitution	of	immortal	soul	in	the	following	chapter,	will	yield	insights	into	how	the	human	body	 and	 soul	 are	 bound	 together,	 interact	 with	 each	 other,	 and	 are	 disconnected	 from	 one	another	on	the	elementary	level.
																																																								44	 This	is	not	a	strong	claim	because	we	are	given	a	very	strong	statement	regarding	the	separation	of	that	
which	always	is	and	has	no	becoming	and	that	which	becomes	but	never	is	(Tim.	27d6-28a6)	at	the	beginning	of	Timaeus’	account.	This	distinction	will	be	examined	in	Chapter	3,	3.1	The	construction	of	cosmic	soul.	
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Chapter	3	The	immortal	soul	
Introduction	 	 	
In	 Chapter	 2,	 I	 have	 investigated	 the	 mortal	 nature	 of	 the	 human	 race	 in	 terms	 of	 the	triangles’	coming	 into	being.	One	of	 the	central	claims	of	Chapter	2	 is	 that	 the	triangles	are	the	impression	of	the	images	of	Forms	in	the	Receptacle.	Thus,	the	Forms	and	Receptacle	are	integral	components	 in	constituting	the	body	of	 the	human	race.	 In	 this	and	the	next	chapter,	 I	want	 to	look	at	the	immortal	nature	of	the	human	race	with	regard	to	the	constitution	of	the	human	soul.	The	human	 soul	 introduced	 in	 the	Timaeus	 is	 tripartite	 as	 consisting	of	 the	 immortal	 part,	 the	spirited	part,	and	the	appetitive	part.1	 The	immortal	soul	represents	the	immortal	nature	of	the	human	race,	while	the	other	two	mortal	parts	come	into	being	out	of	the	disturbance	that	occurs	during	 embodiment	 of	 immortal	 soul	 and	 function	 as	 intermediaries	 that	 allow	 the	communication	between	the	immortal	and	mortal	nature	of	a	human	being.	Then,	in	this	chapter,	the	 discussion	 will	 focus	 on	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 immortal	 soul,	 which,	 together	 with	 the	discussion	of	the	mortal	nature	of	human	body	in	Chapter	2,	will	support	the	explanation	of	how	the	 interactions	between	 the	 immortal	 and	mortal	 souls	 as	well	 as	 between	 the	 tripartite	 soul	and	the	physical	body	take	place	in	Chapter	4.	My	argument	proceeds	as	follows.	One	of	the	central	claims	I	want	to	make	in	this	chapter	is	that	 Forms	 and	 Receptacle	 are	 integral	 components	 in	 constructing	 the	 cosmic	 and	 human	immortal	 soul	 as	 well	 as	 the	 mortal	 body	 of	 humans.	 Since	 human	 immortal	 soul	 shares	 a	common	 origin	 with	 the	 cosmic	 soul,	 I	 start	 by	 shedding	 some	 light	 on	 the	 components	 that	constitute	the	cosmic	soul.	I	will	argue	that	the	components	that	the	Demiurge	used	to	create	the	cosmic	 soul	 and	 body	 are	 essentially	 the	 same,	 and	 they	 differ	 in	 that	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	components	were	actually	used	to	fashion	the	cosmic	soul	and	body	respectively.	Then	I	turn	to	the	 constitution	 of	 human	 immortal	 soul	 by	 making	 a	 comparison	 between	 the	 cosmic	 and	human	 immortal	 souls.	The	necessity	of	 this	 comparison	 is	based	on	 the	 fact	 that	 the	human’s	immortal	 soul	 is	 of	 second	 and	 third	 grade,	 compared	 to	 the	 cosmic	 soul.	 The	 degradation	 of																																																									1	 Cf.	Tim.	41d-42a	and	69c-72d.	
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purity	 of	 human	 immortal	 soul	 not	 only	 entails	 that	 the	 immortal	 soul	 is	 subject	 to	 the	disturbance	from	the	body	when	embodied,	but	also	give	rise	to	the	matter	of	the	cause	of	evil.	Then,	at	last,	I	will	explain	that	human	immortal	soul’s	being	created	as	less	pure	does	not	imply	a	 failure	 of	 the	 Demiurgic	 teleology,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 it	 speaks	 in	 favor	 of	 Plato’s	 intention	 to	bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 mortal	 and	 immortal	 nature	 of	 a	 human	 being	 by	 showing	 the	intermediate	 nature	 of	 the	 other	 two	mortal	 parts	 that	 draw	 together	 the	 immortal	 soul	 and	mortal	body.	
3.1	The	construction	of	cosmic	souls	
At	Timaeus	41d4-42a3	Plato	proffers	an	account	of	how	the	Demiurge	created	the	immortal	souls	for	the	human	race:	When	he	had	finished	this	speech,	he	turned	again	to	the	mixing	bowl	he	had	used	before,	the	one	 in	which	he	had	blended	and	mixed	 the	soul	of	 the	universe.	He	began	 to	pour	 in	 to	 it	what	remained	of	the	previous	ingredients	and	to	mix	them	in	somewhat	the	same	way,	though	these	were	no	 longer	 invariably	and	constantly	pure,	but	of	a	second	and	third	grade	of	purity.	And	when	he	had	compounded	it	all,	he	divided	the	mixture	into	a	number	of	souls	equal	to	the	number	of	 the	stars	and	assigned	each	soul	 to	a	star.	He	mounted	each	soul	 in	a	carriage,	as	 it	were,	 and	 showed	 it	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 universe.	He	 described	 to	 them	 the	 laws	 that	 had	 been	foreordained:	they	would	all	be	assigned	one	and	the	same	initial	birth.	Then	he	would	sow	each	of	the	souls	into	that	instrument	of	time	suitable	to	it,	where	they	were	to	acquire	the	nature	of	being	 the	 most	 god-fearing	 of	 living	 things,	 and,	 since	 humans	 have	 a	 twofold	 nature,	 the	superior	kind	should	be	such	as	would	from	then	on	be	called	“man.”	(transl.	by	Zeyl,	D.	J.)2	In	 order	 to	 achieve	 substantial	 clarity	 regarding	 the	 process	 of	 the	 creation	 of	 individual	immortal	 souls,	 two	problems	must	 be	 stressed	 and	 resolved:	 first,	what	 is	 the	 constitution	of	individual	 immortal	 souls?	 Second,	 what	 is	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 claim	 that	 each	 soul	 was	assigned	to	a	star?	A	 satisfactory	 investigation	 of	 the	 first	 problem	 calls	 for	 reference	 to	 the	 passage	 where	Timaeus	has	explicitly	demonstrated	the	constitution	of	the	cosmic	soul.	Most	scholars	agree	that	individual	immortal	souls	have	their	origin	in	the	cosmic	soul,	reading	41d4-7	at	face	value.3	 The																																																									2	 Ταῦτ᾽εἶπε,	καὶ	πάλιν	ἐπὶ	τὸν	πρότερον	κρατῆρα,	ἐν	ᾧ	τὴν	τοῦ	παντὸς	ψυχὴν	κεραννὺς	ἔμισγεν,	τὰ	τῶν	πρόσθεν	ὑπόλοιπα	κατεχεῖτο	μίσγων	τρόπον	μέν	τινα	τὸν	αὐτόν,	ἀκήρατα	δὲ	οὐκέτι	κατὰ	ταὐτὰ	ὡσαύτως,	ἀλλὰ	δεύτερα	καὶ	τρίτα.	συστήσας	δὲ	τὸ	πᾶν	διεῖλεν	ψυχὰς	ἰσαρίθμους	τοῖς	ἄστροις,	ἔνειμέν	θ᾽ἑκάστην	πρὸς	ἕκαστον,	καὶ	ἐμβιβάσας	ὡς	ἐς	ὄχημα	τὴν	τοῦ	παντὸς	φύσιν	ἔδειξεν,	νόμους	τε	τοὺς	εἱμαραμένους	εἶπεν	αὐταῖς,	ὅτι	γένεσις	πρώτη	μὲν	ἔσοιτο	τεταγμένη	μία	πᾶσιν,	ἵνα	μήτις	ἐλαττοῖοτ	ὑπ᾽αὐτοῦ,	δέοι	δὲ	σπαρείσας	αὐτὰς	εἰς	τὰ	προσήκοντα	ἑκάσταις	ἕκαστα	ὄργανα	χρόνων	φῦναι	ζῴων	τὸ	θεοσεβέστατον,	διπλῆς	δὲ	οὔσης	τῆς	ἀνθρωπίνης	φύσεως,	τὸ	κρεῖττον	τοιοῦτον	εἴη	γένος	ὅ	καὶ	ἔπειτα	κεκλήσοιτο	ἀνήρ.	3	 Cf.	Cornford	(1937)	142-143,	Johansen	(2004)	137,	Robinson	(1995)	85.	
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evidence	 supporting	 that	 viewpoint	 is	 that	 these	 phrases	 in	 the	 quoted	 passage,	 i.e.	 ‘what	remained	of	the	previous	ingredients’	(τὰ	τῶν	πρόσθεν	ὑπόλοιπα),	‘in	somewhat	the	same	way’	(τρόπον…τινα	 τὸν	 αύτόν),	 and	 ‘of	 a	 second	 and	 third	 grade’	 (άκήρατα…δεύτερα	 καὶ	 τρίτα),	indicate	 that	 there	 is	 a	 comparable	 paradigm	 for	 Timaeus	 to	 refer	 to,	 which	 is,	 in	 this	 case,	apparently	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 cosmic	 soul.	 And	 it	 is	 worth	 stressing	 that	 referring	 to	 the	creation	 of	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 is	 of	 particular	 necessity	 and	 importance	 to	 our	 investigation	 of	Plato’s	 attempting	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 immortal	 and	 mortal	 nature	 of	 humans.	 A	comprehensive	 investigation	 depends	 on	 the	 adequate	 knowledge	 of	 the	 bond	 between	 the	individual	 soul	 and	 the	 body.	 Apart	 from	 41d4-8,	 a	 brief	 account	 of	 the	 creation	 of	 individual	immortal	 souls,	 and	 44d3-6	 and	 73b8-d2,	 where	 it	 is	 shown	 that	 the	 lesser	 gods	 bind	 the	individual	immortal	soul	to	the	head,	precisely,	the	brain,	Timaeus	does	not	provide	any	further	account	about	the	bond	between	the	individual	immortal	soul	and	the	body.	Given	that	the	bond	in	human	beings	is	an	imitation	of	the	bond	of	cosmic	soul	and	body,4	 it	is	reasonable	to	turn	to	the	 passage	 describing	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 cosmic	 soul.	 Therefore,	 the	 investigation	 of	 the	constitution	of	individual	immortal	souls	should	be	conducted	on	the	basis	of	the	understanding	of	the	constitution	of	the	cosmic	soul	and,	furthermore,	its	bond	and	interaction	with	the	cosmic	body.	On	the	basis	of	those	investigations,	I	will	then	discuss	why	the	Demiurge	made	the	choice	to	allot	every	individual	immortal	soul	to	a	star	and	showed	them	the	nature	of	the	cosmos	and	the	destined	laws.	At	35a1-b3,	we	learn	the	ingredients	and	the	preliminary	mixture	of	the	cosmic	soul:	In	between	 the	being	 that	 is	undivided	and	always	changeless,	and	 the	one	 that	 is	divided	and	 comes	 to	be	 in	 the	 corporeal	 realm,	he	mixed	a	 third,	 intermediate	 form	of	being,	derived	from	the	other	two.	Similarly,	he	made	a	mixture	of	 the	Same,	and	then	one	of	 the	Different,	 in	between	 their	 undivided	 and	 their	 corporeal,	 divided	 counterparts.	 And	 he	 took	 the	 three	mixtures	and	mixed	them	together	to	make	a	uniform	mixture,	forcing	the	Different,	which	was	hard	 to	mix,	 into	 conformity	with	 the	Same.	Now	when	he	had	mixed	 these	 two	 together	with	Being,	 and	 from	 the	 three	 had	made	 a	 single	mixture,	 he	 redivided	 the	whole	mixture	 into	 as	many	parts	as	his	task	required,	each	part	remaining	a	mixture	of	the	Same,	the	Different,	and	of	Being.5	 (transl.	by	Zeyl	with	alteration)																																																									4	 Cf.	Tim.	44d:	Copying	the	revolving	shape	of	the	universe,	the	gods	bind	the	two	divine	orbits	into	a	ball-shaped	body,	the	part	that	we	now	call	our	head.	5	 τῆς	ἀμερὶστου	καὶ	ἀεὶ	κατὰ	ταὐτὰ	ἐχούσης	οὐσίας	καὶ	τῆς	αὖ	περὶ	τὰ	σώματα	γιγνομένης	μεριστῆς	τρίτον	ἐξ	ἀμφοῖν	ἐν	μέσῳ	συνεκεράσατο	οὐσίας	εἶδος,	τῆς	τε	ταὐτοῦ	φύσεως	[αὖ	πέρι]	καὶ	τῆς	τοῦ	ἑτέρου,	καὶ	κατὰ	ταὐτὰ	συνέστησεν	ἐν	μέσῳ	τοῦ	τε	ἀμεροῦς	αὐτῶν	καὶ	τοῦ	κατὰ	τὰ	σώματα	μεριστοῦ.	καὶ	τρία	λαβὼν	αὐτὰ	ὄντα	συνεκεράσατο	εἰς	μίαν	πάντα	ἰδέαν,	τὴν	θατέρου	φύσιν	δύσμεικτον	οὖσαν	εἰς	ταὐτὸν	συναρμόττων	βίᾳ.	μειγνὺς	δὲ	μετὰ	τῆς	οὐσίας	καὶ	ἐκ	τριῶν	ποιησάμενος	ἕν,	πάλιν	ὅλον	τοῦτο	μοίρας	ὅσας	
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Various	exegetical	and	textual	debates	about	this	passage	have	arisen	since	antiquity.6	 I	am	not	 going	 to	 investigate	 every	 issue,	 since	 that	 would	 be	 a	 task	 too	 comprehensive	 for	 my	discussion	here.	I	will	confine	myself	to	matters	that	are	most	relevant	and	vital	to	the	question	of	the	bond	of	cosmic	soul	and	body,	that	is,	which	aspect	of	the	nature	of	the	ingredients	enables	a	 non-physical	 soul	 to	 be	 bound	 to	 and	 interact	 with	 a	 physical	 body?	 I	 shall	 examine	 the	individual	 ingredients,	 the	 intermediate	mixture,	 and	 the	whole	preliminary	mixture	 in	 turn	 in	order	 to	 determine	 which	 element(s)	 within	 the	 compound	 of	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 provides	 the	compositional	foundation	(in	contrast	to	the	structural	foundation	–	the	redividision	of	the	whole	preliminary	mixture	by	ratio	and	reform	as	two	revolving	circles)7	 for	the	non-physical	cosmic	soul	to	be	bound	and	interact	with	the	cosmic	body.	I	 shall	 begin	 with	 ἡ	 ἀμέριστος	 οὐσία	 and	 ἡ	 μεριστὴ	 οὐσία.	 One	 of	 the	 accepted	interpretations,	that	of	Cornford,	Grube,	and	Robinson,8	 is	that	ἡ	ἀμέριστος	οὐσία	refers	to	Form	and	 ἡ	 μεριστὴ	 οὐσία	 refers	 to	 sensible	 objects.	 The	 viewpoint	 is	made	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 the	resemblance	between	the	description	of	Timaeus	35a1-3	and	27d6-28a6.	At	27d6-28a6,	Timaeus	makes	 a	 distinction	 of	 entities	 according	 to	 their	 respective	 existence,	 that	 is,	 there	 are	 ‘that	which	always	is	and	has	no	becoming’	(τὸ	ὄν	ἀεί,	γένεσιν	δὲ	οὐκ	ἔχον),	and	‘that	which	becomes	but	 never	 is’	 (τὸ	 γιγνόμενον	 μὲν	 ἀεί,	 ὄν	 δὲ	 οὐδέποτε).	 In	 this	 distinction,	 τί	 τὸ	 γιγνόμενον	 is	introduced	in	contrast	to	τί	τὸ	ὄν	in	a	way	that	seems	very	similar	to	that	of	ἡ	μεριστὴ	οὐσία	to	ἡ	ἀμέριστος	οὐσία	at	35a1-3.	Those	scholars	assume	that	it	is	reasonable	to	regard	the	undivided	and	divided	being	at	35a1-3	as	 identical	 to	being	and	becoming	at	27d6-7,	and	 thus	undivided	being	as	Form	and	divided	being	as	sensible	objects.	In	my	view,	the	resemblance	in	these	two	passages	does	not	necessarily	warrant	or	 justify	the	 assumption	 that	 the	 two	 sets	 of	 phrases	 should	 be	 read	 as	 equivalent.	 I	 do	 not	 deny	 the	apparent	 affinity	 between	 the	 two	 pairs	 of	 concepts,	 but	 I	 cannot	 see	 that	 their	 similarity	indicates	their	equivalence	as	obviously	as	some	suggest.	I	am	particularly	doubtful	because,	first	
																																																																																																																																																														προσῆκεν	διένειμεν,	ἑκάστην	δὲ	ἔκ	τε	ταὐτοῦ	καὶ	θατέρου	καὶ	τής	οὐσίασ	μεμειγμένην.	6	 For	a	discussion	of	most	ancient	and	modern	exegeses,	see	Taylor	(1928)	106~136;	for	a	discussion	particularly	about	the	second	ἆυ	περὶ,	see	Grube	(1932)	80~82;	for	a	more	recent	exegetical	reading,	see	Lisi	(1997)	251-259.	7	 As	sketched	previously,	the	immortal	part	and	the	other	two	mortal	parts	of	the	soul	communicate	through	their	motions.	In	the	following	argument,	I	want	to	show	if	there	is	any	compositional	base	that	enables	the	motional	communication	in	the	first	place.	8	 Cf.	Cornford	(1937)	62;	Grube	(1932)	80;	Robinson	(1995)	71.	
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of	 all,	 the	 terminology	 Timaeus	 employs	 in	 the	 two	 passages	 is	 actually	 different.	 The	employment	 of	 τὸ	 ὄν	 and	 τὸ	 γιγνόμενον	 found	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 Timaeus	 seems	 to	 be	 quite	consistent,	whereas	the	frequency	of	the	term	οὐσία	suggests	a	richer	sense	that	incorporates	τὸ	ὄν	 and	 τὸ	 γιγνόμενον.9	 I	 will	 expand	 on	 and	 explain	 this	 point	 below.	 Briefly	 speaking,	 even	though	the	variety	in	terminology	cannot	confirm	the	dissimilarity	between	the	two	passages,	at	least	such	inconsistency	suggests	the	possibility	of	an	alternative	interpretation.	Secondly,	 the	contexts	where	the	two	pairs	of	concepts	are	brought	up	are	different.	Since	the	 birth	 of	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 is	 earlier	 than	 that	 of	 the	 cosmic	 body,	 as	 is	 explicitly	 noted	 at	34c2-35a1,	 that	 the	construction	of	 the	cosmic	soul	 took	place	pre-cosmos	 is	without	question.	Whereas,	 at	 27d6-28a6,	 when	 Timaeus	 introduces	 the	 distinction	 between	 τὸ	 ὄν	 and	 τὸ	γιγνόμενον,	it	is	not	so	clear	whether	he	refers	to	entities	in	the	cosmos	or	pre-cosmos,	or	maybe	Timaeus	makes	this	distinction	to	set	up	a	general	rule	that	is	applicable	to	situations	in	both	the	cosmos	 and	 pre-cosmos.	 For,	 the	 unchangeable	 nature	 of	 τὸ	 ὄν	 and	 changeable	 nature	 of	 τὸ	γιγνόμενον	is	consistent	regardless	of	whether	they	are	to	be	found	in	the	cosmos	or	pre-cosmos.	But	if	we	take	the	passage	word	by	word,	the	claim	that	τὸ	γιγνόμενον	can	be	grasped	by	sense	perception	 implies	 a	 cosmic	 background,	 because	 that	 which	 perceives	 and	 that	 which	 is	perceived	 are	 made	 of	 the	 same	 materials,	 i.e.	 the	 four	 elemental	 solids.	 Additionally,	 τὸ	γιγνὀμενον	 in	 pre-cosmos	 is	 chaotic	 and	 disproportional,	 that	 is,	 without	 forms	 and	 numbers.	Hence,	 even	 if	 there	 were	 sense	 perception	 in	 the	 pre-cosmos,	 it	 could	 not	 perceive	 τὸ	γιγνὀμενον.	Therefore,	τὸ	γιγνόμενον	at	27d6-28a6	refers	to	sensible	objects	in	the	cosmos.	This	being	the	case,	given	the	fact	that	the	Form	is	the	only	entity	which	always	is	and	never	becomes,	I	accept	 the	viewpoint	 that	 the	undivided	being	refers	 to	Form,	but	not	 that	 the	undivided	and	divided	being	can	be	equated	with	τὸ	ὄν	and	τὸ	γιγνόμενον,	for	there	was	not	such	a	thing	as	a	sensible	object	when	the	cosmic	soul	was	constructed.	Thirdly,	 the	 interpretation	 that	 undivided	 being	 means	 Form	 and	 divided	 being	 sensible	objects	involves	two	problems.	First,	as	argued	above,	chronologically	speaking,	sensible	objects	are	yet	to	be	available	for	the	Demiurge	to	use	when	he	constructs	the	cosmic	soul.	Second,	the	cosmic	 body	 consists	 of	 various	 sensible	 objects	 and	 it	 as	 a	whole	 is	 a	 sensible	 object	 per	 se.																																																									9	 For	a	discussion	on	the	terms	of	the	distinction	between	‘being’	and	‘becoming’	in	other	Platonic	dialogues,	see	Owen	(1986).	
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Therefore,	 saying	 that	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 is	 constructed	 of	 Form	 and	 sensible	 objects	 equates	 to	saying	that	the	cosmic	soul	is	composed	of	Form	and	cosmic	body.	This	being	the	case,	then	what	is	the	point	of	making	a	cosmic	body	when	there	is	already	a	cosmic	soul	that	contains	the	cosmic	body	and	is	superior	in	every	sense?	Furthermore,	given	that	sensible	objects	come	into	being	as	the	images	of	Forms,	precisely,	the	impressions	of	Forms	on	the	Receptacle	(52c-d),	a	cosmic	soul	constructed	of	Form	and	sensible	objects	means	a	cosmic	soul	composed	of	Form	and	the	images	of	Form.	It	is	very	unlikely	that	the	Demiurge	could	have	forced	the	Forms	into	mixture	with	any	other	entities	since	the	Forms	are	unchangeable.	It	is	also	very	unlikely	that	the	Demiurge	would	have	made	the	cosmic	body	as	contingent	upon	the	Forms	as	it	is	if	he	was	able	to	mix	the	Forms	with	other	entities,	since	he	wanted	the	cosmos	to	come	to	be	as	good	as	possible.	Therefore,	the	idea	that	the	undivided	being	and	divided	being	refer	to	Form	and	sensible	objects	is	doubtful.	What,	then,	do	‘undivided	being’	and	‘divided	being’	mean?	To	answer	this	question,	I	will	first	 consider	 the	 particular	 connotation	 of	 ὄν,	 γιγνόμενον,	 and	 οὐσία	 in	 the	 Timaeus	 by	comparing	 the	 application	 of	 each	 term	 in	 the	 text.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 that,	 I	 then	 decide	 what	undivided	and	divided	being	refer	to	in	the	context	of	35a1-b3.	A	careful	reading	of	27d6-28a6	and	35a1-b3	will,	as	has	been	shown	above,	convince	us	that	ὄν,	γιγνόμενον,	and	οὐσία	are	employed	disparately.	At	27d6-28a6,	τὸ	ὄν	and	τὸ	γιγνόμενον	are	the	 substantive	 use	 of	 εἰμί	 (to	 be)	 and	 γίγνομαι	 (to	 become)	 and	 indicate	 entities	 whose	existential	 state	 is	 ὄν	 (being)	 and	 γιγνόμενον	 (becoming)	 respectively.	 And	 here	 τὸ	 ὄν	 and	 τὸ	γιγνόμενον	indicate	Forms	and	sensible	objects.	Elsewhere	in	the	Timaeus,	e.g.	29b2-c2,	51d3-e6,	and	 52a1-7,	 there	 are	 similar	 distinctions	 of	 Forms	 and	 sensible	 objects	 and	 Timaeus	 also	introduces	 the	 corresponding	 humanly	 possible	 ways	 to	 cognize	 them.	 In	 all	 those	 passages,	Timaeus	 has	 employed	 τὸ	 ὄν	 and	 τὸ	 γιγνόμενον	 to	 indicate	 Form	 and	 sensible	 objects	respectively.	 It	 is	 evident	 that	 Plato	 has	 applied	 specific	 terms	 to	 denote	 the	 two	 entities,	therefore	 readers	might	 expect	 terminological	 consistency	 in	 reference	 to	 Forms	 and	 sensible	objects.	However,	 one	will	 find	 it	 startlingly	 odd	 that	 Plato	 has,	 in	 some	other	 passages	 of	 the	
Timaeus,	 used	another	 term	 to	 refer	 to	both	ὄν	and	γιγνόμενον	 (if	 the	orthodox	 interpretation	holds).	For	instance,	he	applies	οὐσία	to	deliver	the	same	meaning	as	ὄν	at	29c2,	37e5,	and	52c4,	and	entities	that	are	and	that	become,	even	the	intermediate	mixture	of	the	two,	at	35a1-3	and	37a3.	 It	 is	 obvious	 that	 οὐσία	 enjoys	 a	 richer	 connotation	 than	 that	 of	 ὄν,	 unlike	 some	 other	
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dialogues	 in	 which	 Plato	 uses	 ὄν	 and	 οὐσία	 interchangeably.10	 Otherwise	 the	 terminological	variety	of	οὐσία	seems	to	devalue	the	distinction	Timaeus	made	at	27d6-28a6.	This	 is	because,	now	that	textual	evidence	shows	οὐσία	can	be	used	to	indicate	entities	that	become	as	well,	if	in	the	following	account	οὐσία	and	ὄν	share	one	meaning,	 then	inescapably	γιγνόμενον	equals	ὄν,	since	there	is	no	definitive	evidence	which	shows	that	Timaeus	used	οὐσία	in	a	way	that	excludes	γιγνόμενον.	Therefore,	οὐσία	must	possess	a	connotation	that	covers	the	meaning	of	both	ὄν	and	γιγνόμενον,	whether	or	not	ἡ	ἀμέριστος	οὐσία	 refers	 to	Form	and	ἡ	μεριστὴ	οὐσία	 to	 sensible	objects,	 since	 they	must	 be	 indicative	 of	 disparate	 existence	 taking	 the	mixing	 procedure	 into	consideration.	Thinking	of	the	fact	that	οὐσία	is	applicable	to	indicating	the	connotation	of	ὄν,	it	is	 reasonable	 to	 infer	 that	 οὐσία	 is	 used	 by	 Timaeus	 as	 a	 term	 for	modes	 of	 existence,	 one	 of	which	is	being	(ὄν)	and	one	of	which	is	becoming	(γιγνόμενον),	which	are	the	participle	form	of	“to	be”	and	“to	become”.	And	then	we	can	have	the	substantial	application	of	οὐσία,	for	instance,	ἡ	ἀμέριστος	οὐσία	as	referring	to	Forms.	This	being	the	case,	we	can	conclude	that	οὐσία	has	a	more	extensive	category	and	application	than	that	of	ὄν	and	γιγνόμενον	and	thus	can	be	used	as	an	equivalent	not	only	to	ὄν	and	γιγνόμενον	but	also	to	other	modes	of	existence,	if	any.11	That	οὐσία	possesses	a	richer	connotation	allows	a	broader	range	of	 interpretation:	οὐσία	can	indicate	not	only	the	modes	in	which	entities	exist,	entities	like	τὸ	ὄν	and	τὸ	γιγνόμενον,	in	the	cosmos,	but	also	other	possible	modes	of	existence	in	the	pre-cosmos.	I	refer	to	existence	in	the	 pre-cosmos	 particularly	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 our	 earlier	 discussion	 that	 in	 view	 of	 the	 order	 of	cosmic	creation	the	ingredients	the	Demiurge	used	for	constructing	the	cosmic	soul	must	belong	to	 pre-cosmos.	 According	 to	 Timaeus	 52d3,	 there	 were	 three	 modes	 of	 existence	 in	 the	pre-cosmos:	ὄν,	γένεσις,	and	χώρα.	It	is	reasonable	to	suggest	that	the	divided	being	(ἡ	μεριστὴ	οὐσία)	 refers	 to	 either	 γένεσις	 or	 χώρα	 (the	 Receptacle).	 The	 difference	 between	 pre-cosmic	γένεσις	and	cosmic	τὸ	γιγνόμενον,	sensible	objects,	resides	in	the	fact	that	the	latter	comes	into	being	in	an	orderly	fashion	because	of	the	interference	from	the	Demiurge	while	the	former	was	in	a	chaotic	condition	due	to	the	lack	of	proportionality,	as	described	at	30a3-5	and	52d4-53b4.	Apart	from	that,	both	pre-cosmic	γένεσις	and	τὸ	γιγνόμενον	refer	to	a	kind	of	entity	that	exists	in	a	 way	 that	 is	 unstable	 and	 constantly	 changing.	 Therefore,	 firstly,	 the	 disorderly	 quality	 of																																																									10	 Cf.	Sophist	232c8;	246b1	and	8,	c2	and	7;	248c8,	d2,	e2.	11	 The	way	this	terminology	is	used	can	also	be	found	in	other	Platonic	dialogues.	Cf.	Sophist	219b4;	239b8;	246d5;	248c2;	250b11;	251d1	and	5,	e10;	252a2;	258b	2	and	10;	260d3;	261e5;	262c3.	
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pre-cosmic	 γένεσις	 invalidates	 its	 being	 one	 of	 the	 ingredients	 the	 Demiurge	 could	 use	 to	construct	the	cosmic	soul.	This	is	because,	in	essence,	the	ways	in	which	the	pre-cosmic	γένεσις	and	τὸ	γιγνόμενον	exist	are	 the	same,	 that	 is,	 they	are	always	changing,	and	they	differ	only	 in	that	the	latter	is	a	proportional	version	of	the	former.	That	being	so,	it	would	be	absurd	to	claim	that	the	Demiurge	could	have	considered	the	pre-cosmic	γένεσις	as	an	ingredient	for	the	cosmic	soul.	This	is	because,	as	has	been	argued	earlier,	one	reason	the	Demiurge	would	not	use	sensible	objects	to	construct	the	cosmic	soul	is	because	it	 is	contingent	upon	Forms,	and	the	pre-cosmic	γένεσις	 existed	 even	 in	 a	 worse	 fashion.	 Secondly,	 as	 has	 been	 briefly	 stated	 earlier,	 it	 is	 not	possible,	even	for	the	Demiurge,	to	alter	the	unchangeable	nature	of	the	Form,	let	alone	to	force	it	into	 a	mixture	with	 its	 own	 reflection,	 that	 is,	 sensible	 object	 as	 the	 image	 of	 Form.	 Similarly,	since	the	pre-cosmic	γένεσις	is	a	disorderly	version	of	τὸ	γιγνόμενον,	it	is	impossible	for	it	to	be	mixed	with	 the	 Forms.	 The	 reason	 is	 as	 follows.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 according	 to	 52a1-7,	 τὸ	 ὄν,	Form,	 “neither	 receives	 into	 itself	 anything	 else	 from	 anywhere	 else,	 nor	 itself	 enters	 into	anything	 else	 anywhere,”	 and	 the	 only	 way	 in	 which	 Form	 will	 ever	 have	 connection,	 or,	inappropriately	speaking,	 ‘interaction’,	with	other	entities,	as	Timaeus	claims	(50d1-2),	 is	 to	be	the	 model	 of	 τὸ	 γιγνόμενον.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 just	 like	 sensible	 objects,	 the	 existence	 of	pre-cosmic	γένεσις	was	contingent	upon	the	Forms,	and	without	the	creation	of	the	Demiurge,	it	lacked	proportion	and	measure	(53a8)	and	merely	had	the	traces	of	what	were	later	to	be	called	the	 four	elemental	solids	(53b2)	 that	compose	sensible	objects.	The	Demiurge	wanted	the	best	for	the	cosmos,	whereas	entities	such	as	pre-cosmic	γένεσις,	whose	nature	was	disproportional	and	unstable,	could	hardly	suffice	to	be	one	of	the	ingredients	for	the	construction	of	the	cosmic	soul.	Furthermore,	since	the	Demiurge	was	able	to	bring	proportionality	to	pre-cosmic	γένεσις,	it	seems	very	odd	that	he	would	have	used	pre-cosmic	γένεσις	directly	instead	of	altering	it	first.	Now	that	I	have	argued	against	the	claim	that	the	divided	being	indicates	pre-cosmic	γένεσις,	I	 shall	proceed	 to	demonstrate	 that	 the	divided	being	 refers	 to	χώρα,	 the	Receptacle,	 since	 the	Receptacle	is	now	the	only	material	available.	If	the	divided	being	is	the	Receptacle,	then	how	are	we	 to	 understand	 the	 description	 “that	 which	 becomes	 (γιγνομένης)	 divided	 in	 bodies	 (τὰ	σώματα)?”	 Body	 (τὸ	 σῶμα)	 in	 the	 Timaeus	 relates	 to	 those	 that	 are	 perceptible,	 or,	 at	 a	microscopic	level,	elemental	triangles	and	solids	(the	former	being	the	result	of	the	cluster	of	the	latter).	The	Receptacle	is	characterless,	according	to	50b7-c3,	therefore	it	is	impossible	that	one	
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part	 of	 it	 could	 be	 distinct	 from	 another	 by	 itself.	Whereas	 when	 the	 Receptacle	 receives	 the	imitations	 imprinted	 upon	 it,	 it	 becomes	 different	 at	 different	 times	 (50c3-6),	 the	 part	 that	receives	the	imitation	of	an	equilateral	triangle	shows	divergence	from	another	part	that	receives	the	 imitation	 of	 an	 isosceles	 right-angled	 triangle.	 In	 this	way,	 the	 Receptacle	 is	 divided.	 Take	gold	moulding	for	instance:	one	part	of	the	gold	is	identical	to	another	until	the	gold	is	moulded	into,	say,	a	figure	of	a	man.	You	can	tell	which	part	of	this	gold	figure	represents	eyes,	which	is	obviously	 not	 identical	 to	 the	 part	 that	 represents	 mouth	 or	 nose.	 Hence,	 the	 gold	 becomes	divided,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 its	 parts	 are	 distinctive.	 One	 thing	 worth	 emphasizing	 is	 that,	 even	though	pre-cosmic	γένεσις	came	into	being	in	the	Receptacle,	it	does	not	mean	that	the	existence	of	the	Receptacle	entails	pre-cosmic	γένεσις.	So	the	fact	that	the	Demiurge	used	the	Receptacle	as	one	 of	 the	 components	 to	 contruct	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 does	 not	 conflict	 with	 the	 claim	 that	 the	Receptacle	is	that	in	which	pre-cosmic	γένεσις	came	into	being.	I	 think	 the	 obscurity	 of	 Timaeus’	 introduction	 of	 the	 Receptacle	 as	 ‘divided	 being’	 is	explained	by	the	fact	that	he	has	not	introduced	the	concept	of	the	Receptacle	yet	when	he	talks	about	the	construction	of	the	cosmic	soul.	Moreover,	the	belated	introduction	of	the	Receptacle	gives	 rise	 to	 an	 objection	 against	 my	 interpretation	 as	 to	 why	 it	 is	 admissible	 to	 rely	 on	 the	Receptacle	as	an	explanation	before	Plato	introduces	it	in	the	Timaeus.	First	of	all,	the	postponed	introduction	 of	 the	 Receptacle	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 to	 discuss	 the	 nature	 of	 the	Receptacle	requires	a	 lengthy	digression	 from	the	main	topic,	 thus,	 I	 think	 it	 is	understandable	that	he	only	introduces	the	concept	once	his	discourse	requires	it.	Secondly,	the	Receptacle	exists	as	 one	of	 the	pre-cosmos	 existents,	 so	 it	 has	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 the	 creation	of	 the	 cosmic	 soul,	considering	the	order	in	which	and	the	available	components	out	of	which	the	Demiurge	created	the	cosmic	soul.	Due	 to	 the	nature	of	 the	Forms,	 the	only	possible	way	 for	 the	Demiurge	 to	mix	 the	Forms	with	other	entities	is	to	make	an	impression	of	the	Forms	out	of	those	other	entities,	leaving	the	Forms	 themselves	 unchanged.	 In	 this	 case,	 to	 mix	 the	 undivided	 being,	 the	 Forms,	 and	 the	divided	being,	 the	Receptacle,	 is	 to	model	an	 impression	after	 the	Forms	out	of	 the	Receptacle,	which	 is	exactly	how	pre-cosmic	γένεσις	and	τὸ	γιγνόμενον	come	 into	being:	 the	 former	 is	 the	haphazard	 images	of	 the	Forms	and	the	 latter	 is	 the	proportional	 images	of	 the	Forms.	 I	 find	 it	plausible	 to	 imagine	that	 the	Demiurge	saw	three	kinds	of	existence	 in	 the	chaotic	pre-cosmos,	
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taking	 full	 advantage	 of	 which,	 he	 then	 rearranged	 their	 forms	 of	 existence	 by	 giving	 them	proportionality	 instead	 of	 transforming	 them	utterly:	 the	Demiurge	 configured	 the	 pre-cosmic	γένεσις	as	proportional	τὸ	γιγνόμενον,	 i.e.	 sensible	objects,	which	are,	at	 the	microscopic	 level,	elemental	triangles	and	solids;	prior	to	which,	he	created	the	cosmic	soul	to	be	governing	those	sensible	objects	in	his	absence	by	mixing	the	Forms	and	the	Receptacle.	Since	the	mixture	of	the	Forms	 and	 the	Receptacle	 is	made	 by	 the	 hand	 of	 the	Demiurge	 himself,	 and	 according	 to	 the	
Timaeus	 41a7-8	 and	 c2-3,	 whatever	 comes	 into	 being	 by	 the	 hand	 of	 the	 Demiurge	 will	 be	exempted	 from	 being	 undone,	 the	 mixture	 of	 the	 undivided	 being	 and	 divided	 being	 shall	 be	indissoluble,	 that	 is,	 that	 very	 impression	 made	 by	 the	 Demiurge	 himself	 will	 not	 perish	 like	γένεσις12	 normally	does.	Apart	from	the	‘undivided	being’	and	‘divided	being’,	the	Demiurge	then	also	made	a	mixture	of	 ‘undivided	 Same’	 and	 ‘divided	 Same’,	 and	 a	 mixture	 of	 ‘undivided	 Different’	 and	 ‘divided	Different’,	that	is,	‘intermediate	Same’	and	‘intermediate	Different’.	The	concepts	of	‘intermediate	Same’	 and	 ‘intermediate	Different’	will	 become	even	more	difficult	 to	 grasp	 than	 ‘intermediate	being’	if	we	try	to	imagine	‘Same’	and	‘Different’	as	being	actual	entities.	A	relevant	aspect	that	is	worth	 stressing	 is	 that	 the	 account	 of	 35a1-b3	 applies	 two	 terms	 to	 indicate	 the	 intermediate	mixture:	 one	 is	 οὐσία	 and	 the	 other	 is	 φύσις.13	 To	 throw	 some	 light	 on	 the	 understanding	 of	φύσις,	we	 can,	 I	 suggest,	 use	 the	 connotation	 of	 οὐσία	 as	 a	 resource.	 As	 demonstrated	 above,	Timaeus	uses	οὐσία	to	indicate	variations	of	existence,	such	as	being,	becoming,	and	the	way	in	which	the	Receptacle	exists.	With	a	specific	attributive	phrase	modifying	it,	e.g.	 ‘ἀεὶ	κατὰ	ταὐτὰ	ἐχούσης’,	 οὐσία	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 refer	 to	 corresponding	 entities	 that	 exist	 in	 the	 way	 as	attributed.	 What	 Timaeus	 tries	 to	 emphasize	 at	 35a1-b3	 by	 using	 οὐσία	 is	 not	 really	 the	ingredients	as	entities	themselves	but	rather	the	particular	ways	in	which	those	entities	exist.	If	this	is	the	case,	and	if	such	understanding	works	for	the	φύσις	of	the	Same	and	Different	as	well,	φύσις	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 indicating	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Same	 and	 Different	 that	 are	abstracted	from	entities	that	possess	such	qualities,	in	other	words,	the	conception	of	same	and	different	by	themselves	rather	than	as	attributes	in	some	things.	As	Robinson	points	out,	the	text																																																									12	 In	the	following	discussion,	I	will	use	γένεσις	to	indicate	becoming	in	a	general	sense,	and	will	add	‘pre-cosmic’	or	‘cosmic’	as	indicative	of	particular	reference.	13	 Cf.	Grube	(1932).	Grube	suggested	that	ἡ	φύσις	ταὐτού	is	identical	to	ταὐτού	and	ἡ	φύσις	τοῦ	ἑτέρου	to	τὸ	ἕτερον.	Lisi	(2007)	noticed	that	Plato	could	use	φύσις	to	imply	something	particular	but	he	failed	to	develop	any	explanation.	
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provides	no	hint	of	any	subordination	among	Being	(οὐσία),	Same,	and	Different,	which	means	the	 three	 kinds	must	 possess	 equal	 importance	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 cosmic	 soul.14	 If	we	associate	 the	 concepts	 of	 the	 Same	 and	 Different	 in	 the	Timaeus	 with	 those	 of	 the	 Sophist,	 as	Cornford	suggests,	we	will	reach	a	conclusion	that	Being,	Same,	and	Different	are	‘all-pervading’	in	that	every	other	Form	‘combines’	with	them	while	they	themselves	cannot	be	identified	with	or	derived	from	one	another,	or	any	other.15	 Therefore,	Being,	Same,	and	Different	indicate	the	attributes,	in	terms	of	the	particular	ways	certain	entities	exist,	of	the	ingredients	for	the	cosmic	soul.	How,	then,	do	we	understand	the	“undivided”	and	“divided”	Same	and	Different?	Robinson	suggests,	 referring	 to	 the	 logical	distinction	of	Being,	Same,	and	Different	 that	 is	applied	 to	 Forms	 in	 the	 Sophist,	 that	 ‘undivided	 Same’	 could	 mean	 the	 self-identical,	 simple,	single,	unique	nature	of	the	individual	Form	and	‘divided	Same’	could	indicate	the	similar	nature	of	sensible	objects.16	 Despite	my	objection	to	Robinson’s	viewpoint	that	divided	being	equates	to	sensible	objects,	I	find	it	quite	explanatory	if	we	apply	the	abstract	concepts	of	Being,	Same,	and	Different	in	the	Sophist	to	help	us	understand	the	actual	entities	discussed	in	the	Timaeus,	in	that	undivided/divided	 Being,	 Same,	 and	 Different	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 distinct	 and	 individual	attributes	 ascribed	 to	 particular	 entities	 so	 that	 the	 readers	 can	 isolate	 them.	 Therefore,	 the	undivided	Being	 and	 divided	Being	 denote	 the	ways	 in	which	 Forms	 and	 the	Receptacle	 exist,	that	 is,	 ὄν	 and	 χώρα.	 The	 undivided	 Same	 indicates	 that	 every	 individual	 Form	 is	 the	 same	 as	itself	 and	 undivided	 Different	 indicates	 that	 it	 is	 different	 from	 any	 other	 Forms.	 The	 divided	Same	refers	to	the	essence	of	the	Receptacle	that	whatever	impression	has	been	imprinted,	it	is	always	characterless	by	itself,	in	other	words,	the	unchangeable	in	nature.	The	divided	Different	refers	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Receptacle	 constantly	 receives	 various	 kinds	 of	 images	 and	 thus	appears	different	at	different	times	and	different	regions,	in	other	words,	it	is	different	from	itself	from	time	to	time.	The	reading	of	37a2-b3	makes	some	scholars	believe	that	the	ingredients	of	the	cosmic	soul	essentially	 enable	 the	 capacity	 of	 cognition	 of	 the	 cosmic	 soul.17	 Because	 the	 cosmic	 soul	contains	 the	 attributes	 of	 Being,	 Same,	 and	 Different	 of	 the	 Forms	 and	 the	 Receptacle,	 it	 can,																																																									14	 Cf.	Robinson	(1995)	73.	15	 Cf.	Cornford	(1937)	61-66.	16	 Cf.	Robinson	(1995)	72-74.	17	 Cf.	Johansen	(2004)	138-139.	
	 55	
according	to	the	principle	of	‘like	is	known	by	like’,	cognize	things	discerning	their	sameness	and	difference	by	comparing	them	with	itself.	Another	reason	that	this	cognitive	process	is	possible	is	because	the	constituents	of	the	cosmic	soul	and	the	cosmic	body	are	in	a	sense	the	same,	that	is,	the	Forms	and	 the	Receptacles	are	 integral	components	 in	 the	 fashioning	of	 the	cosmic	soul	as	well	as	 the	cosmic	body.	As	 I	have	argued	above,	 the	Demiurge	constructed	the	cosmic	soul	by	modeling	 an	 impression	 after	 the	 Forms	 out	 of	 the	 Receptacle.	 In	 this	 way,	 he	 produced	intermediate	 forms	 of	 Being,	 Same,	 and	 Different	 of	 the	 Forms	 and	 the	 Receptacle.	 As	 I	 have	argued	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 the	 triangles	 and	 solids	 come	 into	 being	 in	 a	 way	 that	 they	 are	 the	impression	of	the	images	of	the	Forms	out	of	the	Receptacle.	Combining	the	argument	in	Chapter	2	 with	 the	 discussion	 of	 pre-cosmic	 γένεσις	 that	 it	 is	 that	 which	 comes	 into	 being	 in	 the	Receptacle	and	then	perishes	out	of	it,	only	without	forms	and	numbers,	we	can	add	some	details	about	 the	creation	of	 the	 triangles	and	solids,	 that	 is,	 the	material	 the	Demiurge	used	to	create	the	 elemental	 triangles	 and	 solids	 was	 actually	 the	 disproportional	 γένεσις,	 and	 by	 giving	pre-cosmic	γένεσις	 forms	and	numbers,	 the	pre-cosmic	γένεσις	received	distinctive	shapes	and	then	 become	 proportional,	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 triangles	 and	 solids	 is	 the	Demiurge’	 transforming	 pre-cosmic	 γένεσις	 into	 τὸ	 γιγνόμενον.	 In	 that	 case,	 the	 triangles	 and	solids	 as	 well	 as	 the	 cosmic	 body	 as	 a	 whole	 are	 also	 created	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 ‘interaction’	between	the	Forms	and	the	Receptacle	under	the	interference	of	the	Demiurge.	Therefore,	both	the	 cosmic	 soul	 and	 the	 cosmic	 body	 are	 made	 out	 of	 the	 ‘mixture’	 of	 the	 Forms	 and	 the	Receptacle.	 In	other	words,	 the	basic	components	 that	constitute	 the	cosmic	soul	and	body	are	the	same.	And	 the	difference	 in	 the	 construction	of	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 and	body	 resides	 in	 that,	 firstly,	when	 constructing	 the	 cosmic	 soul,	 the	 mixture	 of	 the	 Forms	 and	 the	 Receptacle	 had	 been	deliberately	 and	 carefully	 arranged	 by	 the	 Demiurge,	 while	 on	 the	 contrary,	 the	 Demiurge	directly	used	pre-cosmic	γένεσις	as	 the	component	 to	 create	 the	 triangles	and	solids.	After	 the	mixing	 process,	 the	 Demiurge	 then	 constructed	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 compound	 by	 dividing	 it	 into	intervals	according	to	mathematical	ratios,	and	further	cut	up	the	proportioned	compound	into	two	bands	and	bent	these	two	bands	into	circles,	 joining	one	another	at	two	opposite	points	of	the	circles.	He	designated	the	outer	circle	as	the	Same,	the	revolution	of	which	is	uniform,	and	the	
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inner	 the	 Different,	 which	 was	 further	 divided	 into	 seven	 unequal	 circles.18	 In	 this	 way,	 the	Demiurge	 endowed	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 with	 circular	 motions	 and	 thus	 he	 completed	 the	construction	 of	 the	 cosmic	 soul.	 In	 contrast,	 the	way	 the	 Demiurge	 configured	 the	 pre-cosmic	γένεσις	 was	 to	 alter	 it	 with	 geometrical	 shapes	 and	 give	 it	 rectilinear	 motions	 that	 allow	 the	inter-transformation	 among	 the	 solids.	 The	 similarity	 in	 constituents	 and	 proportional	construction,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 enables	 the	 bond	 and	 interaction	 between	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 and	cosmic	 body;	while	 the	 structural	 superiority	 of	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 over	 that	 of	 the	 cosmic	 body	explains	its	priority	to	the	cosmic	body,	as	well	its	invisibility.	As	to	the	invisibility	of	the	cosmic	soul,	T.	K.	Johansen	suggests	that	it	is	the	perceptibility	of	the	cosmic	body	and	the	invisibility	of	the	cosmic	soul	that	distinguish	them	from	each	other.19	He	 argues	 that	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 is	 an	 infinitesimally	 thin	 layer	 that	 has	 spatial	 extension	 but	occupies	 non-spatial	 volume	 at	 the	 same	 time.20	 However,	 at	 45b-46c	 and	 65b-68d,	 Timaeus	explains	that	the	inter-transformation	and	interaction	among	elemental	triangles	and	solids	are	the	 cause	of	 physical	 sensation	of	 the	human	body.	And	Timaeus	 also	warns	his	 audience	 that	only	 clusters	 of	 the	 elemental	 triangles	 are	 humanly	 perceptible	 at	 56b-c.	 This	 means	 that	whatever	is	perceptible	is	material,	that	is,	composed	of	elemental	triangles	and	solids;	however,	whatever	is	imperceptible	is	not	necessarily	non-material	but	may	be	too	small	to	be	perceived,	as	clearly	stated	at	56b-c.	As	is	shown	above,	the	cosmic	soul	and	the	cosmic	body	share	the	same	constituents,	 and	 differ	 in	 the	 ways	 those	 constituents	 are	 constructed.	 Therefore,	 that	 the	cosmic	body	is	perceptible	and	the	cosmic	soul	is	invisible	are	not	the	attributes	that	distinguish	the	 cosmic	 soul	 from	 its	 body.	 This	 is	 because	 those	 attributes	 themselves	 are	 caused	 by	 the	difference	 in	 structure	of	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 and	body.	And	 the	 structural	difference	between	 the	cosmic	soul	and	body	is	what	essentially	distinguishes	the	cosmic	soul	and	its	body.	So	 far,	 I	 have	 discussed	 the	 constituents	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 cosmic	 soul,	 and	explained	why	 the	 non-material	 soul	 is	 able	 to	 be	 bound	 to	 and	 interact	with	 physical	 cosmic	body:	the	cosmic	soul	 is	non-material	not	 in	a	sense	that	 it	 is	absolutely	 incompatible	with	and	different	 from	 the	 cosmic	 body,	 it	 is	 non-material	 only	 in	 a	 sense	 that	 its	 constituents	 are	constructed	in	a	way	that	is	different	and	superior	to	that	of	the	cosmic	body	and	nevertheless	its																																																									18	 Cf.	Tim.	35b4-36d7.	19	 Cf.	Johansen	(2004)	140.	20	 Cf.	Johansen	(2004)	141.	
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constituents	are	the	same	as	that	of	the	cosmic	body.	And	likewise,	the	cosmic	body	is	regarded	as	physical	in	the	sense	that	it	was	constructed	in	such-and-such	a	way	that	is	different	from	that	of	the	cosmic	soul.	This	being	the	case,	the	cosmic	soul	is	allowed	to	be	connected	to	the	cosmic	body	on	the	one	hand,	and	to	govern	the	latter	on	the	other	hand.	
3.2	The	creation	of	individual	human	immortal	souls	
	 	 For	the	constitution	of	the	individual	immortal	souls,	the	Demiurge	used	‘what	remained	of	the	previous	ingredients’	(τὰ	τῶν	πρόσθεν	ὑπόλοιπα)	that	he	had	used	to	construct	the	cosmic	soul	and	mixed	them	‘in	somewhat	the	same	way’	(τρόπον…τινα	τὸν	αύτόν),	which	turned	out	to	be	no	longer	as	pure	as	the	preliminary	mixture	that	served	for	the	creation	of	the	cosmic	soul	but	was	‘of	a	second	and	third	grade’	(άκήρατα…δεύτερα	καὶ	τρίτα)	(41d).	This	description,	as	I	have	 pointed	 out	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 section,	 indicates	 the	 affinity	 that	 Plato	 wants	 his	readers	to	notice	between	the	constitution	of	the	cosmic	soul	and	that	of	the	individual	immortal	souls.	The	ingredients	that	compose	the	cosmic	soul	are	the	intermediate	mixture	of	Being,	Same,	and	 Different,	 the	 remainder	 of	 which,	 as	 Taylor	 and	 Cornford	 interpreted	 correctly,	 are	 the	ingredients	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 individual	 immortal	 souls.21	 The	 phrase	 ‘in	 somewhat	 the	same	way’	indicates	that	individual	immortal	souls	have	similarity	in	composition	to	the	cosmic	soul,	 that	 is,	 the	 Demiurge	 first	 forced	 the	 intermediate	mixture	 of	 Difference	 into	 conformity	with	that	of	the	Same	and	then	mixed	it	with	the	intermediate	mixture	of	Being	to	form	a	uniform	mixture	(35a6-b1).	On	the	other	hand,	the	phrase	may	also	be	implying	that	there	is	possibility	that	the	ways	in	which	the	Demiurge	created	human	immortal	souls	and	the	cosmic	soul	are	not	exactly	the	same,	which	then	allows	and	explains	the	degradation	of	purity	of	human	immortal	soul.	 But	 it	 is	 unclear	 what	 Plato	 means	 by	 saying	 ‘purity’	 (άκήρατα)	 and	 what	 causes	 the	degradation	of	purity.	At	41d4-42a3,	Plato	does	not	mention	the	complex	process	of	dividing	and	reforming	after	the	mixing	process,	then	whether	the	way	in	which	the	Demiurge	constructed	the																																																									21	 Cf.	Taylor	(1928)	255	and	Cornford	(1937)	142.	For	an	alternative	view,	see	Lisi	(2007).	Lisi	argued	that	the	remainders	indicate	the	undivided	Being,	divided	Being,	undivided	Same,	divided	Same,	undivided	Different,	and	Divided	Different.	The	reason	he	thought	Taylor	and	Cornford	were	wrong	is	the	intermediate	mixtures	of	Being,	Same,	and	Different	were	used	up	to	create	the	cosmic	soul,	which,	I	think,	is	where	he	misinterpreted	the	text.	The	intermediate	mixtures	of	Being,	Same,	and	Different	were	not	used	up,	but	the	mixture	of	Being,	Same,	and	Different	was	used	up	in	the	process	of	division	(Tim.	36b5-6).	The	Demiurge	used	the	former	mixtures	to	form	the	latter	mixture,	but	Plato	never	mentions	that	the	Demiurge	had	used	all	the	intermediate	mixture	(Tim.	35a6-b3).	 	
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two	 revolutions	 in	 human	 immortal	 soul	 is	 exactly	 the	 same	 as	 that	 of	 the	 cosmic	 is	 open	 to	dispute,	 i.e.	 it	 might	 even	 be	 possible	 that	 the	 Demiurge	 changed	 the	 mathematical	 ratios	 in	dividing	 the	 soul	 compound	 so	 as	 to	 affect	 the	 purity	 of	 the	 created	 souls.	 Thus,	 I	 agree	with	Archer-Hind’s	suggestion	that	purity	represents	the	harmonious	proportion	among	the	mixture	of	 Being,	 Same,	 and	 Different,	 and	 hence	 the	 ‘second	 and	 third	 grade	 of	 purity’	 describes	 the	inferior	proportionality	of	the	preliminary	mixture,	particularly	the	resistance	of	the	Different.22	However,	 the	 degradation	 of	 the	 individual	 immortal	 souls	 seems	 to	 violate	 the	 principle	claimed	at	41c2-3	by	Timaeus	that	the	direct	product	of	the	Demiurge	would	have	been	as	good	and	 perfect	 as	 the	 gods.23	 Such	 degradation,	 however,	 as	 Archer-Hind	 comments,	 fits	 Plato’s	scheme	of	a	cosmology	within	which	the	entities,	from	celestial	stars	to	human	beings	to	plants,	manifest	their	remoteness	from	the	Forms	correspondingly	and	hierarchically.24	 Therefore,	this	degradation	 of	 proportionality	 in	 individual	 immortal	 souls	 may	 be	 a	 deliberate	 work	 of	 the	Demiurge	 in	 order	 that	 the	 individual	 immortal	 souls	 are	 potentially	 corruptible;	 in	 this	 way,	then	they	can	degenerate	and	reincarnate	to	bring	the	other	mortal	creatures	into	being	and	thus	subserve	for	the	completion	of	the	cosmos.25	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 re-division	 of	 the	 preliminary	 mixture	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 two	revolving	 circles	 of	 the	 Same	 and	 Different	 is	 not	 mentioned	 in	 Timaeus’	 discourse,26	 the	structural	 similarity	 between	 the	 individual	 immortal	 souls	 and	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 –	 there	 are	internal	 revolutions	 of	 the	 Same	 and	 the	 Different	 in	 both	 souls	 –	 can	 be	 inferred	 from	 the	description	of	the	disturbance	of	the	revolution	within	the	individual	immortal	souls	when	they	are	embodied	(43d-e):27	 the	revolutions	of	the	Same	and	the	Different	in	the	immortal	soul	are																																																									22	 Cf.	Archer-Hind	(1888)	141.	Cornford	(1937),	on	page	143	and	145,	argued	that	‘second	or	third	purity’	referred	to	the	superiority	of	men’s	soul	over	women’s.	I	cannot	see	any	connection	of	this	phrase	to	the	superiority	of	men’s	soul	over	women’s	first	of	all;	secondly,	the	first	incarnation	of	all	souls	was	the	same,	that	is,	all	men	at	the	first	incarnation,	and	women	only	came	into	being	after	the	degeneration	of	the	men’s	soul.	23	 For	arguments	and	application	of	this	principle,	see	Robinson	(1995)	80,	84-85.	24	 Cf.	Archer-Hind	(1888)	141.	25	 I	shall	talk	about	the	intention	of	the	Demiurge	in	creation	in	detail	later.	26	 Taylor	(1928,	256)	suggested	the	circle-making	process	has	been	covered	by	‘μἰσγων	τρόπον	...	τινα	τὸν	αὐτόν’	in	objection	to	Chalcidius’	viewpoint	that	the	Demiurge	dividing	᾽τὸ	πάν’	indicates	the	circle-making	process.	But	I	cannot	see	how	it	is	possible	that	the	word	‘μἰσγων’	connotes	both	the	process	of	mixing	and	the	process	of	dividing	and	reshaping.	Archer-Hind	(1888,	141)	was	partly	right	in	pointing	out	᾽τὸ	πάν’	refers	to	the	preliminary	mixture	and	the	Dermiuge	then	divided	it	into	portions	equal	in	number	to	the	stars.	This	is	where,	I	think,	Plato	skips	the	complicated	process	of	dividing	and	reshaping	that	could	become	a	digression.	But	Archer-Hind	mistook	the	meaning	of	᾽τὸ	πάν’,	for	a	detailed	refutation	of	which,	see	Taylor	(1928)	256-257.	27	 Also	at	42c5,	the	restoration	of	the	internal	revolution	of	the	soul	is	mentioned.	
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destroyed	 by	 the	 rectilinear	motions	 of	 the	 bodily	 elemental	 solids	when	 the	 immortal	 soul	 is	first	embodied.	
3.3	The	allotment	of	the	individual	immortal	souls	and	the	cause	of	evils	
The	 Demiurge	 next	 formed	 individual	 immortal	 souls	 equal	 in	 number	 to	 the	 stars	(ἰσαρίθμους	τοῖς	ἄστροις),28	 and	then	allotted	those	souls	into	each	star.	This	description,	as	has	been	pointed	out	by	many	scholars,29	 implies	that	the	number	of	the	individual	immortal	souls	is	finite,	and	this	finite	number	is	equal	to	that	of	the	stars,	which	themselves	have	souls	and	are	the	first	 living	 kind	 the	 Demiurge	 created	 within	 the	 cosmos,	 that	 is,	 the	 lesser	 gods.30	 Timaeus	describes	the	stars	as	the	chariots	(ὄχημα)	for	individual	 immortal	souls,	a	setting	in	which	the	Demiurge	showed	them	the	nature	of	the	cosmos	and	the	destined	laws,	which	possibly	intends	to	recall	Phaedrus	(246e-248b),	where	the	procession	of	the	gods	and	the	individual	souls	closely	following	 climbed	 up	 onto	 the	 rim	 of	 the	 heaven	 to	 get	 a	 vision	 of	 the	 Forms.	 However,	 the	terminological	 affinity	 between	 the	 Timaeus	 and	 the	 Phaedrus	 may	 be	 misleading.	 In	 the	
Phaedrus,	 the	 chariot	 (ὄχημα,	 247b2)	 refers	 to	 the	 soul	 as	 a	 united	 whole	 consisting	 of,	metaphorically,	a	charioteer	and	 two	horses,	whereas,	 in	 the	Timaeus,	 the	chariot	 indicates	 the	fixed	stars,	to	which	the	Demiurge	assigned	individual	immortal	souls	as	their	temporal	dwelling.	Similar	applications	of	this	word	‘ὄχημα’	can	be	found	at	Timaeus	44e2	and	69c7,	where	it	is	used	to	 express	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 soul	 and	 the	 body	 as	 the	 body	 being	 the	 soul’s	 vehicle.	Despite	that,	the	analogue	between	the	two	dialogues	is	noticeable,	on	which	scholars	tend	to	lay	stress	 in	an	epistemological	perspective	as	connecting	 it	with	 the	 theory	of	Recollection,31	 and	thus	fail	 to	consider	the	possibility	that	this	allotment	and	demonstration	may	be	conducted	to	serve	a	particular	purpose	under	the	framework	of	cosmogony.	Despite	the	terminological	difference	between	these	two	dialogues,	a	parallel	reading	of	the	description	 in	 the	 Phaedrus	 can	 help	 to	 sketch	 the	 possible	 scenario	 of	 the	 allotment	 and	demonstration	 described	 in	 the	 Timaeus.	 In	 the	 Phaedrus,	 there	 are	 various	 gods	 that																																																									28	 The	stars	here	indicate	the	fixed	stars	the	Demiurge	created	as	the	adornment	for	the	cosmos	(40a-b).	And	Plato	uses	the	instruments	of	time	(ὄργανα	χρόνου)	to	refer	to	the	wanderers	(πλάνητες),	that	is,	the	sun,	the	moon,	and	other	planets,	at	41e5	and	42d5.	Cf.	Taylor	(1928,	p.256).	29	 Cf.	Cornford	(1937)	143,	Taylor	(1928)	256,	Robinson	(1995)	85-86.	30	 Cf.	Tim.	39e-40b.	31	 Cf.	Cornford	(1937)	144,	Taylor	(1928)	257-258,	Robinson	(1995)	86.	
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accompanied	the	individual	souls	on	the	difficult	journey	to	have	a	glimpse	of	the	Forms;	thus	the	circumstances	for	individual	souls	shall	vary	due	to	the	diverse	characteristics	of	the	gods.	And	in	the	 Timaeus,	 each	 individual	 immortal	 soul	 was	 allotted	 to	 a	 carriage	 according	 to	 the	arrangement	of	the	Demiurge.32	 Thus,	if	the	Phaedrus	case	is	equally	applicable	to	the	Timaeus,	the	allotment	and	demonstration	will	 result	 in	 the	variation	of	 individuality	with	regard	 to	 the	extent	 to	which	each	 immortal	 soul	has	 grasped	 the	knowledge	 showed	by	 the	Demiurge.	And	that	Plato	neither	confirms	nor	denies	the	diversity	of	the	stars	shows	that	the	Timaean	account	is	 at	 least	 open	 for	diverse	 interpretations.33	 As	Archer-Hind	 comments,	 the	 allotment	 to	 each	star	can	be	 ‘a	 fanciful	way	of	accounting	 for	 innate	diversity	of	character	and	disposition.’34	 At	the	 same	 time,	 considering	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 lesser	gods	created	 the	physical	bodies	 for	human	beings,35	 the	diversity	of	the	lesser	gods	themselves	can	also	be	responsible	for	the	outcome	of	individual	distinctiveness	not	only	in	soul	but	also	in	physicality.	That	 the	 diversity	 of	 the	 stars	 and	 thus	 of	 the	 lesser	 gods	 entails	 the	 variation	 of	individuality	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 claim	 Plato	 makes	 in	 the	 following	 lines	 that	 the	 first	incarnation	of	all	 individual	 immortal	souls	was	the	same	out	of	 the	Demiurge’s	hand	(41e3-4)	and	the	Demiurge	himself	is	exempt	from	being	the	cause	of	any	evils	that	might	be	brought	upon	human	 beings	 (42d3	 and	 e3-4).	 The	 Demiurge	 gave	 every	 single	 immortal	 soul	 the	 same	opportunity	 to	 behold	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 cosmos	 and	 the	 destined	 laws.	 This	 being	 the	 case,	regardless	 of	 their	 distinctive	 comprehension,	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	Demiurge,	 then,	 the	first	 incarnation	 of	 all	 immortal	 souls	 was	 indeed	 undifferentiated.	 However,	 this	 individual	distinctiveness	 is	obviously	the	inevitable	consequence	caused	by	the	degradation	of	the	purity	of	individual	immortal	souls,	which	seems	a	deliberate	work	by	the	Demiurge.	If	this	statement	is	correctly	inferred,	the	account	is	apparently	self-contradictory	in	claiming,	on	the	one	hand,	that	the	Demiurge	is	not	responsible	for	any	evils,	and	implying,	on	the	other	hand,	that	the	Demiurge	could	 be	 the	 indirect	 origin	 of	 evils.	 Besides,	 the	 idea	 ‘evolution	 by	 degeneration’	 itself	 is	contradictory	to	the	fact	that	the	Demiurge	is	so	benevolent	as	Plato	affirms	(30a).	In	order	that	the	teleological	premise	that	the	Demiurge	should	be	the	most	benevolent	and																																																									32	 Cf.	Tim.40e.	33	 Cf.	Tim.	40a-b.	34	 Cf.	Archer-Hind	(1888)	142.	35	 Cf.	Tim.	42e-43a.	
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wanted	the	best	for	the	cosmos	shall	not	fail,	the	contentious	matter	of	the	cause	of	evils	must	be	dealt	with.	Whereas,	a	Demiurge	that	is	possibly	the	cause	of	evils,	on	the	contrary,	cannot	stand	as	 such	 a	 premise.	 I	 will	 discuss	 the	matter	 of	 evils	 from	 two	 perspectives.	 The	 first,	 relative	aspect	we	need	to	put	into	perspective	is	the	denotation	of	evil	in	the	Timaeus.	For,	it	is	possible	that	 a	moral-related	 idea	of	 evils	may	not	be	 identical	with	 the	nature	of	 evils	 in	 the	Timaeus’	framework.	 Our	 argument	 could	 be	 misled	 by	 not	 defining	 the	 evils	 Timaeus	 refers	 to.	 The	second	perspective	from	which	to	regard	this	matter	is	to	construct	it	as	under	the	framework	of	the	overall	Demiurgic	work	of	cosmic	creation	instead	of	within	the	confines	of	anthropocentric	creation	activities.	What	 is	 evil	 then?	According	 to	 the	description	at	42b-c,	 evil	 refers	 to	 the	opposite	of	 the	condition	 in	 which	 the	 mortal	 parts	 of	 soul	 are	 under	 control.36	 In	 a	 later	 part	 of	 Timaeus’	monologue,	 where	 he	 introduces	 bodily	 diseases	 and	mental	 illness,	 the	 disproportion,	 either	among	the	bodily	elemental	solids	or	between	soul	and	body,	is	asserted	to	be	both	the	cause	and	the	manifestation	of	evils.37	 It	is	obviously	a	kind	of	evil	that	the	mortal	parts	of	the	soul	become	the	master	of	a	person.	This	is	because	there	is	disproportion	between	the	immortal	and	mortal	soul,	and	thus	disorderliness	between	the	soul	and	the	body.38	 If	such	is	the	denotation	of	evil,	there	 is	no	 justification	 for	attributing	evils	 to	 the	Demiurgic	work,	since	 the	Demiurge	did	not	bring	 any	 disproportionality	 into	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 individual	 immortal	 souls:	 second	 or	third	 grades	 of	 purity	 in	 the	 individual	 immortal	 souls	 should	 not	 be	 regarded	 as	 being	disproportional.	Even	though	the	degradation	of	purity	brought	about	the	possible	corruption	of	the	 immortal	 souls,	 still,	 such	 corruption	 of	 the	 immortal	 souls	 and	 any	 sequential	 evils	themselves	are	not	created	by	the	Demiurge	himself.39	And	 neither	 is	 the	 Demiurge	 the	 indirect	 source	 of	 evils,	 which	 may	 be	 clarified	 with	reference	 to	 the	 calculation	of	pros	 and	 cons	of	human	beings’	 longevity	 and	well-being	 in	 the	process	 that	 the	 lesser	 gods	 created	 the	human	body	 (75b-c).	When	 creating	 the	human	body,																																																									36	 Cf.	Tim.	42b-c.	‘And	if	they	could	master	these	emotions,	their	lives	would	be	just,	whereas	if	they	were	mastered	by	them,	they	would	be	unjust.	…	then	he	still	could	not	refrain	from	wickedness	(κακίας)	…’	The	context	is	very	clear	that	wickedness	(κακίας)	refers	to	the	mortal	parts	of	soul	being	master.	37	 Cf.	Tim.	86e	and	87d.	38	 Cf.	Cherniss	(1954)	27.	Cherniss	argued	that	the	disproportional	manifestations,	in	relation	to	the	circumstances,	of	the	phenomenal	world	should	be	termed	as	evils.	39	 Cf.	Meldrum	(1950)	68.	Meldrum	argued	that	a	merely	potential	discord	among	the	mixture	of	Existence,	Same,	and	Different	should	account	for	the	actual	evil	in	the	world.	His	line	of	thought	is	similar	to	my	argument	here.	
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due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 materials	 restrained	 the	 lesser	 gods	 to	 two	 alternative	characteristics	that	were	both	desirable	for	the	building	of	the	human	head,	the	lesser	gods	had	to	 sacrifice	 the	 less	 favorable	 characteristic	 –	 longevity	 –	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 the	 other	characteristic,	–	less	flesh	with	keen	and	responsive	sensation	–	which	they	determined	to	be	of	more	 benefit	 to	 the	 life	 of	 human	 beings.	 No	 one	 would	 blame	 the	 lesser	 gods	 for	 choosing	well-being	over	longevity,	and	neither	would	any	one	think	of	it	as	a	deliberate	deed	that	might	provoke	evils	 in	 terms	of	 the	desire	 for	 longevity.	Likewise,	 the	Demiurge	should	not	bear	any	responsibility	 for	 the	corruption	of	 individual	 souls,	 since,	 first	of	all,	 it	 is	 incontrovertible	 that	the	 Demiurge	 should	 fulfill	 the	 overall	 finalization	 and	 continuous	 completion	 of	 the	 cosmos	rather	 than	the	welfare	of	a	particular	race	that	 is	but	an	 integral	part	 to	 the	whole	cosmos.	 In	other	words,	 the	 cosmic	paradigm	entails	 the	 inevitability	 and	necessity	 of	 the	 corruption	 and	degeneration	 of	 individual	 souls,	 in	 that	 the	 corruption	 and	 degeneration	 of	 individual	 souls	helps	 to	 realize	 the	wholesome	 nature	 of	 the	 cosmos,	which	 accords	with	 the	 internal	 cosmic	harmony.	Besides,	the	Demiurge	showed	individual	 immortal	souls	the	nature	of	the	cosmos	and	the	destined	 laws,	 and	 this	 is	 likely	 to	be	 the	compensation	 for	 the	 lesser	degree	of	purity	 in	 their	composition	 in	order	 to	 enhance	 the	 internal	 harmonious	 revolutions	 and	 thus	 their	mundane	life	 would	 be	 as	 good	 as	 possible.	 Secondly,	 as	 evils	 in	 the	 Timaeus	 are	 manifestations	 of	disproportionality,	that	the	Demiurgic	work	of	finalizing	and	ensuring	the	continuous	completion	of	 the	cosmos	 is	grounded	in	yielding	the	perfection	of	 individual	 immortal	souls	does	not	give	rise	to	any	kind	of	disproportionality.	Rather,	the	fulfillment	of	perfection	in	individual	immortal	souls	 would	 violate	 the	 overall	 cosmic	 well-being	 and	 thus	 might	 originate	 disproportional	phenomena,	since	the	other	mortal	beings	come	into	being	by	the	reincarnation	of	the	corrupted	immortal	 souls.	 For	 that	 reason,	 a	 lesser	 grade	 of	 purity	 in	 the	 composition	 of	 individual	immortal	souls	is	preferable	to	its	perfection,	and	thus,	the	Demiurge	is	not	the	source	of	evils.	
Conclusion	
In	this	chapter	I	have	argued	that	there	is	an	analogy	between	the	constitution	of	immortal	soul	and	mortal	body,	that	is,	Forms	and	Receptacle	are	integral	components	for	the	construction	
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of	both	immortal	soul	and	mortal	body.	The	analogy	is	applicable	to	cosmic	soul	and	body	as	well	as	human	 immortal	 soul	 and	mortal	body.	That	 the	 immortal	 soul	 and	mortal	body	essentially	have	same	constituents	offers	an	explanation	of	the	substance	underlying	and	enabling	the	bond	between	immortal	soul	and	mortal	body.	I	have	also	argued	that	out	of	the	same	components	the	Demiurge	employed	different	processes	to	create	immortal	soul	and	mortal	body	respectively.	It	entails	that	immortal	soul	and	mortal	body	appear	to	be	utterly	different	in	existence.	They	differ	not	 only	 in	 the	ways	 in	which	 they	were	 constructed	 but	 also	 in	 the	modes	 of	movement	 the	Demiurge	designated	 to	 them.	Then,	we	can	 infer	 from	the	analogy	between	 the	 immortal	 soul	and	mortal	body	that	in	the	Timaeus	Plato	is	trying	to	bridge	the	gap	between	the	immortal	and	mortal	 nature.	 Moreover,	 the	 dissimilarities	 between	 the	 immortal	 and	mortal	 nature	 reveals	what	 the	 ‘gap’	 actually	 is:	 immortal	 soul	 and	mortal	 body	 differ	 in	 their	 structural	 and	 kinetic	modes.	In	conclusion,	the	observations	about	the	analogy	and	dissimilarities	between	immortal	and	mortal	nature	will	help	to	foreground	Chapter	4’s	explanations	of	the	precise	ways	in	which	the	immortal	soul	and	mortal	body	interact.	I	have	also	argued	that	compared	with	the	cosmic	soul,	human	individual	immortal	souls	are	less	 pure	 in	 terms	 of	 proportionality.	 The	 degradation	 of	 purity	 allows	 corruption	 and	reincarnation	of	individual	immortal	souls.	It	follows	the	matter	of	the	source	of	evil.	My	view	is	that	the	Demiurge	is	not	the	source	of	evil	because	although	he	willingly	created	less	pure	souls,	it	does	not	mean	that	he	willingly	created	evil.	I	have	also	redefined	evil	in	Timaeus’	context,	that	is,	evil	refer	to	manifestations	of	disproportionality.	And	since	the	Demiurge	shows	no	intention	or	action	of	disproportionality	 in	cosmic	creation,	he	cannot	be	counted	as	the	source	of	evil.	 If	we	 apply	 the	 concept	 of	 evil	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 immortal	 and	mortal	 nature,	 it	 can	 be	 inferred	 that	 the	 best	 condition	 for	 a	 human	 being	 is	 to	 keep	proportionality	between	his	soul	and	body	as	well	as	between	the	immortal	soul	and	mortal	ones.	And	 we	 can	 also	 observe	 that	 the	 design	 of	 the	 human	 body,	 i.e.	 bodily	 organs	 and	 their	respective	 functions,	 is	 in	 service	of	 a	proportional	 interaction	between	 the	 immortal	 soul	 and	mortal	body.	I	will	elaborate	this	claim	in	the	following	chapter.
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Chapter	4	The	mortal	souls	
Introduction	 	 	
Chapter	2	discussed	the	construction	of	the	human	body	at	the	elementary	level.	Chapter	3	explained	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 immortal	 soul,	 including	 that	 of	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 and	 human	individual	ones.	In	this	chapter,	I	want	to	look	at	the	nature	of	the	two	kinds	of	mortal	souls.	After	the	 creation	and	allotment	of	 individual	 immortal	 souls,	 the	Demiurge	predicated	 to	 the	 lesser	gods	that	that	which	is	regarded	as	the	mortal	kind	of	soul	would	arise	from	the	immortal	soul’s	embodiment	(42a3-b1).	The	description	is	rather	brief.	What	follows	the	Demiurgic	predication	is	not	a	more	detailed	account	of	the	mortal	soul’s	constitution,	as	readers	might	expect,	but	is	an	exposition	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 four	 elemental	 solids	 and	 the	 application	 of	 such	 a	 nature	 to	physiology	 as	 well	 as	 psychology	 (pleasure	 and	 pain,	 64a-65b).	 Then,	 at	 69c3-d6,	 Timaeus	recapitulates	 the	 composition	 of	 the	mortal	 kind	 of	 soul	 following	which	he	 describes	 the	 two	specifications	of	the	mortal	kind	of	soul:	the	spirited	and	the	appetitive	(69e5-72d3).	The	argument	in	this	chapter	will	focus	on	two	aspects:	first,	the	constitution	of	the	mortal	kind	 of	 soul	 and	 the	 two	 respective	 specifications;	 second,	 the	 communication	 between	 the	immortal	 and	mortal	kinds	of	 soul.	The	 first	 aspect	aims	at	 exploring	 the	 relation	between	 the	mortal	 kind	 of	 soul	 and	 the	 body,	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 the	mortal	 kind	 of	 soul	will	 arise	 once	 the	immortal	 soul	 is	 embodied	 and	 the	 digressive	 physical	 account	 at	 44d-69a	 seem	 to	 strongly	imply	the	connection	between	the	mortal	kind	of	soul	and	the	physical	body.	The	second	aspect	aims	 at	 revealing	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 two	 distinctive	 kinds	 of	 souls	 cooperate	 as	 a	 unity	hierarchically	 so	 as	 to	 deepen	 the	 understanding	 of	 tripartite	 soul	 demonstrated	 in	 Timaeus’	cosmology.	The	two	aspects	together	are	intended	to	bridge	the	gap	between	the	immortal	soul	and	the	physical	body.	If	the	mortal	kind	of	soul,	on	the	one	hand,	has	connection	to	the	physical	body,	 and	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 capable	 of	 communicating	 with	 the	 immortal	 soul,	 then	 the	immortal	soul	and	the	physical	body	are	not	 irrelevant	to	each	other	having	the	mortal	kind	of	soul	as	 intermediate	 link.	 In	 this	way	we	shall	obtain	 the	knowledge	of	how	 the	 immortal	 soul	and	body	mutually	affect	each	other.	
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4.1Πάθημα	and	αἴσθησις	
Let’s	first	take	a	look	at	the	ingredients	the	lesser	gods	used	to	construct	the	mortal	kind	of	soul:	So,	once	the	souls	were	of	necessity	implanted	in	bodies,	and	those	bodies	had	things	coming	to	them	and	leaving	them,	the	first	innate	capacity	they	would	of	necessity	come	to	have	would	be	 sense	 perception	 (αἰσθήσιν),	 which	 arises	 out	 of	 forceful	 disturbances	 (παθημάτων).	 This	they	all	would	have.	The	second	would	be	love,	mingled	with	pleasure	and	pain.	And	they	would	come	to	have	 fear	and	spiritedness	as	well,	plus	whatever	goes	with	having	 these	emotions,	as	well	as	all	their	natural	opposites.	(42a3-b1)1	In	 reading	 this	 outline,	 readers	might	 expect	 a	more	detailed	 account	 of	 the	mortal	 soul’s	constitution	 to	 follow	 the	 discourse	 of	 embodiment.	However,	 Timaeus	 does	 not	 return	 to	 the	topic	until	69c3,	after	a	thorough	elucidation	of	the	construction	of	the	four	elemental	solids	and	the	 application	 of	 the	 rules	 of	 their	 inter-transformation	 to	 physiology.	 I	 will	 come	 back	 to	discuss	 this	 digression	 shortly.	 But,	 first,	 let’s	 take	 a	 look	 at	 how	 Timaeus	 recapitulates	 the	generation	of	the	mortal	kind	of	soul	at	69c3-d6:	He	 himself	 fashioned	 those	 that	 were	 divine,	 but	 assigned	 his	 own	 progeny	 the	 task	 of	fashioning	 the	 generation	 of	 those	 that	 were	 mortal.	 They	 imitated	 him:	 having	 taken	 the	immortal	origin	of	the	soul,	they	proceeded	next	to	encase	it	within	a	round	mortal	body,	and	to	give	it	the	entire	body	as	its	vehicle.	And	within	the	body	they	built	another	kind	of	soul	as	well,	the	mortal	kind,	which	contains	within	it	those	dreadful	but	necessary	disturbances	(παθήματα):	pleasure,	 first	of	all,	evil’s	most	powerful	 lure;	 then	pains,	 that	make	us	run	away	from	what	 is	good;	beside	these,	boldness	and	also	fear,	foolish	counselors	both;	then	also	the	spirit	of	anger	hard	 to	 assuage,	 and	 expectation	 easily	 led	 astray.	 These	 they	 fused	 with	 unreasoning	 sense	perception	 (αἴσθησις)	 and	 all-venturing	 lust,2	 and	 so,	 as	 was	 necessary,	 they	 constructed	 the	mortal	type	of	soul.3	As	 commentators	have	noticed,4	 Timaeus	 restates	 the	 ingredients	 the	 lesser	 gods	used	 to	constitute	 the	mortal	kinds	of	 soul	 showing	a	slight	difference	 in	order	and	mixture.	When	 the	Demiurge	predicted	what	would	happen	once	the	immortal	soul	was	embodied,	the	ingredients																																																									1	 ὁπότε	δὴ	σώμασιν	ἐμφυστευθεῖεν	ἐξ	ἀνάγκης,	καὶ	τὸ	μὲν	προσίοι,	τὸ	δ᾽ἀπίοι	τοῦ	σώματος	αὐτῶν,	πρῶτον	μὲν	αἴσθησιν	ἀναγκαῖον	εἴη	μίαν	πᾶσιν	ἐκ	βιαίων	παθημάτων	σύμφυτον	γίγνεσθαι,	δεύτερον	δὲ	ἡδονῇ	καὶ	λύπῃ	μεμειγμένον	ἔρωτα,	πρὸς	δὲ	τούτοις	φόβον	καὶ	θυμὸν	ὅσα	τε	ἑπόμενα	αὐτοῖς	καὶ	ὁπόσα	ἐναντίως	πέφυκε	διεστηκότα.	2	 I	take	‘lust’	here	as	‘a	passionate	desire	for	something’	rather	than	‘sexual	desire’.	3	 καὶ	τῶν	μὲν	θείων	αὐτὸς	γίγνεται	δημιουργός,	τῶν	δὲ	θνητῶν	τὴν	γένεσιν	τοῖς	ἑαυτοῦ	γεννήμασιν	δημιουργεῖν	προσέταξεν.	οἱ	δὲ	μιμούμενοι,	παραλαβόντες	ἀρχὴν	ψυχῆς	ἀθάνατον,	τὸ	μετὰ	τοῦτο	θνητὸν	σῶμα	αὐτῇ	περιετόρνευσαν	ὄχημά	τε	πᾶν	τὸ	σῶμα	ἔδοσαν	ἄλλο	τε	εἶδος	ἐν	αὐτῷ	ψυχῆς	προσῳκοδόμουν	τὸ	θνητόν,	δεινὰ	καὶ	ἀναγκαῖα	ἐν	ἑαυτῷ	παθήματα	ἔχον,	πρῶτον	μὲν	ἡδονήν,	μέγιστον	κακοῦ	δέλεαρ,	ἔπειτα	λύπας,	ἀγαθῶν	φυγάς,	ἔτι	δ᾽αὖ	θάρρος	καὶ	φόβον,	ἄφρονε	συμβούλω,	θυμὸν	δὲ	δυσπαραμύθητον,	ἐλπίδα	δ᾽εὐπαράγωγον.	αἰσθήσει	δὲ	ἀλόγῳ	καὶ	ἐπιχειρητῇ	παντὸς	ἔρωτι	συγκερασάμενοι	ταῦτα,	ἀναγκαίως	τὸ	θνητὸν	γένος	συνέθεσαν.	4	 Cf.	Archer-Hind	(1888)	256;	Cornford	(1937)	281.	
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were:	perception,	love	mixed	with	pleasure	and	pain,	fear	and	spiritedness,	and	all	their	natural	opposites;	whereas	in	the	account	of	the	actual	creation	of	the	mortal	kind	of	soul	by	the	lesser	gods,	the	ingredients	are,	as	listed	in	order:	pleasure,	pain,	boldness	and	fear,	spirit	of	anger	and	hope,	all	together	mixed	with	perception	and	love.	As	Johansen	points	out,5	 the	alteration	could	be	merely	stylistic,	or	it	could	be	indicative	of	substantial	change	when	the	lesser	gods	proceeded	with	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 mortal	 soul.	 In	 order	 to	 shed	 some	 light	 on	 the	 alteration	 of	 the	constitution	of	the	mortal	soul,	I	will	first	examine	the	nature	of	those	ingredients	listed	in	these	two	 accounts,	 since,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 difference	 in	 order	 and	mixture,	 the	 ingredients	 the	 lesser	gods	used	to	generate	the	mortal	kind	of	soul	remain	mostly	the	same.	The	first	problem	to	be	addressed	about	the	ingredients	is	how	those	ingredients	came	into	being.	 The	 term	πάθημα	 is	 used	 to	 indicate	 the	 disturbances	 provoked	 by	 embodiment	 of	 the	immortal	soul.	The	arising	of	sense	perception	and	other	emotional	ingredients	(pleasure,	pain,	fear,	etc.),	and	love	(ἔρως)	as	well,	are	ascribed	to	the	disturbances.	In	contrast,	at	69d,	πάθημα	is	mentioned	as	a	generic	term	for	all	emotional	ingredients,	only	except	love,	and	those	emotional	ingredients	are	supposed	to	be	mixed	with	sense	perception	and	love.	In	the	former	passage,	it	is	explicit	that	the	mortal	kind	of	soul	would	consist	of	sense	perception	and	emotions,	both	caused	by	πἀθημα.	In	the	latter	passage,	it	is	unclear	whether	or	not	the	lesser	gods	themselves	created	the	emotions,	and	the	elements	composing	the	mortal	kind	of	soul	turn	into	emotions	(denoted	as	πἀθημα	here),	sense	perception,	and	love.	Then,	does	such	adjustment	of	ingredients	merely	represent	 the	 modification	 of	 the	 Demiurgic	 plan	 by	 the	 lesser	 gods	 when	 it	 came	 to	 actual	construction?	 Or	 could	 it	 be	 Timaeus	 retelling	 the	 same	 account,	 with	more	 precise	 wording,	after	 having	 explicated	 the	 conceptions	 of	 the	 Receptacle	 and	 elemental	 solids,	 and	 based	 on	these	also	 the	mechanical	principles	of	 affections	and	perception,	 if	we	 read	 the	 latter	passage	not	in	isolation	but	with	the	preceding	discourses?	I	propose	the	latter	hypothesis.	The	reason	why	the	difference	between	these	two	passages	gives	 rise	 to	 such	 confusion,	 I	 think,	 is	 the	 terminological	 ambiguity	 of	 πἀθημα,	 that	 since	Timaeus	 uses	 πάθημα	 to	 indicate	 the	 disturbances	 that	 engender	 perception	 and	 emotions,	terminological	 consistency	would	 lead	us	 to	 expect	Timaeus	not	 to	 apply	 the	 identical	 term	 to	indicate	 those	 which	 are	 caused	 by	 the	 phenomena	 denoted	 by	 this	 very	 term	 in	 previous																																																									5	 Cf.	Johansen	(2004)	147.	
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account.	Therefore,	 if	we	can	sort	out	 the	mechanical	principles	 that	underlie	 the	disturbances,	perception,	 and	 emotions,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 sequentiality	 in	 which	 they	 generate,	 whether	 the	former	causes	the	latter	two	or	otherwise,	we	will	be	able	to	reveal	the	interconnection	among	those	phenomena.	And	based	on	this,	we	can	then	decide	the	connotation	of	πάθημα	and	explain	away	the	inconsistency	in	Timaean	terminology.	For	that	reason,	I	suggest	we	correlate	our	investigation	with	Timaeus’	account	at	61c-69a	of	how	πάθημα	provokes	perception	that	is	common	to	the	whole	body	(61c-64a)	and	to	particular	bodily	organs	as	well	 (65b-69a),	along	with	a	specific	explication	of	 the	origination	of	pleasure	and	pain	(64a-65b).	Another	piece	of	 textual	evidence	supporting	my	suggestion	 is	at	61c7-d2,	where	 Timaeus	 outlines	 his	 following	 account	 and	 warns	 his	 audience	 that	 the	 account	 of	πάθημα	and	of	bodily	construction	and	the	mortal	kind	of	soul	are	inseparable,	although	to	treat	them	 simultaneously	 is	 impossible.	 On	 that	 account,	 Timaeus	 decides	 to	 assume	 the	 nature	 of	bodily	organs	and	the	mortal	kinds	of	soul	for	the	sake	of	demonstration.	I	think	it	is	plausible	to	suggest,	upon	the	reading	of	those	lines,	that	the	mechanical	principles	of	πάθημα	are	integral	to	the	account	of	 the	generation	of	 the	mortal	kind	of	 soul,	 that	 the	 reading	of	 the	 former	 can	be	complementary	to	the	understanding	of	the	latter,	and	vice	versa.	As	Karfík	argues,	and	I	agree	with,	the	mechanical	principles	of	πάθημα	can	be	explained	in	terms	of	the	movement	of	elemental	solids.6	 Karfík’s	 interpretation	 is	 largely	successful	 in	that	he	employs	the	concept	of	πάθημα	to	explain	the	ingredients	composing	the	mortal	soul.	But	he	misunderstands	the	relation	between	πάθημα	and	the	mortal	soul,	for	he	claims	that	the	mortal	soul	 is	 a	place	where	πάθημα	 takes	place,	which	may	 imply	 the	prior	 existence7	 of	 the	mortal	kind	of	soul	to	πάθημα	and	this	implication	is	in	contradiction	with	the	fact	that	the	ingredients	used	 to	compose	 the	mortal	kind	of	 souls	arise	out	of	πάθημα	(Tim.	42a3-b1).	 In	 the	 following	discussion,	I	will	argue	that	the	relation	between	πάθημα	and	the	two	kinds	of	mortal	souls	is	not	like	a	motion	and	that	in	which	the	former	takes	place.	Karfík	fails	to	make	a	distinction	between	πάθημα	that	only	takes	place	in	the	human	body	and	πάθημα	that	indicates	inter-transformation	of	elemental	solids	in	a	generic	sense.	It	is	not	that	any	movement	of	elemental	solids	occuring	in																																																									6	 Karfík	(2005)	204-207.	7	 Πάθημα	indicates	the	motions	of	elemental	solids,	thus	it	enjoys	kinetic	and	temporal	attributes.	So	there	will	always	be	succeeding	πάθημα	that	comes	into	being	after	other	πάθημα	that	has	already	taken	place	in	the	mortal	souls,	according	to	Karfík’s	interpretation,	which	entails	that	at	least	some	πάθημα	come	into	being	after	the	mortal	kind	of	souls’	coming	into	being.	
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the	 mortal	 soul	 is	 counted	 as	 πάθημα;	 quite	 the	 contrary,	 it	 is	 πάθημα,	 a	 specific	 kind	 of	movement	 of	 elemental	 solids	within	 the	 human	 body	 constitutes	 the	mortal	 soul.	 I	 will	 then	elaborate	my	view	in	the	following	discussion.	The	term	πάθημα	is	first	mentioned	in	Timaeus’	discourse	at	42a,	the	passage	quoted	earlier.	It	 is	 used	 again	 at	 43b7	 and	 44a8,	 where	 Timaeus	 introduces	 what	 shall	 happen	 when	 the	immortal	soul	is	first	embodied.	In	that	demonstration,	Timaeus	has	also	briefly	summarized	the	psychophysiological	 process	 that	 he	 later	 elaborates	 at	 61c-69a.	 The	 physiological	 process	 of	how	an	external	object	affects	a	psychic	recipient	 is	as	follows:	both	the	object	and	the	body	of	the	recipient	are	made	of	elemental	solids,	 i.e.	 fire,	air,	water,	and	earth.	And	when	the	body	of	the	recipient	encounters	an	external	object	that	consists	of	elemental	solids	other	than	that	of	the	recipient’s	body,	 interaction	between	the	external	and	bodily	elemental	solids	will	naturally	be	engendered	due	 to	 the	non-uniformity	of	 sizes	and	shapes	between	 their	 constituent	 triangles.	Such	interaction	will	not	only	occur	between	the	object	and	the	part	of	the	recipient	where	they	make	contact	but	the	motion	will	be	passed	on	through	the	whole	body	and	reach	the	immortal	soul.	The	revolutions	within	the	immortal	soul	are	thus	suspended	or	distorted	by	the	dissimilar	motions	 from	 outside.	 It	 seems	 obvious	 that	 Timaeus	 uses	 πάθημα	 here	 to	 indicate	 the	interaction	 and	 continuous	 internal	 motions	 caused	 by	 the	 recipient’s	 encounter	 with	 the	external	 object	 and	 αἰσθήσεις	 to	 indicate	 the	 receipt	 and	 awareness	 of	 such	 πάθημα	 by	 the	immortal	 soul. 8 	 In	 short,	 πάθημα	 are	 in	 essence	 a	 kind	 of	 motion	 and	 αἰσθήσεις	 the	consciousness	of	the	former.	Then,	what	kind	of	motion	precisely	does	πάθημα	denote?	In	 the	 account	 of	 61c-69a,	 Timaeus	 employs	 the	 term	 πάθημα	 to	 also	 indicate	 those	properties	of	external	objects	he	illustrates.	Take	hot	for	instance.	We	notice	how	fire	acts	on	our	bodies	by	dividing	and	cutting	them.	We	are	all	aware	that	the	experience	(πάθος)	is	a	sharp	one.	The	fineness	of	fire’s	edges,	the	sharpness	of	its	angles,	the	minuteness	of	its	parts,	and	the	swiftness	of	its	motion	–	all	of	which	make	fire	severely	piercing,	so	that	it	makes	sharp	cuts	in	whatever	it	encounters	–	must	be	taken	into	consideration	as	we	recall	how	its	shape	came	to	be.	It	is	this	substance,	more	than	any	other,	that	divides	our	bodies	throughout	and	cuts	them	up	into	small	pieces,	thereby	giving	us	the	property	(πάθημα)	(as	well																																																									8	 Brisson	argues	that	it	is	not	the	primary	elemental	solids	but	the	secondary	substances	that	are	sensible	to	the	percipient,	because	the	former	are	just	too	small	to	be	perceived.	Cf.	Brisson	(1997)	149.	I	think	he	is	right	in	that	only	a	certain	amount	of	aggregation	of	elemental	solids’	effects	upon	the	percipient’s	body	can	be	transmitted	through	the	body	because	the	bodily	elemental	solids	are	themselves	in	constant	internal	interactive	motion;	it	is	impossible	for,	for	instance,	a	single	external	solid	of	fire	to	make	any	change	in	the	form	of	motion	of	the	bodily	solids.	The	statement	that	gradual	and	mild	disturbances	cannot	be	perceived	at	64d2-3	supports	this	viewpoint.	
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as	the	name)	that	we	now	naturally	call	hot.	(61d5-62a5)9	The	 hotness	 of	 fire	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 constituent	 solids	 of	 fire	 cutting	 the	 subject’s	 bodily	elemental	 solids,	 for	 the	 latter	give	way	 to	 the	 incomparable	sharpness	 in	shape	of	 the	 former.	This	being	the	case,	the	property	of	hotness	cannot	be	possessed	by	fire	independently,	since	the	cutting	 process,	 or	 referring	 to	 it	 as	 a	 πάθημα,	 presupposes	 a	 recipient.	 This	 viewpoint	 is	corroborated	by	the	exposition	of	what	are	cold,	hard	and	soft,	heavy	and	light,	above	and	below,	and	smooth	and	rough	at	62a5-64a1.	All	the	mechanical	processes	underlying	the	properties	that	we	 ascribe	 to	 respective	 objects	 involve	 the	 engagement	 of	 elemental	 solids	 from	 both	 the	objects	and	any	recipient	that	encounters	them.	And	the	way	in	which	the	elemental	solids	of	the	two	groups	will	interact	is	determined	by	the	diverse	sizes	and	shapes	of	those	solids,	complying	with	the	rules	of	the	inter-transformation	among	various	elemental	solids,	on	which	Timaeus	has	shed	light	at	56c8-57c6.	That	the	forms	of	the	interaction	between	external	and	bodily	elemental	solids	 vary	 explains	 why	 a	 percipient10	 will	 be	 affected	 differently	 when	 they	 encounter	disparate	objects.	It	 is	 now	 clear	 that	 Timaeus	 applies	 πάθημα	 to	 both	 the	 disturbances	 caused	 by	 the	encounters	with	external	objects	within	the	body	of	a	recipient	and	the	properties	those	objects	possess,	because	in	fact	both	the	disturbances	and	the	properties	refer	to	the	same	processes	of	the	interaction	of	elemental	solids	that	are	distinguished	by	alternative	perspectives,	like	the	two	sides	of	a	coin.	That	is,	to	be	precise,	if	we	examine	the	process	from	the	aspect	of	how	a	recipient	is	affected	by	any	external	object,	we	refer	to	the	interaction	as	the	disturbances	occurring	inside	the	 recipient’s	 body.	Whereas	 if	 we	 examine	 the	 process	 from	 the	 aspect	 of	 how	 a	 particular	external	 object	 brings	 distinctive	 effects	 upon	 a	 recipient,	 we	 attribute	 the	 interaction	 in	micro-scale,	 or	 phenomena	 in	macro-scale,	 to	 this	 particular	 external	 object,	 designating	 it	 as	properties	of	hot,	cold,	etc.	So	 far,	 I	 have	 examined	 what	 mechanical	 process	 πάθημα	 denotes	 when	 a	 percipient	encounters	an	external	object.	Now	I	proceed	with	the	 investigation	of	what	 follows	within	the																																																									9	 πρῶτον	μὲν	ᾗ	πῦρ	θερμὸν	λέγομεν,	ἴδωμεν	ὧδε	σκοποῦντες,	τὴν	διάκρισιν	καὶ	τομὴν	αὐτοῦ	περὶ	τὸ	σῶμα	ἡμῶν	γιγνομένην	ἐννοηθέμεθα.	ὅτι	μὲν	γὰρ	ὀξύ	τι	τὸ	πάθος,	πάντες	σχεδὸν	αἰσθανόμεθα.	τὴν	δὲ	λεπτότητα	τῶν	πλευρῶν	καὶ	γωνιῶν	ὀξύτητα	τῶν	τε	μορίων	σμικρότητα	καὶ	τῆς	φορᾶς	τὸ	τάχος,	οἶς	πᾶσι	σφοδρὸν	ὄν	καὶ	τομὸν	ὀξέως	τὸ	προστυχὸν	ἀεὶ	τέμνει,	λογιστέον	ἀναμιμνῃσκομένοις	τὴν	τοῦ	σχήματος	αὐτοῦ	γένεσιν,	ὅτι	μάλιστα	ἐκείνη	καὶ	οὐκ	ἄλλη	φύσις	διακρίνουσα	ἡμῶν	κατὰ	σμικρά	τε	τὰ	σώματα	κερματίζουσα	τοῦτο	ὅ	νῦν	θερμὸν	λέγομεν	εἰκότως	τὸ	πάθημα	καὶ	τοὔνομα	παρέσχεν.	10	 I	use	‘recipient’	in	previous	discussion	to	emphasize	the	physical	aspect	of	the	subject,	and	I	use	‘percipient’	here	to	emphasize	the	engagement	of	consciousness	of	the	subject.	
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body	of	a	percipient	after	the	πάθημα	has	emerged.	At	43c7-d2:	It	was	just	then,	at	that	very	instant,	that	they	produced	a	very	long	and	intense	commotion.	They	cooperated	with	the	continually	flowing	channel	to	stir	and	violently	shake	the	orbits	of	the	soul.11	And	a	similar	but	more	elaborate	and	comprehensive	account	at	64b3-c7:	When	 even	 a	 minor	 disturbance	 affects	 that	 which	 is	 easily	 moved	 by	 nature,	 the	disturbance	is	passed	on	in	a	chain	reaction	with	some	parts	affecting	others	in	the	same	way	as	they	were	 affected,	 until	 it	 reaches	 the	 center	 of	 consciousness	 and	 reports	 the	 property	 that	produced	 the	 reaction.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 something	 that	 is	 hard	 to	move	 remains	 fixed	 and	merely	 experiences	 the	 disturbance	 without	 passing	 it	 on	 in	 any	 chain	 reaction.	 It	 does	 not	disturb	 any	 of	 its	 neighboring	 parts,	 so	 that	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 some	 parts	 passing	 on	 the	disturbance	to	others,	the	initial	disturbance	affecting	them	fails	to	move	on	into	the	living	thing	as	a	whole	and	renders	the	disturbance	unperceived.	This	is	true	of	our	bones	and	hair	and	of	the	other	mostly	earth-made	parts	that	we	possess.	But	the	former	is	true	of	our	sight	and	hearing	in	particular,	and	this	is	because	their	chief	inherent	power	is	that	of	air	and	of	fire.12	These	two	passages	taken	together	tell	us	that	there	are	two	opposite	consequences	that	the	πάθημα	(as	in	disturbance)	will	lead	to	within	the	percipient’s	body:	one	is	that	the	πάθημα	will	be	transmitted	to	the	immortal	soul,	and	the	other	is	that	the	πάθημα	will	remain	on	the	bodily	part	where	it	happens	and	not	be	reported	to	the	immortal	soul.	Which	consequence	will	be	the	case	 depends	 on	 the	 mobility	 of	 the	 elemental	 solids	 that	 constitute	 the	 bodily	 part	 that	 the	external	 object	 affects,	 that	 is,	 if	 the	 πάθημα	 involves	 the	 participation	 of,	 e.g.	 fiery	 solids,	 the	active	 nature	 of	 those	 solids	will	 pass	 on	 the	 πάθημα	 to	 inner	 bodily	 parts	 and	 thus	 generate	internal	 disturbances	 that	will	 eventually	 reach	 the	 immortal	 soul.	Whereas	 if	 those	 elemental	solids,	e.g.	earthy	ones,	are	not	mobile	enough	to	transmit	the	πάθημα	inward	in	the	percipient’s	body,	a	consecutive	reactive	motion13	 within	the	body	will	not	be	generated.	Whether	a	bodily	part’s	constituent	solids	are	mobile	or	not	is	decided	by	their	own	geometrical	structures.	In	light	of	 these	 observations,	we	 can	now	 categorize	 various	παθήματα	 into	 two	 groups	 according	 to	their	 general	 consequences:	 those	 that	 are	 perceived,	 that	 is,	 those	παθήματα	whose	 forms	 of																																																									11	 καὶ	δὴ	καὶ	τότε	ἐν	τῷ	παρόντι	πλείστην	καὶ	μεγίστην	παρεχόμεναι	κίνησιν͵	μετὰ	τοῦ	ῥέοντος	ἐνδελεχῶς	ὀχετοῦ	κινοῦσαι	καὶ	σφοδρῶς	σείουσαι	τὰς	τῆς	ψυχῆς	περιόδους.	12	 τὸ	μὲν	γὰρ	κατὰ	φύσιν	εὐκίνητον͵	ὅταν	καὶ	βραχὺ	πάθος	εἰς	αὐτὸ	ἐμπίπτῃ͵	διαδίδωσιν	κύκλῳ	μόρια	ἕτερα	ἑτέροις	ταὐτὸν	ἀπεργαζόμενα͵	μέχριπερ	ἂν	ἐπὶ	τὸ	φρόνιμον	ἐλθόντα	ἐξαγγείλῃ	τοῦ	ποιήσαντος	τὴν	δύναμιν·	τὸ	δ΄	ἐναντίον	ἑδραῖον	ὂν	κατ΄	οὐδένα	τε	κύκλον	ἰὸν	πάσχει	μόνον͵	ἄλλο	δὲ	οὐ	κινεῖ	τῶν	πλησίον͵	ὥστε	οὐ	διαδιδόντων	μορίων	μορίοις	ἄλλων	ἄλλοις	τὸ	πρῶτον	πάθος	ἐν	αὐτοῖς	ἀκίνητον	εἰς	τὸ	πᾶν	ζῷον	γενόμενον	ἀναίσθητον	παρέσχεν	τὸ	παθόν.	ταῦτα	δὲ	περί	τε	ὀστᾶ	καὶ	τὰς	τρίχας	ἐστὶν	καὶ	ὅσ΄	ἄλλα	γήϊνα	τὸ	πλεῖστον	ἔχομεν	ἐν	ἡμῖν	μόρια·	τὰ	δὲ	ἔμπροσθεν	περὶ	τὰ	τῆς	ὄψεως	καὶ	ἀκοῆς	μάλιστα͵	διὰ	τὸ	πυρὸς	ἀέρος	τε	ἐν	αὐτοῖς	δύναμιν	ἐνεῖναι	μεγίστην.	13	 Brisson	thinks	that	the	agent	transmitting	the	μάθημα	is	the	blood.	Cf.	Brisson	(1997)	157-159.	Karfík	endorses	Brisson’s	viewpoint	specifying	the	agent	more	accurately	as	the	solids	of	fire	that	constitute	the	blood.	Cf.	Karfík	(2005)	205,	note	45.	
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motion	are	passed	on	through	the	body	by	mobile	solids	and	finally	become	apprehended	by	the	immortal	 soul	 (the	 problem	 how	 the	 immortal	 soul	 can	 be	 conscious	 of	 παθήματα	 will	 be	discussed	later),	and	those	that	are	not,	that	is,	the	transmission	of	the	motion	is	stopped	by	the	immobility	 of	 the	 bodily	 parts	 in	 which	 the	 παθήματα	 initially	 occur.	 As	 to	 those	 perceived	παθήματα,	Timaeus	has	specified	them	as	 ‘αἰσθήσεις	(sensations	or	sense	perception)’	at	43c6:	
that	is	no	doubt	why	these	motions	as	a	group	came	after	to	be	called	‘sensations,’	as	they	are	still	
called	today.	So	far	I	have	investigated	the	mechanical	process	of	sensation	and	made	clear	what	πάθημα	and	 αἴσθησις	 denote	 in	 the	 process.	 Let	me	 recapitulate	my	 interpretation.	 The	 denotation	 of	πἀθημα	 can	 be	 specified	 into	 two	 aspects	 for	 now:	 one	 is	 the	 interaction	 of	 elemental	 solids	between	 the	body	of	 the	 recipient	 and	 the	 external	 object,	which	 can	be	 examined	 in	 terms	of	disturbances	and	properties	depending	on	the	perspective;	the	other	is	the	transmission	of	such	interaction	 inside	 the	 recipient’s	 body,	 which	 can	 be	 distinguished	 into	 two	 groups	 generally	with	 regard	 to	 the	 consequences,	 that	 is,	 unperceived	and	perceived.	The	perceived	πάθημα	 is	called	 αἴσθησις.	 Therefore,	 αἴσθησις	 is	 essentially	 a	 kind	 of	 πἀθημα,	 which	 involves	 the	engagement	of	the	immortal	soul.	On	that	account,	it	is	not	problematic	to	claim	that	αἴσθησις	is	caused	by	πάθημα,	 for	 the	occurrence	of	 the	 former	has	presupposed	 that	of	 the	 latter.	Hence,	this	interpretation	is	explanatorily	applicable	to	the	Demiurge’s	account	of	mortal	soul	at	42a.	Furthermore,	since	αἴσθησις	itself	involves	interaction	withe	immortal	soul,	and,	as	Timaeus	claims	at	69d4,	αἴσθησις	 is	one	of	 the	 ingredients	composing	 the	mortal	kind	of	soul.	Then	the	distinction	 of	 the	 immortal	 soul	 and	mortal	 soul	 is	 not	 an	 absolute	 one.	 There	 is	 a	 connection	between	 them	 in	 that	 the	 immortal	 soul	 is	 incorperated	 in	 the	 constitution	of	 the	mortal	 soul.	Moreover,	αἴσθησις	also	comprehends	the	movement	of	elemental	solids	with	the	human	body.	In	 this	way,	 there	 is	a	connection	between	 the	mortal	 soul	and	 the	mortal	body.	Therefore,	we	can	 say	 that,	 the	 subtle	 shift	 of	 expression	 at	 69c3-d6	 is	 substantial,	 for	 it	 is	 indicative	 of	 the	mortal	soul’s	connection	with	the	immortal	soul	as	well	as	the	mortal	body,	on	the	basis	that	the	ingredients	composing	the	mortal	soul	can	be	explained	in	terms	of	πἀθημα	and	αἴσθησις.	
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4.2	Emotions	and	the	mortal	parts	of	soul	
Now	that	we	have	 these	clarifications	of	 the	 relationship	between	πάθημα	and	αἴσθησις,	 I	will	 continue	with	 the	examination	of	what	 the	emotions	are.	According	 to	64c7-d3,	pain	 is	 an	unnatural	 disturbance	 (πάθος)14	 that	 comes	 upon	 a	 percipient	with	 great	 force	 and	 intensity,	and	pleasure	is	the	equally	great	and	intense	departure	of	that	disturbance	and	the	restoration	of	the	natural	state	of	the	bodily	parts.	From	this	desciption	we	can	tell	that	both	pain	and	pleasure	are	essentially	παθήματα,	the	kind	that	is	perceived	and	depicted	as	violent	(βίαιον)	and	sudden	(ἁθρόον),	and	most	importantly	relates	to	the	change	of	the	natural	state	of	relevant	bodily	parts.	This	being	the	case,	we	can	conclude	that	pleasure	and	pain	are	specific	αἰσθήσεις	and	that	their	occurrence	 is	 accompanied	 with	 a	 violent	 and	 sudden	 change	 of	 the	 bodily	 parts’	 previous	conditions,	 be	 it	 naturally	 normal	 or	 gradually	 depleted	 (64e4-65a3).	 In	 other	words,	 the	 one	character	that	distinguishes	pleasure	and	pain	from	regular	αἰσθήσεις	is	that	the	παθήματα	that	give	rise	to	pleasure	and	pain	cause	the	change	of	the	nature	of	whichever	bodily	part	they	affect.	Following	 the	 above	 train	 of	 thought,	 we	 can	 immediately	 surmise	 that	 the	coming-into-being	of	 the	remaining	emotions,	namely,	 love	 (ἔρως),	boldness	 (θάρρος)	and	 fear	(φόβος),	 and	 spiritedness	 (θυμός)	 and	 expectation	 (ἐλπίς),	 is	 highly	 likely	 subject	 to	 the	 very	mechanical	principles	that	underlie	the	generation	of	pleasure	and	pain,	 i.e.	 those	emotions	fall	into	 particular	 categories	 of	 αἰσθήσεις	 that	 are	 aroused	 by	 specific	 παθήματα.	However,	 apart	from	 the	 reference	at	42a3-b1	and	69c3-d6,	 there	 is	no	 trace	elsewhere	 in	his	monologue	 that	Timaeus	 ever	 provides	 an	 account	 for	 the	 generation	 of	 the	 remaining	 emotions.	 This	 being	noted,	 we	 must	 now	 change	 our	 perspective.	 The	 approach	 to	 the	 study	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	mortal	kind	of	soul	that	I	have	employed	earlier	is	to	first	analyse	the	nature	of	the	ingredients	of	which	the	mortal	kind	of	soul	consists	and	then	examine	how	the	lesser	gods	availed	themselves	of	 those	 ingredients	 accordingly	 to	 construct	 the	 mortal	 kind	 of	 soul.	 Now	 that	 the	 textual	account	for	the	generation	of	the	remaining	emotions	is	unavailable	and	thus	it	is	impossible	to	obtain	 the	 knowledge	 of	 emotions	 first,	 I	 shall	 proceed	 to	 investigate	 Timaeus’	 discourse	 at	69e5-72d3,	where	he	demonstrates	the	division	of	 the	mortal	kind	of	soul	 in	two	parts,	 that	 is,	
																																																								14	 Plato	used	both	πάθημα	and	πάθος,	seemingly	distinctive	and	confusingly	interchangeable,	in	his	account	at	61c-69a.	Cf.	Zeyl	(2000)	lxxv,	note	146.	
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spirited	(θυμὀς)	and	appetitive	(ἐπιθυμητικόν),	and	specifies	the	bodily	seats	of	the	two	distinct	parts	of	the	mortal	kind	of	soul	and	accounts	for	their	collaboration	with	the	bodily	organs	they	are	housed	within.	The	mechanical	principle	of	how	the	 two	parts	of	mortal	soul	 function	with	bodily	organs	corresponds	to	the	cooperation	of	 the	remaining	emotions’	respective	work	with	their	 associated	 bodily	 organs.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 study	 of	 the	 function	 of	 the	 mortal	 parts	 will	contribute	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 remaining	 emotions,	 and	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	remaining	emotions	can	complement	the	account	of	the	creation	of	the	mortal	parts.	The	 account	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 the	mortal	 kind	 of	 soul	 starts	 at	 69d7.	 In	 the	 hope	 of	preventing	the	immortal	soul	from	being	stained	by	the	mortal	kind	as	far	as	possible,	the	lesser	gods	 situated	 the	mortal	 kind	 of	 soul	 in	 the	 trunk	 of	 the	 body,	 between	which	 and	 the	 head,	which	 they	bounded	 the	 immortal	 soul	within,	 they	built	 the	neck	 as	 isthmus	 to	 keep	 the	 two	parts	apart.	And	 inside	the	trunk	the	 lesser	gods	 further	divided	 it	 into	two	parts	separated	by	the	diaphragm,	the	upper	section	to	house	the	relatively	superior	part	of	mortal	soul,	i.e.	spirited	(θυμὀς)	 and	 the	 lower	 section	 to	hold	 the	 inferior	part,	 i.e.	 appetitive	 (ἐπιθυμητικόν).	 It	 is	 not	clear	 at	 this	 point	whether	 the	 lesser	 gods	 decided	 to	 divide	 the	mortal	 kind	 of	 soul	 into	 two	parts	 or	 the	 mortal	 kind	 of	 soul	 inevitably	 broke	 up	 into	 two	 parts	 due	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 its	ingredients	of	 affections	and	perception.	As	 this	question	 is	being	addressed,	 another	question	arises	 subsequently,	 whether	 both	 the	 spirited	 and	 the	 appetitive	 parts	 contain	 all	 the	ingredients	Timaeus	lists,	or	are	each	of	the	two	parts	assigned	corresponding	ingredients?	If	the	former	were	true,	then	we	are	troubled	with	the	problem	why	there	would	be	two	distinct	parts	of	mortal	soul	in	the	first	place	now	that	both	parts	consist	of	exactly	the	same	ingredients?	If	the	latter	were	the	case,	then	we	are	challenged	to	specify	the	ingredients	the	lesser	gods	assigned	to	each	part.	 The	 textual	 evidence,	 I	 think,	 apparently	 is	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 latter	 interpretation.	 It	 is	very	unlikely	 the	 spirited	and	 the	appetitive	parts	are	 composed	of	 the	 same	 ingredients	 since	Timaeus	is	quite	explicit	about	the	spirited	part’s	capacity	of	understanding	the	commands	from	the	immortal	soul	(70a4-6)	and	the	appetitive	part’s	inability	to	listen	to	or	obey	the	orders	from	the	 immortal	 soul	 (71a3-5).	 The	 lesser	 gods,	 foreseeing	 the	 nature	 of	 each	 ingredient,	 chose	those	that	are	favorable	to	the	ruling	of	the	immortal	soul	over	the	whole	body	to	construct	the	spirited	part	and	settle	it	in	the	heart	where	it	is	not	remote	from	the	head.	And	they	took	those	that	are	not	as	much	of	positive	benefit	to	make	the	appetitive	part	and	gave	it	the	liver	as	seat.	
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4.2.1	Anger	and	the	spirited	part	of	soul	
Now,	let’s	first	take	a	look	at	the	account	of	the	lesser	gods’	arrangement	of	the	spirited	part	of	mortal	soul	at	70a2-d1.	I	also	quote	the	lines	depicting	how	the	spirited	part	collaborates	with	heart	and	lungs:	Now	the	part	of	the	mortal	soul	that	exhibits	manliness	and	spirit	(τῆς	ψυχῆς	ἀνδρείας	καἱ	θυμοῦ),	 the	ambitious	part,	 they	 settled	nearer	 the	head,	between	 the	midriff	 and	 the	neck,	 so	that	it	might	listen	to	reason	and	together	with	it	restrain	by	force	the	part	consisting	of	appetites,	should	the	latter	at	any	time	refuse	outright	to	obey	the	dictates	of	reason	coming	down	from	the	citadel.	 The	 heart,	 then,	 which	 ties	 the	 veins	 together,	 the	 spring	 (πηγή)	 from	 which	 blood	courses	with	vigorous	pulse	throughout	all	the	bodily	members,	they	set	in	the	guardhouse.	That	way,	if	spirit’s	might	(τὸ	τοῦ	θυμοῦ	μένος)	should	boil	over	(ζέσειεν)	at	a	report	from	reason	that	some	wrongful	act	involving	these	members	is	taking	place	–	something	being	done	to	them	from	outside	 or	 even	 something	 originating	 from	 the	 appetites	 within	 –	 every	 bodily	 part	 that	 is	sensitive	may	 be	 keenly	 sensitized,	 through	 all	 the	 narrow	 vessels,	 to	 the	 exhortations	 or	 the	threats	and	so	listen	and	follow	completely.	In	this	way	the	best	part	among	them	all	can	be	left	in	charge.	The	gods	foreknew	that	the	pounding	of	the	heart	(which	occurs	when	one	expects	what	one	fears	or	when	one’s	spirit	is	aroused)	would,	like	all	such	swelling	(οἴδησις)	of	the	passions	(τῶν	θυμουμένων),	be	caused	by	fire	(διὰ	πυρός).	So	they	devised	something	to	relieve	the	pounding:	they	 implanted	 lungs,	 a	 structure	 that	 is	 first	 of	 all	 soft	 and	without	 blood	 (ἄναιμον)	 and	 that	secondly	contains	pores	bored	 through	 it	 like	a	sponge.	This	enables	 it	 to	 take	 in	breath	 (τό	…	πνεῦμα)	and	drink	(τὸ	πῶμα)	and	thereby	cool	the	heat,	bringing	it	respite	and	relaxation	in	the	heat.	…15	From	 the	 reading	of	 the	above	quotation,	 it	 is	 at	 least	 safe	 for	us	 to	 claim	 that	emotion	of	anger	is	one	of	the	ingredients	composing	the	spirited	part	of	soul16	 so	that	to	investigate	what	the	emotion	of	 anger	 is	 and	how	 it	 comes	 into	being	will	help	us	 to	examine	 the	nature	of	 the	spirited	part	of	soul.	We	can	tell	from	the	above	passage	that	the	emotion	of	anger	is	a	boiling	in																																																									15τὸ	μετέχον	οὖν	τῆς	ψυχῆς	ἀνδρείας	καὶ	θυμοῦ͵	φιλόνικον	ὄν͵	κατῴκισαν	ἐγγυτέρω	τῆς	κεφαλῆς	μεταξὺ	τῶν	φρενῶν	τε	καὶ	αὐχένος͵	ἵνα	τοῦ	λόγου	κατήκοον	ὂν	κοινῇ	μετ΄	ἐκείνου	βίᾳ	τὸ	τῶν	ἐπιθυμιῶν	κατέχοι	γένος͵	ὁπότ΄	ἐκ	τῆς	ἀκροπόλεως	τῷ	τ΄	ἐπιτάγματι	καὶ	λόγῳ	μηδαμῇ	πείθεσθαι	ἑκὸν	ἐθέλοι·τὴν	δὲ	δὴ	καρδίαν	ἅμμα	τῶν	φλεβῶν	καὶ	πηγὴν	τοῦ	περιφερομένου	κατὰ	πάντα	τὰ	μέλη	σφοδρῶς	αἵματος	εἰς	τὴν	δορυφορικὴν	οἴκησιν	κατέστησαν͵	ἵνα͵	ὅτε	ζέσειεν	τὸ	τοῦ	θυμοῦ	μένος͵	τοῦ	λόγου	παραγγείλαντος	ὥς	τις	ἄδικος	περὶ	αὐτὰ	γίγνεται	πρᾶξις	ἔξωθεν	ἢ	καί	τις	ἀπὸ	τῶν	ἔνδοθεν	ἐπιθυμιῶν͵	ὀξέως	διὰ	πάντων	τῶν	στενωπῶν	πᾶν	ὅσον	αἰσθητικὸν	ἐν	τῷ	σώματι͵	τῶν	τε	παρακελεύσεων	καὶ	ἀπειλῶν	αἰσθανόμενον͵	γίγνοιτο	ἐπήκοον	καὶ	ἕποιτο	πάντῃ͵	καὶ	τὸ	βέλτιστον	οὕτως	ἐν	αὐτοῖς	πᾶσιν	ἡγεμονεῖν	ἐῷ.	τῇ	δὲ	δὴ	πηδήσει	τῆς	καρδίας	ἐν	τῇ	τῶν	δεινῶν	προσδοκίᾳ	καὶ	τῇ	τοῦ	θυμοῦ	ἐγέρσει͵	προγιγνώσκοντες	ὅτι	διὰ	πυρὸς	ἡ	τοιαύτη	πᾶσα	ἔμελλεν	οἴδησις	γίγνεσθαι	τῶν	θυμουμένων͵	ἐπικουρίαν	αὐτῇ	μηχανώμενοι	τὴν	τοῦ	πλεύμονος	ἰδέαν	ἐνεφύτευσαν͵	πρῶτον	μὲν	μαλακὴν	καὶ	ἄναιμον͵	εἶτα	σήραγγας	ἐντὸς	ἔχουσαν	οἷον	σπόγγου	κατατετρημένας͵	ἵνα	τό	τε	πνεῦμα	καὶ	τὸ	πῶμα	δεχομένη͵	ψύχουσα͵	ἀναπνοὴν	καὶ	ῥᾳστώνην	ἐν	τῷ	καύματι	παρέχοι·	16	 Manliness	or	ambition	(ἀνδρείας)	is	mentioned	here.	But	we	can	see	that	neither	42a3-b1	nor	69c3-d6	mentioned	manliness,	and	throughout	the	quoted	passage,	Plato	give	no	further	explanation	of	what	manliness	refers	to.	The	text	limits	our	understanding	of	the	spirited	part	of	soul	to	the	extent	of	our	understanding	of	the	emotion	of	anger.	
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the	region	of	the	heart.17	 To	understand	anger	as	being	a	boiling,	we	need	to	answer	these	two	questions:	what	is	it	that	boils	and	how	do	we	understand	the	motion	of	boiling	in	the	Timaean	context?	 The	 answer	 to	 the	 first	 question	 can	 be	 found	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 second	 quoted	paragraph:	 the	pounding	of	 the	heart,	 like	all	such	swelling	of	 the	passions,	 is	caused	by	 fire.	 If	that	which	boils	 in	 the	region	of	 the	heart	 is	 the	elemental	solid	of	 fire,	 then	the	answer	 to	 the	second	 question	 has	 already	 been	 plainly	 pointed	 out	 by	 Timaeus	 himself	 using	 the	 verb	 ‘boil	(ζέω)’,	which	vividly	pictures	the	motion	of	the	elemental	solid	of	fire.	The	fact	that	the	heart	is	the	knot	of	the	two	blood	veins	(70b1)	and	also	the	intersection	where	all	the	narrow	channels	(πάντων	 τῶν	 στενωπῶν)	 throughout	 the	 body	 converge	 by	 joining	 to	 the	 veins	 supports	 the	interpretation	that	anger	is	the	elemental	solid	of	fire	boiling	in	the	region	of	the	heart.	The	term	‘boil’	allows	us	to	imagine	something	that	conducts	a	kind	of	motion	in	the	region	of	the	heart	just	like	when	water	boils,	something	liquid.	The	heart	is	depicted	as	the	spring	from	which	blood	courses,	and	the	blood	consists	mostly	of	elemental	solids	of	fire	in	micro-scale	and	appears	to	be	 liquid	 in	macro-scale.	We	all	have	the	common	sense	that	water	boils	because	of	heating,	 and	 heating	 is	 to	 deliver	 hotness	 from	 one	 object	 to	 another.	 As	 argued	 previously,	hotness	is	essentially	the	movement	of	fiery	solids	and	the	interaction	of	those	fiery	solids	with	other	elemental	solids	they	encounter.	Bearing	this	in	mind,	we	can	claim	that	water	boils	when	heated	is	the	process	that	the	motion	of	the	fiery	solids	transmits	from	the	source	of	hotness	to	the	water	and	then	due	to	the	sharpness	of	fiery	solids	the	watery	solids	are	disintegrated,	and	thus	 yield	 non-uniformity	within	 the	water	 and	 the	water	 is	 then	more	 susceptible	 to	motion,	which,	in	this	case,	is	boiling.18	 Since	that	the	blood	has	the	fiery	solids	as	its	main	constituents,19	the	 sharpness	 and	 mobility	 induce	 non-uniformity	 within	 the	 blood	 and	 render	 it	 more	susceptible	to	motion,	which	is,	in	this	case,	boiling,	than	any	other	bodily	parts.	And	the	region	of	the	heart,	which	is	the	spring	of	blood,	of	fiery	solids,	is	even	more	so.	In	the	knowledge	that	anger	is	the	boiling	of	the	blood	at	the	macro-scale	and	the	dividing	and	 cutting	motion	of	 elemental	 solids	of	 fire	 at	 the	micro-scale	 in	 the	 region	of	 the	heart,	 the																																																									17	 Cf.	Cornford	(1937)	283.	18	 Cf.	Tim.	58e,	another	type	of	water,	the	metal,	melts	by	the	acts	of	fire.	19	 At	Tim.78e7-79a4,	it	is	clear	that	the	blood	consists	of	tiny	parts	that	are	food	and	drink	dissolved	and	taken	into	the	two	veins	by	the	fiery	bodily	solids.	At	79d1-2,	Timaeus	describes	the	area	around	the	veins	as	the	hottest	part	within	every	living	body,	and	this	is	because	the	veins	contain	large	amounts	of	fiery	solids.	 	
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clarification	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 anger	 still	 requires	 us	 to	 stress	 one	 feature,	 that	 is,	 it	 is	 the	 fiery	solids’	 nature	 to	 divide	 and	 cut	 other	 solids	 they	 encounter,	 which	 happens	 inside	 the	 body	constantly,	 so	 what	 specifies	 the	motion	 of	 fiery	 solids	 in	 the	 region	 of	 the	 heart	 at	 a	 certain	moment	as	anger?	Using	the	boiling	of	water	again	as	analogy,	we	can	see	that	the	characteristic	of	anger	is	that	the	amount	of	fiery	solids	that	emerge	in	the	region	of	the	heart	is	much	greater	than	usual,	 just	as	only	when	 the	accumulation	of	hotness	 in	 the	water	 reaches	a	certain	point	will	 the	boiling	begin.	The	 fact	 that	 the	 lesser	gods	 invented	 the	 lungs	 to	soothe	 the	heart	 (the	second	quoted	passage)	is	supporting	evidence	that	there	are	too	many	fiery	solids20	 in	motion	in	the	region	of	the	heart	such	that	a	cooling	system	is	required.	This	accounts	for	the	claim	that	the	lungs	are	firstly	devoid	of	blood,	so	as	to	prevent	further	increase	of	fiery	solids,	and	secondly	sponge-shaped	 containing	 pores,	 so	 that	 to	 absorb	 fiery	 solids	 when	 the	 anger	 in	 the	 heart	reaches	its	peak	in	order	to	avoid	excessive	anger.	Let	me	 recapitulate	what	we	have	 so	 far	 learned	 about	 anger.	Anger	 is	 in	 essence	 a	 great	amount	of	 fiery	solids	gathering	together	 in	the	region	of	the	heart	and	actively	conducting	the	motion	of	dividing	and	cutting.	The	function	of	the	heart	and	the	two	veins	connecting	to	it	is	to	supply	sufficient	–	sufficient	in	a	sense	that	the	amount	becomes	identifiable	–	fiery	solids	to	this	process.	And	the	purpose	for	the	lungs	is	to	ease	the	burden	around	the	heart	by	decreasing	the	amount	of	fiery	solids	if	necessary	in	order	that	the	heart	shall	function	better	in	the	process	of	anger.	 In	 other	words,	 anger	 can	be	 regarded	 as	 a	particular	 kind	of	motion	of	 fiery	 solids.	As	discussed	 above,	 πἀθημα	 is	 motions	 of	 the	 elemental	 solids.	 Then,	 being	 a	 kind	 of	 motion	 of	elemental	 solids	 itself,	 anger	 can	 count	 as	 a	 specific	 kind	 of	 πάθημα.	 Accordingly,	 it	 is	understandable	 that	 at	 69c3-d6	 Timaeus	 refers	 to	 anger	 as	 πάθημα	 while	 at	 42a3-d1	 he	mentions	the	emotions	singled	out.	Now	 that	we	 have	 grasped	 the	 knowledge	 of	 anger,	 then	what	 is	 the	mortal	 kind	 of	 soul	Timaeus	 refers	 to	 as	 the	 spirited	 part?	 Answering	 this	 question	 requires	 further	 clarification	about	 the	 term	θὐμος	Timaeus	uses	 in	his	 account.	When	mentioned	at	42a7,	69d3,	 and	70a3,	θὐμος	 obviously	 means	 the	 emotion	 of	 anger.	 Whereas	 at	 70b3,	 c2,	 and	 d5,	 where	 Timaeus	depicts	the	creation	of	the	spirited	part	of	soul,	it	is	not	certain	whether	he	uses	the	word	to	refer																																																									20	 Cf.	Tim.	70c3-4,	διὰ	πυρὸς	ἡ	τοιαύτη	πᾶσα	ἔμελλεν	οἴδησις	γίγνεσθαι	τῶν	θυμουμένων.	Since	in	the	Timaean	cosmology,	there	is	no	void	among	the	elemental	solids,	the	only	way	in	which	anger	swells	or	ferments,	which	implies	the	expansion	of	space,	is	to	draw	together	the	fiery	solids	that	are	in	motion.	
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to	 anger	 alone	 or	 to	 represent	 the	whole	 spirited	 part	 of	 soul.	 Since	 at	 70a	 2-3,	 Timaeus	 has	explicitly	addressed	the	spirited	part	of	soul	as	the	part	of	soul	that	consists	of	bravery	and	anger	(τὸ	μετέχον	τῆς	ψυχῆς	ἀνδρείας	καὶ	θυμοῦ),	 it	won’t	be	problematic	to	consider	the	account	of	the	function	of	anger	(70a2-d5)	as	also	that	of	the	function	of	the	spirited	part	of	soul.	This	being	the	 case,	we	 can	 then	 conclude	 that	 the	 spirited	 part	 of	 soul	 is	 essentially	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	motion	of	 the	elemental	 solids,	or,	πάθημα,	 that	 is	 circumscribed	by	 the	 lesser	gods	within	 the	region	of	the	heart.	An	important	aspect	about	the	function	of	the	spirited	part	of	soul	worth	stressing	is	that	the	lesser	 gods	 devised	 two	 veins	 and	 narrow	 channels	 throughout	 the	 whole	 body	 as	 passages	(77c-e)	that	enable	fiery	solids	to	move	all	around	the	body.	In	this	way,	the	motion	of	the	fiery	solids	can	be	promptly	transmitted	inside	the	body,	which	benefits	a	soul-body	individual	in	two	ways.	On	the	one	hand,	as	shown	at	70b,	when	anger	boils	over	at	any	internal	or	external	wrong	deed,	the	message	of	the	occurrence	of	something	unjust	can	be	easily	and	quickly	transported	to	every	 sensitive	 bodily	 part	 by	 the	 transmission	 of	 the	 fiery	 solids’	 motion	 through	 the	 blood	vessels,	such	that	the	immortal	part	of	soul	is	able	to	deliver	its	demand	to	and	coordinate	those	bodily	 parts.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 as	 shown	 in	 earlier	 discussion,	 there	 are	 two	 consequences	following	the	occurrence	of	πάθημα,	one	of	which	 is	 that	the	πάθημα	reaches	the	awareness	of	the	immortal	soul.	Since	the	blood	veins	are	situated	alongside	the	spine	(77d),	where	the	lesser	gods	 placed	 marrow	 that	 connects	 to	 both	 immortal	 and	 mortal	 parts	 of	 the	 soul,	 the	transmission	of	those	παθήματα	can	arrive	at	the	consciousness	of	the	immortal	part	as	soon	as	possible	 through	 the	 veins	 and	 blood	 vessels	 as	 well.	 This	 is	 how	 the	 immortal	 part	 of	 soul	communicates	 with	 the	 mortal	 part	 and	 the	 body:	 by	 the	 transmission	 of	 various	 kinds	 of	elemental	 solids’	 motions	 via	 blood	 channels	 throughout	 the	 body.	 The	 demands	 from	 the	immortal	part	of	 soul	are	delivered	by	 the	active	motions	of	 fiery	solids	 through	 the	veins	and	vessels	to	the	body,	and	παθήματα	become	αἰσθήσεις	when	the	motions	of	elemental	solids	are	passed	on	and	at	last	reach	the	immortal	soul	due	to	the	dynamic	character	of	certain	elemental	solids,	mainly	fiery	solids	in	this	case.	In	this	way,	the	communication	is	bidirectional.	 	There	is	one	crucial	problem	remaining	unsolved,	that	is,	how	can	an	immortal	soul	interact	with	the	spirited	part	of	soul	in	the	first	place.	I	have	argued,	in	Chapter	3,	‘3.1	the	construction	of	cosmic	soul’,	 that	 the	 immortal	soul	shares	with	sensible	objects	 the	same	constituents,	 that	 is,	
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they	are	both	the	impressions	of	the	Forms	in	the	Receptacle.	Hence,	ontologically	speaking,	it	is	possible	for	the	immortal	soul	to	interact	with	sensible	objects,	despite	their	structural	difference.	The	 Demiurge	 guaranteed	 the	 dominance	 of	 the	 immortal	 soul	 over	 sensible	 objects	when	 he	endowed	 it	 with	 circular	 motions.21	 The	 reason	 why	 the	 spirited	 part	 of	 soul	 is	 able	 to	communicate	with	the	immortal	part	while	the	appetitive	is	not	is	because	the	blood	circulation,	starting	 from	 the	 heart,	 passing	 throughout	 the	 body,	 and	 ending	 back	 in	 the	 heart,	 roughly	resonates	with	 the	revolutions	within	 the	 immortal	 soul.	 In	my	view,	 the	motions	of	elemental	solids	 exclude	 the	 kind	 that	 is	 circular,	 thus	 the	 body	 itself	 is	 devoid	 of	 understanding	 and	intelligence.	 This	 is	 because,	 according	 to	 34a,	 circular	 motion	 is	 especially	 associated	 with	understanding	 and	 intelligence	 and	 can	 only	 be	 awarded	 by	 the	 Demiurge,	 for	 instance,	 the	self-rotation	of	the	cosmic	body	(34a),	the	two	revolutions	of	the	cosmic	soul	(36b-37c),	and	the	orbits	of	the	planets	(38c-e).	So	in	order	that	the	body	can	be	coordinated	with	the	immortal	soul	and	not	always	disturb	the	revolutions	within	the	immortal	soul	as	when	it	is	first	embodied,	the	lesser	 gods	 rearranged	 and	 organized	 the	motions	 of	 bodily	 elemental	 solids,	 endowing	 them	with	auxiliary	bodily	organs	and	parts	 to	 create	 the	circuit,	 in	which	 the	blood	moves	 in	 cycle,	and	in	this	sense	it	resembles	the	revolutions	in	the	immortal	soul.	 	In	 conclusion,	 the	 spirited	part	of	 soul	 is	 set	up	as	an	 intermediary	between	 the	 immortal	soul	and	the	mortal	body	owing	to	its	specific	function	and	activity	of	delivering	demands	from	the	 immortal	 soul	 to	 the	 body	 as	 well	 as	 παθήματα	 from	 the	 body	 to	 the	 immortal	 soul.	 The	intermediary	 function	of	 the	 spirited	part	 of	 soul	 is	 grounded	 in	 that,	 as	 explained	 in	 terms	of	πἀθημα	and	αἴσθησις,	the	emotion	of	anger	enjoys	connection	with	both	the	immortal	soul	and	mortal	 body,	 and	 so	 does	 the	 spiritied	 part	 of	 soul.	 This	 connection	 is	 further	 justified	 by	 the	explanation	 of	 the	 immortal	 soul	 and	 mortal	 body	 are	 both	 constructed	 using	 Forms	 and	Receptacle	 as	 integral	 components.	Although	 the	 kinetic	 difference	between	 the	 immortal	 soul	and	the	spirited	part	of	soul	entails	that	the	latter	is	a	hindrance	to	the	former,	the	presence	of	the	 circuit	 of	 bloodstream	 helps	 spirited	 part	 of	 soul	 overall	 to	 be	 less	 troublesome	 to	 the	restoration	 of	 the	 revolutions	within	 the	 immortal	 soul	 and	 even	 to	 be	 an	 intermediary	 in	 the	communication	of	the	immortal	soul	and	mortal	body.	
																																																								21	 Cf.	Tim.	34a.	 	
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4.2.2	The	appetitive	part	of	soul	
Likewise,	as	to	the	creation	of	the	appetitive	part	of	soul,	I	will	first	take	a	look	at	where	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	is	situated	and	with	what	organs	it	is	associated,	and	why	it	is	housed	in	those	organs.	I	 then	investigate	how	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	communicates	with	the	spirited	part	and	further	the	immortal	part	of	soul.	It	 is	not	expressly	 indicated	what	 ingredients	 the	 lesser	had	 taken	 to	create	 the	appetitive	part	of	soul.	I	quoted	the	full	passage	(70d6-71d4)	that	demonstrates	the	lesser	gods’	situating	it	within	the	belly	and	inventing	the	liver	as	its	correlating	organ.	The	part	of	the	soul	that	has	appetites	(ἐπιθυμητικόν)	for	food	and	drink	and	whatever	else	it	 feels	a	need	for,	given	the	body’s	nature,	they	settled	in	the	area	between	the	midriff	and	the	boundary	toward	the	navel.	In	the	whole	of	this	region	they	constructed	something	like	a	trough	for	the	body’s	nourishment.	Here	they	tied	this	part	of	the	soul	down	like	a	beast,	a	wild	(ἄγριον)	one,	but	one	they	could	not	avoid	sustaining	along	with	the	others	if	a	mortal	race	were	ever	to	be.	They	assigned	it	its	position	there,	to	keep	it	ever	feeding	at	its	trough,	living	as	far	away	as	possible	 from	 the	 part	 that	 takes	 counsel,	 and	 making	 as	 little	 clamor	 and	 noise	 as	 possible,	thereby	letting	the	supreme	part	take	its	counsel	in	peace	about	what	is	beneficial	for	one	and	all.	They	know	that	this	part	of	the	soul	was	not	going	to	understand	the	deliverance	of	reason	and	that	even	if	it	were	in	one	way	or	another	to	have	some	awareness	of	them,	it	would	not	have	an	innate	regard	for	any	of	them,	but	would	be	much	more	enticed	by	images	and	phantoms	night	and	 day.	Hence	 the	 god	 conspired	with	 this	 very	 tendency	 by	 constructing	 a	 liver,	 a	 structure	which	he	situated	in	the	dwelling	place	of	this	part	of	the	soul.	he	made	it	into	something	dense,	smooth,	bright	and	sweet,	 though	also	having	a	bitter	quality,	 so	 that	 the	 force	of	 the	 thoughts	sent	down	from	the	mind	might	be	stamped	upon	 it	as	upon	a	mirror	 that	receives	 the	stamps	and	returns	visible	images.	So	the	force	of	the	mind’s	thoughts	could	frighten	this	part	of	the	soul	whenever	it	could	avail	itself	of	a	congenial	portion	of	the	liver’s	bitterness	and	threaten	it	with	severe	command.	And	by	infusing	the	bitterness	all	over	the	liver,	it	could	project	bilious	colors	onto	it	and	shrink	the	whole	liver,	making	it	wrinkled	and	rough.	It	could	curve	and	shrivel	up	the	liver’s	 lobe	and	block	up	and	close	off	 its	receptacles	and	portal	 fissures,	 thereby	causing	pains	and	 bouts	 of	 nausea.	 And	 again,	 whenever	 thought’s	 gentle	 inspiration	 should	 paint	 quite	opposite	 picture,	 its	 force	would	 bring	 respite	 from	 the	 bitterness	 by	 refusing	 to	 stir	 up	 or	 to	make	 contact	 with	 a	 nature	 opposite	 to	 its	 own.	 It	 would	 instead	 use	 the	 liver’s	 own	 natural	sweetness	on	it	and	restore	the	whole	extent	of	it	to	be	straight	and	smooth	and	free,	and	make	that	 portion	 of	 the	 soul	 that	 inhabits	 the	 region	 around	 the	 liver	 gracious	 and	 well	 behaved,	conducting	 itself	with	moderation	during	 the	night	when,	 seeing	 that	 it	has	no	share	 in	 reason	and	understanding,	it	practices	divination	by	dreams.22																																																									22	 Τὸ	δὲ	δὴ	σίτων	τε	καὶ	ποτῶν	ἐπιθυμητικὸν	τῆς	ψυχῆς	καὶ	ὅσων	ἔνδειαν	διὰ	τὴν	τοῦ	σώματος	ἴσχει	φύσιν͵τοῦτο	εἰς	τὸ	μεταξὺ	τῶν	τε	φρενῶν	καὶ	τοῦ	πρὸς	τὸν	ὀμφαλὸν	ὅρου	κατῴκισαν͵	οἷον	φάτνην	ἐν	ἅπαντι	τούτῳ	τῷ	τόπῳ	τῇ	τοῦ	σώματος	τροφῇ	τεκτηνάμενοι·	καὶ	κατέδησαν	δὴ	τὸ	τοιοῦτον	ἐνταῦθα	ὡς	θρέμμα	ἄγριον͵	τρέφειν	δὲ	συνημμένον	ἀναγκαῖον͵	εἴπερ	τι	μέλλοι	ποτὲ	θνητὸν	ἔσεσθαι	γένος.	ἵν΄	οὖν	ἀεὶ	νεμόμενον	πρὸς	φάτνῃ	καὶ	ὅτι	πορρωτάτω	τοῦ	βουλευομένου	κατοικοῦν͵	θόρυβον	καὶ	βοὴν	ὡς	ἐλαχίστην	
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By	the	reading	of	the	quoted	passage	above,23	 we	can	tell	that	the	lesser	gods	endowed	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	with	two	main	functions.	One	is	that	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	is	housed	in	the	region	of	the	belly	and	the	lesser	gods	assigned	the	function	of	nourishment	to	it.	Another	is	 that	 the	 appetitive	 part	 of	 soul	 is	 associated	 with	 liver,	 the	 organ	 that	 the	 lesser	 gods	constructed	in	order	that	the	immortal	soul	can	take	control	of	the	appetitive	part	in	an	imagistic	way.24	Let’s	first	take	a	look	at	the	nourishment	function	of	the	appetitive	part	of	soul.	According	to	Timaeus’	account	at	77a,	the	reason	why	human	beings	need	food	and	drink	is	that	we	live	a	life	surrounded	by	fire	and	air,	which	are	the	two	most	mobile	kinds	of	elemental	solids.25	 Hence	the	constant	inter-transformation	between	external	and	bodily	elemental	solids	would	cause	the	human	body	to	waste	away	and	be	depleted,	and	moreover	to	perish,	if	without	replenishment.	Therefore,	 the	 lesser	 gods	 created	 plants	 to	 nourish	 us	 (77a-c)	 and	 fashioned	 the	 irrigation	system	(78a-81b)	so	 that	 the	 food	and	drink	digested	 in	 the	belly	can	nourish	 the	whole	body.	Here	is	Timaeus’	summary	of	this	process	(78e3-79a4	and	80d3-81a).	This	entire	pattern	of	action	and	reaction,	irrigating	and	cooling	our	bodies,	supports	their	nutrition	and	 life.	 For	whenever	 the	 internal	 fire,	 united	with	 the	breath	 that	passes	 in	or	out,	follows	it	along,	it	surges	up	and	down	continually	and	makes	its	way	through	and	into	the	belly,	where	it	gets	hold	of	food	and	drink.	There	it	dissolves	or	breaks	up	into	tiny	parts,	which	it	then	takes	 through	 the	 outbound	passages	 along	which	 it	 is	 advancing,	 and	 transfers	 them	 into	 the	[two]	veins,	as	water	from	a	spring	is	transferred	into	water	pipes.	And	so	it	causes	the	currents	of	the	veins	to	flow	through	the	body	as	through	a	conduit.	The	fire	cuts	up	the	food	[in	our	bellies]	and	as	it	follows	the	breath	it	oscillates	inside	us.	As	the	oscillation	goes	on,	the	fire	pumps	the	cut-up	bits	of	food	from	the	belly	and	packs	them	into	 veins.	 This	 is	 the	 mechanism	 by	 which	 the	 streams	 of	 nourishment	 continue	 to	 follow																																																																																																																																																															παρέχον͵τὸ	κράτιστον	καθ΄	ἡσυχίαν	περὶ	τοῦ	πᾶσι	κοινῇ	καὶ	ἰδίᾳ	συμφέροντος	ἐῷ	βουλεύεσθαι͵	διὰ	ταῦτα	ἐνταῦθ΄	ἔδοσαν	αὐτῷ	τὴν	τάξιν.	εἰδότες	δὲ	αὐτὸ	ὡς	λόγου	μὲν	οὔτε	συνήσειν	ἔμελλεν͵	εἴ	τέ	πῃ	καὶ	μεταλαμβάνοι	τινὸς	αὐτῶν	αἰσθήσεως͵	οὐκ	ἔμφυτον	αὐτῷ	τὸ	μέλειν	τινῶν	ἔσοιτο	λόγων͵	ὑπὸ	δὲ	εἰδώλων	καὶ	φαντασμάτων	νυκτός	τε	καὶ	μεθ΄	ἡμέραν	μάλιστα	ψυχαγωγήσοιτο͵τούτῳ	δὴ	θεὸς	ἐπιβουλεύσας	αὐτῷ	τὴν	ἥπατος	ἰδέαν	συνέστησε	καὶ	ἔθηκεν	εἰς	τὴν	ἐκείνου	κατοίκησιν͵	πυκνὸν	καὶ	λεῖον	καὶ	λαμπρὸν	καὶ	γλυκὺ	καὶ	πικρότητα	ἔχον	μηχανησάμενος͵	ἵνα	ἐν	αὐτῷ	τῶν	διανοημάτων	ἡ	ἐκ	τοῦ	νοῦ	φερομένη	δύναμις͵	οἷον	ἐν	κατόπτρῳ	δεχομένῳ	τύπους	καὶ	κατιδεῖν	εἴδωλα	παρέχοντι͵	φοβοῖ	μὲν	αὐτό͵	ὁπότε	μέρει	τῆς	πικρότητος	χρωμένη	συγγενεῖ͵	χαλεπὴ	προσενεχθεῖσα	ἀπειλῇ͵	κατὰ	πᾶν	ὑπομειγνῦσα	ὀξέως	τὸ	ἧπαρ͵	χολώδη	χρώματα	ἐμφαίνοι͵	συνάγουσά	τε	πᾶν	ῥυσὸν	καὶ	τραχὺ	ποιοῖ͵λοβὸν	δὲ	καὶ	δοχὰς	πύλας	τε	τὸ	μὲν	ἐξ	ὀρθοῦ	κατακάμπτουσα	καὶ	συσπῶσα͵	τὰ	δὲ	ἐμφράττουσα	συγκλείουσά	τε͵	λύπας	καὶ	ἄσας	παρέχοι͵	καὶ	ὅτ΄	αὖ	τἀναντία	φαντάσματα	ἀποζωγραφοῖ	πρᾳότητός	τις	ἐκ	διανοίας	ἐπίπνοια͵	τῆς	μὲν	πικρότητος	ἡσυχίαν	παρέχουσα	τῷ	μήτε	κινεῖν	μήτε	προσάπτεσθαι	τῆς	ἐναντίας	ἑαυτῇ	φύσεως	ἐθέλειν͵	γλυκύτητι	δὲ	τῇ	κατ΄	ἐκεῖνο	συμφύτῳ	πρὸς	αὐτὸ	χρωμένη	καὶ	πάντα	ὀρθὰ	καὶ	λεῖα	αὐτοῦ	καὶ	ἐλεύθερα	ἀπευθύνουσα͵	ἵλεών	τε	καὶ	εὐήμερον	ποιοῖ	τὴν	περὶ	τὸ	ἧπαρ	ψυχῆς	μοῖραν	κατῳκισμένην͵	ἔν	τε	τῇ	νυκτὶ	διαγωγὴν	ἔχουσαν	μετρίαν͵	μαντείᾳ	χρωμένην	καθ΄	ὕπνον͵	ἐπειδὴ	λόγου	καὶ	φρονήσεως	οὐ	μετεῖχε.	23	 Due	to	the	limited	length	of	this	chapter,	I	will	not	discuss	the	nature	and	significance	of	divination,	and	will	have	it	mentioned	in	Chapter	5.	24	 Cf.	Wilburn	(2014)	628.	25	 Cf.	Tim.	56a.	
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throughout	the	bodies	of	all	living	things.	The	bits	of	food,	freshly	cut	up	and	derived	from	things	like	 themselves	 –	 from	 fruits	 or	 from	 vegetables	 which	 god	 had	 caused	 to	 grow	 for	 this	 very	purpose,	to	serve	us	as	food	–	come	to	have	a	variety	of	colors	as	a	result	of	being	mixed	together,	but	a	reddish	color	pervading	them	predominates,	a	character	that	is	the	product	of	the	cutting	and	 staining	 action	of	 fire	 upon	moisture.	 This	 is	why	 the	 color	 of	 the	 liquid	 that	 flows	 in	 our	bodies	looks	the	way	we’ve	described;	this	liquid	we	call	blood,	which	feeds	our	flesh	and	indeed	our	whole	bodies.	From	this	source	the	various	parts	of	our	bodies	are	watered	and	so	replenish	the	supports	of	the	depleted	area.26	From	the	above	passages,	we	can	 learn	that	the	digestion	and	nourishment	process	within	the	 human	 body	 is	 in	 essence	 the	 inter-transformation	 of	 the	 elemental	 solids.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	taking	 into	account	Plato’s	wording	when	he	 introduced	the	appetitive	part	of	soul,	 that	 is,	 ‘the	part	of	the	soul	that	has	appetites	for	food	and	drink	and	whatever	else	it	feels	a	need	for’,	I	think	it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 appetitive	 part	 of	 soul	 indicates	 human	 body’s	 nature	tendency	to	replenish	itself	with	new	elemental	solids	as	compensation	for	those	lost	during	the	inter-transformation	 between	 the	 external	 and	 bodily	 elemental	 solids.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	appetitive	part	of	soul	can	be	regarded	as	a	particular	kind	of	motion	of	the	elemental	solids,	or	πάθημα,	 that	 is	 circumscribed	 by	 the	 lesser	 gods	 within	 the	 region	 of	 the	 belly.	 And	 its	mechanical	process	is	as	follows:	the	bodily	elemental	solids	of	fire	first	come	into	the	region	of	belly	 through	 the	 irrigation	 system	and	 cut	 up	 those	 elemental	 solids	 that	 constitute	 food	 and	drink	coming	from	outside,	and	then	deliver	those	cut-up	bits	to	the	veins	that	run	through	the	whole	body.	According	to	the	specification	of	πάθημα	and	αἴσθησις	we	have	made	in	previous	discussion,	we	 can	 claim	 that	 the	mechanical	 process	 of	 the	 appetitive	 part	 of	 soul	 involves	 not	 only	 the	interaction	of	 elemental	 solids	between	 the	body	of	 the	 recipient	 (the	 fiery	 solids	 in	 the	belly)	and	the	external	objects	(food	and	drink),	but	also	the	transmission	of	such	interaction	inside	the	recipient’s	 body	 (delivery	 of	 the	 cut-up	 bits	 into	 the	 veins).	 Then	 can	 the	 πάθημα	 of	 the																																																									26	 78e3-79a4:	πᾶν	δὲ	δὴ	τό	τ΄	ἔργον	καὶ	τὸ	πάθος	τοῦθ΄	ἡμῶν	τῷ	σώματι	γέγονεν	ἀρδομένῳ	καὶ	ἀναψυχομένῳ	τρέφεσθαι	καὶ	ζῆν·	ὁπόταν	γὰρ	εἴσω	καὶ	ἔξω	τῆς	ἀναπνοῆς	ἰούσης	τὸ	πῦρ	ἐντὸς	συνημμένον	ἕπηται͵	διαιωρούμενον	δὲ	ἀεὶ	διὰ	τῆς	κοιλίας	εἰσελθὸν	τὰ	σιτία	καὶ	ποτὰ	λάβῃ͵τήκει	δή͵	καὶ	κατὰ	σμικρὰ	διαιροῦν͵	διὰ	τῶν	ἐξόδων	ᾗπερ	πορεύεται	διάγον͵	οἷον	ἐκ	κρήνης	ἐπ΄	ὀχετοὺς	ἐπὶ	τὰς	φλέβας	ἀντλοῦν	αὐτά͵	ῥεῖν	ὥσπερ	αὐλῶνος	διὰ	τοῦ	σώματος	τὰ	τῶν	φλεβῶν	ποιεῖ	ῥεύματα.	80d3-81a:	τέμνοντος	μὲν	τὰ	σιτία	τοῦ	πυρός͵	αἰωρουμένου	δὲ	ἐντὸς	τῷ	πνεύματι	συνεπομένου͵	τὰς	φλέβας	τε	ἐκ	τῆς	κοιλίας	τῇ	συναιωρήσει	πληροῦντος	τῷ	τὰ	τετμημένα	αὐτόθεν	ἐπαντλεῖν·	καὶ	διὰ	ταῦτα	δὴ	καθ΄	ὅλον	τὸ	σῶμα	πᾶσιν	τοῖς	ζῴοις	τὰ	τῆς	τροφῆς	νάματα	οὕτως	ἐπίρρυτα	γέγονεν.	νεότμητα	δὲ	καὶ	ἀπὸ	συγγενῶν	ὄντα͵	τὰ	μὲν	καρπῶν͵	τὰ	δὲ	χλόης͵	ἃ	θεὸς	ἐπ΄	αὐτὸ	τοῦθ΄	ἡμῖν	ἐφύτευσεν͵	εἶναι	τροφήν͵	παντοδαπὰ	μὲν	χρώματα	ἴσχει	διὰ	τὴν	σύμμειξιν͵	ἡ	δ΄	ἐρυθρὰ	πλείστη	περὶ	αὐτὰ	χρόα	διαθεῖ͵	τῆς	τοῦ	πυρὸς	τομῆς	τε	καὶ	ἐξομόρξεως	ἐν	ὑγρῷ	δεδημιουργημένη	φύσις.	ὅθεν	τοῦ	κατὰ	τὸ	σῶμα	ῥέοντος	τὸ	χρῶμα	ἔσχεν	οἵαν	ὄψιν	διεληλύθαμεν	ὃ	καλοῦμεν	αἷμα͵	νομὴν	σαρκῶν	καὶ	σύμπαντος	τοῦ	σώματος͵	ὅθεν	ὑδρευόμενα	ἕκαστα	πληροῖ	τὴν	τοῦ	κενουμένου	βάσιν·	
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appetitive	 part	 of	 soul	 cause	 αἴσθησις,	 in	 other	 words,	 arrive	 at	 the	 consciousness	 of	 the	immortal	 soul?	 I	 think	 the	answer	 is	positive.	The	 reasons	are	as	 follows.	The	 cut-up	 food	and	drink	 bits	 shall	 eventually	 be	 sent	 into	 the	 veins	 and	 through	 the	 veins	 then	 transmitted	throughout	the	whole	body.	And	the	veins,	as	we	have	examined,	are	the	channels	through	which	the	 transmission	 of	 παθήματα	 can	 arrive	 at	 the	 consciousness	 of	 the	 immortal	 soul.	We	 have	drawn	a	 conclusion	 from	earlier	discussion	 that	 the	 spirited	part	of	 the	 soul	 can	 communicate	with	 the	 immortal	 soul	 employing	 the	 blood	 circulation	 through	 the	 veins.	 Now	 that	 the	mechanical	process	of	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	ends	with	taking	part	 in	the	blood	circulation,	there	is	no	reason	to	doubt	the	possibility	that	the	πάθημα	taking	place	in	the	region	of	the	belly	should	reach	the	awareness	of	 the	 immortal	soul	and	become	an	αἴσθησις.	This	being	the	case,	the	sensation	of	being	 full	or	hungry	can	be	 then	explained	with	reference	 to	 the	sensations	of	pleasure	and	pain	(64c7-d3).	As	we	have	studied,	pleasure	and	pain	are	caused	by	a	violent	and	sudden	 change	 of	 the	 bodily	 parts’	 previous	 conditions,	which	 can	be	 regarded	 as	 a	 particular	kind	of	πάθημα.	Following	that	train	of	thought,	we	may	infer	that	feeling	full	or	hungry	may	be	caused	by	the	replenishment	or	depletion	of	the	elemental	solids	in	the	region	of	the	belly.	That	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	is	a	particular	kind	of	πάθημα	occurring	in	the	region	of	the	belly	 entails	 that	 the	 appetitive	 part	 of	 soul	 is	 totally	 devoid	 of	 opinion,	 reasoning,	 or	understanding,	 though	 it	 does	 share	 in	 sensation,	 pleasant	 and	 painful,	 and	 desire.27	 That	 the	appetitive	part	of	soul	is	a	particular	kind	of	πάθημα	occurring	in	the	region	of	the	belly	entails	that	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	is	totally	devoid	of	opinion,	reasoning,	or	understanding,	though	it	does	 share	 in	 sensation,	 pleasant	 and	 painful,	 and	 desire.28	 As	 I	 have	 mentioned	 before,	 the	spirited	part	of	soul	is	capable	of	communicating	with	the	immortal	soul	because	its	circulation	within	the	whole	human	body	roughly	resonates	with	the	revolutions	within	the	immortal	soul.	And	 circular	 motion	 is	 the	 only	 kind	 of	 motion	 that	 is	 associated	 with	 understanding	 and	intelligence	 (34a).	 The	 mechanical	 process	 of	 cutting	 up	 external	 food	 and	 drink’s	 elemental	solids	does	not	involve	any	sort	of	circular	motion.	That	is	why	Timaeus	affirms	at	71a	and	77b	that	this	part	of	soul	cannot	understand	to	deliverance	of	reason.	Nevertheless,	the	participation	of	the	cut-up	food	and	drink	bits	in	the	blood	circulation	supports	Timaeus’	following	claim	that																																																									27	 Cf.	Tim.	77b.	where	Timaeus	claims	the	similarity	between	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	and	that	of	plants;	for	a	detailed	investigation	of	the	souls	of	plants,	cf.	Carpenter	(2010).	28	 Cf.	Tim.	77b.	 	
	 83	
the	appetitive	part	of	soul	in	one	way	or	another	has	some	awareness	of	reason.	And	it	is	also	the	supporting	evidence	that	 it	 involves	sensations	in	that	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	can	indirectly	communicate	with	the	immortal	soul	employing	the	spirited	part	of	soul	as	intermediary.	That	is,	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	connects	itself	with	the	spirited	part	of	soul	by	having	the	cut-up	food	and	drink	bits	 take	participation	 in	 the	blood	circulation	 that	 is	an	 integral	part	of	 the	spirited	part	of	soul.	And	in	this	way,	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	is	able	to	send	message	to	the	immortal	soul	via	the	spirited	part	of	soul.	Now	 I	 shall	 proceed	 to	 discuss	 the	 appetitive	 part	 of	 soul’s	 association	 with	 the	 liver.	According	to	the	quoted	passage	(70d6-71d4),	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	has	the	tendency	to	be	much	more	enticed	by	images	and	phantoms	night	and	day.	So	the	lesser	gods	took	advantage	of	this	very	nature	to	construct	the	liver	as	a	mirror	to	receive	either	frightening	or	soothing	images	from	the	immortal	soul	and	the	liver	shall	infuse	bitterness	or	restore	sweetness	accordingly.	In	this	way,	the	immortal	soul	can	take	control	of	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	by	causing	either	pain	or	pleasure	in	the	liver	around	which	region	the	latter	lives.	 	In	order	to	deepen	our	understanding	of	 the	role	the	 liver	 functions	 in	the	communication	between	 the	 immortal	 soul	 and	 the	 appetitive	 part	 of	 soul,	 these	 three	 questions,	 I	 suggest,	should	be	addressed.	First,	why	is	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	inclined	to	be	persuaded	by	images	and	phantasms?	Second,	how	does	the	immortal	soul	send	images	to	the	liver?	Third,	what	is	the	mechanical	process	of	the	liver’s	infusing	bitternes	and	restoring	sweetness,	and	thereby	causing	pain	 and	 pleasure	 in	 the	 surrounding	 region?	 Pender’s	 interpretation29	 answers	 those	 three	questions:	the	language	Plato	employs	to	portray	the	communication	between	the	immortal	soul	and	appetitive	part	of	 soul	 supports	 a	 ‘homoculi’	 reading,	 that	 is,	Plato	 speaks	of	 the	 immortal	soul	and	appetitive	part	of	soul	in	a	metaphorical	sense	so	as	to	convey	difficult	concept,	that	is,	the	soul’s	apparatus	of	communication.	Her	metaphorical	reading	is	plausible.	My	interpretation,	on	the	contrary,	pays	more	attention	on	the	mechanical	princples	underlies	the	communication,	with	regard	to	πἀθημα	and	αἴσθησις,	rather	than	terminologies.	Then,	 in	 order	 to	 answer	 the	 first	 question,	 I	want	 to	 first	 take	 a	 look	 at	 the	mechanical	process	 of	 the	 production	 of	 images	 and	 phantasms	 so	 as	 to	 find	 out	 if	 there	 is	 any	 affinity	between	the	generation	of	images	and	phantasms	and	the	mechanical	principles	of	the	appetitive																																																									29	 Cf.	Pender	(1997)	286-288.
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part	of	soul.	At	45b-46a,	following	the	introduction	of	the	creation	of	eyes,	Timaeus	demonstrates	how	sight	and	images	are	generated,	from	which	I	excerpt	the	most	related	passages	as	follows.	Now	 whenever	 daylight	 surounds	 the	 visual	 stream,	 like	 makes	 contact	 with	 like	 and	coalesces	with	it	to	make	up	a	single	homogeneous	body	aligned	with	the	direction	of	the	eyes.	This	 happens	 wherever	 the	 internal	 fire	 strikes	 and	 presses	 against	 an	 external	 object	 it	 has	connected	 with.	 And	 because	 this	 body	 of	 fire	 has	 become	 uniform	 throughout	 and	 thus	uniformly	 affected,	 it	 transmits	 the	motions	of	whatever	 it	 comes	 in	 contact	with	 as	well	 as	of	whatever	comes	in	contact	with	it,	to	and	through	the	whole	body	until	they	reach	the	soul.	This	brings	about	the	sensation	we	call	‘seeing.’(45c2-d3)	...	But	if	some	fairly	strong	motions	remain,	they	 produce	 images	 similar	 in	 kind	 and	 in	 number	 to	 the	 kinds	 of	motions	 they	 are,	 and	 the	kinds	of	regions	in	which	they	remain	–	images	which,	though	formed	within,	are	recalled	upon	waking	as	external	objects.(45e4-46a2)30	From	the	quoted	passage	above,	we	can	tell	that	the	generation	of	images	and	phantasms	is	in	essence	the	motions	caused	by	the	interaction	of	the	fiery	elemental	solids	between	the	eyes	of	the	recipient	and	the	external	object,	and	these	very	motions	 then	are	 transmitted	through	the	whole	 body	 and	 reach	 the	 awareness	 of	 the	 immortal	 soul	 eventually.	 The	 only	 difference	between	 the	 images	 and	 phantasms	 is	 that	 the	 latter	 are	 caused	 by	 stronger	motions	 and	 can	remain	within	the	body	when	the	internal	fire	stops	interacting	with	the	external	one.	Hence,	we	can	 say	 that	 the	 images	 and	 phantasms	 can	 be	 specified	 as	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 πάθημα	 that	involves	merely	the	elemental	solids	of	fire.	This	being	the	case,	the	affinity	between	the	images	and	phantasms	and	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	is	then	obvious.	That	is,	the	appetitive	part	of	soul,	as	 I	have	discussed	earlier,	can	be	regarded	as	a	particular	kind	of	πάθημα	taking	place	within	the	region	of	the	belly,	and	the	main	bodily	elemental	solids	that	participate	in	this	very	πάθημα	are	the	fiery	solids,	which	run	into	and	out	of	the	belly	through	the	veins	continually.31	 Therefore,	it	is	understandable	that	the	images	and	phantasms	can	have	effect	on	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	when	they	are	transmitted	through	the	veins,	for	it	is	very	likely	that	the	motions	of	those	images	and	phantasms	pass	on	to	the	fiery	solids	that	are	making	their	way	to	the	belly	through	the	very	same	veins.	Having	 understood	 that	 it	 is	 the	 motions	 of	 the	 fiery	 elemental	 solids	 in	 the	 blood																																																									30	 ὅταν	οὖν	μεθημερινὸν	ᾖ	φῶς	περὶ	τὸ	τῆς	ὄψεως	ῥεῦμα͵	τότε	ἐκπῖπτον	ὅμοιον	πρὸς	ὅμοιον͵	συμπαγὲς	γενόμενον͵	ἓν	σῶμα	οἰκειωθὲν	συνέστη	κατὰ	τὴν	τῶν	ὀμμάτων	εὐθυωρίαν͵	ὅπῃπερ	ἂν	ἀντερείδῃ	τὸ	προσπῖπτον	ἔνδοθεν	πρὸς	ὃ	τῶν	ἔξω	συνέπεσεν.	ὁμοιοπαθὲς	δὴ	δι΄	ὁμοιότητα	πᾶν	γενόμενον͵ὅτου	τε	ἂν	αὐτό	ποτε	ἐφάπτηται	καὶ	ὃ	ἂν	ἄλλο	ἐκείνου͵	τούτων	τὰς	κινήσεις	διαδιδὸν	εἰς	ἅπαν	τὸ	σῶμα	μέχρι	τῆς	ψυχῆς	αἴσθησιν	παρέσχετο	ταύτην	ᾗ	δὴ	ὁρᾶν	φαμεν.	…	καταλειφθεισῶν	δέ	τινων	κινήσεων	μειζόνων͵	οἷαι	καὶ	ἐν	οἵοις	ἂν	τόποις	λείπωνται͵τοιαῦτα	καὶ	τοσαῦτα	παρέσχοντο	ἀφομοιωθέντα	ἐντὸς	ἔξω	τε	ἐγερθεῖσιν	ἀπομνημονευόμενα	φαντάσματα.	31	 Cf.	Tim.	78e3-79a4.	
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circulation	that	allow	the	impact	of	 images	and	phantasms	on	the	appetitive	part	of	soul,	 I	now	proceed	to	answer	the	second	question,	that	is,	how	does	the	immortal	soul	send	images	to	the	liver?	 As	 I	 have	 argued	 in	 previous	 discussion,	 the	 immortal	 soul	 can	 communicate	 with	 the	spirited	 part	 of	 soul	 by	 affecting	 the	 latter’s	 circulation,	 which	 is	 mainly	 conducted	 by	 fiery	elemental	solids.	In	this	way,	the	immortal	soul	can	also	employ	the	circulation	within	the	body	to	transmit	motions	that	generate	either	frightening	or	soothing	images	to	the	appetitive	part	of	soul.	One	thing	that	is	worth	stressing	is	that	the	immortal	soul	does	not	send	the	images	directly	to	the	appetitive	part	of	soul.	Rather,	the	images	can	be	sent	first	to	the	liver	like	being	stamped	upon	a	mirror	and	the	liver	then	returns	visible	images	to	the	appetitive	part	of	soul.32	 	And	as	to	how	the	liver	receives	those	images,	we	can	investigate	it	with	reference	to	how	images	are	produced	on	mirrors	or	other	kinds	of	smoothing	object.	Here	are	Timaeus’	depiction.	And	 so	 there	 is	 no	 longer	 any	 difficulty	 in	 understanding	 how	 images	 are	 produced	 in	mirrors	 or	 in	 any	 other	 smooth	 reflecting	 surfaces.	 On	 such	 occasions	 the	 internal	 fire	 joins	forces	with	 the	 external	 fire,	 to	 form	on	 the	 smooth	 surface	 a	 single	 fire	 that	 is	 reshaped	 in	 a	multitude	of	ways.	So	once	the	fire	from	the	face	comes	to	coalesce	with	the	fire	from	sight	on	the	smooth	and	bright	surface,	you	have	the	inevitable	appearance	of	all	images	of	this	sort.	(46a-b)33	The	mechanical	process	of	producing	an	image	on	a	mirror	differs	from	that	of	a	mere	image	in	 that	 in	 the	 latter	 process	 the	 motions	 caused	 by	 the	 interaction	 of	 fiery	 elemental	 solids	between	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 recipient	 and	 the	 external	 object	 are	 transmitted	 within	 the	 body	immediately	 once	 that	 interaction	 occurs.	 Whereas	 in	 the	 former	 process	 the	 fiery	 elemental	solids	 of	 the	 recipient	 interact	 and	 coalesce	 with	 those	 of	 the	 external	 object,	 and	 then	 such	interaction	 forms	 on	 the	 surface	 of	 the	mirror	 a	 new	mode	 of	motion,	 which	 depends	 on	 the	condition	of	the	surface.34	 In	a	similar	way,	we	can	imagine	that	the	command	from	the	immortal	soul	manifests	as	a	motion	of	elemental	solids	transmitted	through	the	veins	and	channels	to	the	region	of	the	belly.	This	motion	then	interacts	and	coalesces	with	the	motions	of	elemental	solids	in	the	belly	and	then	it	forms	a	new	mode	of	motion	on	the	surface	of	the	liver.	If	the	command	from	 the	 immortal	 soul	 means	 to	 frighten	 the	 appetitive	 part	 of	 soul,	 the	 liver	 then	 becomes	depleted	 of	moisture	 and	 even	dissolves	 some	of	 itself	 so	 that	 it	 becomes	wrinkled	 and	 rough																																																									32	 Cf.	Tim.	71b.	33	 τὸ	δὲ	περὶ	τὴν	τῶν	κατόπτρων	εἰδωλοποιίαν	καὶ	πάντα	ὅσα	ἐμφανῆ	καὶ	λεῖα͵	κατιδεῖν	οὐδὲν	ἔτι	χαλεπόν.	ἐκ	γὰρ	τῆς	ἐντὸς	ἐκτός	τε	τοῦ	πυρὸς	ἑκατέρου	κοινωνίας	ἀλλήλοις͵	ἑνός	τε	αὖ	περὶ	τὴν	λειότητα	ἑκάστοτε	γενομένου	καὶ	πολλαχῇ	μεταρρυθμισθέντος͵	πάντα	τὰ	τοιαῦτα	ἐξ	ἀνάγκης	ἐμφαίνεται͵	τοῦ	περὶ	τὸ	πρόσωπον	πυρὸς	τῷ	περὶ	τὴν	ὄψιν	πυρὶ	περὶ	τὸ	λεῖον	καὶ	λαμπρὸν	συμπαγοῦς	γιγνομένου.	34	 Cf.	Tim.	46b-c.	
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(71b8).	This	is	because	the	liver	is	constructed	by	the	lesser	gods	as	dense,	smooth,	bright,	sweet,	and	bitter	as	well,	at	the	very	beginning.	And	properties,	such	as	bitter,	sweet,	etc.	with	reference	to	 Timaeus’	 description	 at	 65c-66c,	 are	 results	 of	 elemental	 solids’	 contractions	 and	 dilations.	Moreover,	the	command	to	threaten	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	employs	a	kindred	portion	of	the	liver’s	 bitterness	 (71b),	 which	 I	 interpret	 as	 that	 the	 pattern	 of	 motion	 transmitted	 from	 the	command	of	 the	 immortal	 soul	 is	 in	 common	with	 the	bitterness	of	 the	 liver,	 the	bitterness	 in	terms	of	 a	kind	of	πάθημα.	Now	 that	 the	 surface	of	 the	 liver	 is	wrinkled	and	 rough,	 the	 image	formed	on	it	must	share	the	liver’s	bitterness	and	pass	on	such	a	property	to	the	appetitive	part	of	soul,	 causing	pain	and	nausea	(71c).	 In	 this	way,	 the	 immortal	soul	sends	 threatening	 to	 the	appetitive	part	of	soul.	Now	if	the	command	from	the	immortal	soul	means	to	inspire	and	soothe	the	appetitive	part	of	soul,	we	can	assume	that	 the	motion	transmitted	 from	the	 immortal	soul	must	 be	 congruent	 with	 the	 natural	 condition	 of	 the	 liver,	 which	 refers	 to	 the	 liver’s	 own	property	of	sweetness.	And	the	liver’s	restoration	of	such	sweetness	will	make	a	positive	impact	on	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	so	as	to	make	it	gracious	and	well	behaved	(71c-d).	Now	I	have	explained	how	the	immortal	soul	communicates	with	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	in	a	imagistic	way.	Images,	 in	Timaeus	account,	are	essentially	a	particular	kind	of	πάθημα	that	involves	merely	the	solids	of	fire.	Since	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	itself	is	also	a	particular	kind	of	πάθημα	in	the	region	of	the	belly	and	mainly	consists	of	the	solids	of	fire,	images	can	be	sent	to	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	through	the	circuit	of	bloodstream	and	the	cut-up	food	and	drink	bits	are	 transmitted	 from	 the	 belly	 to	 the	 blood	 veins.	 And	 noteworthy	 is	 that	 the	 circuit	 of	bloodstream	 is	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 sipirted	 part	 of	 soul.	 Thus,	 by	 taking	 part	 in	 the	 blood	circulation,	the	appetitive	part	of	soul	sets	up	connection	with	the	spirited	part.	In	this	way,	the	latter	functions	as	an	intermediary	in	the	communication	between	the	former	and	the	immortal	soul.	 	
Conclusion	
In	this	chapter,	I	have	explained	what	are	the	ingredients	composing	the	two	mortal	parts	of	soul	 in	 terms	 of	 πάθημα	 and	 αἴσθησις.	 I	 also	 argued	 that	 the	 communication	 between	 the	immortal	 and	mortal	 souls	 can	 then	be	understood	 in	 the	knowledge	of	πάθημα	and	αἴσθησις.	
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Πάθημα,	 roughly	 speaking,	 refers	 to	 the	 interaction	 of	 elemental	 solids	 in	 the	 human	 body.	Taking	 into	account	 the	various	results	of	 the	 interaction,	πάθημα	can	be	specified	as	denoting	properties	of	sensible	objects	and	disturbances	within	the	human	body.	Αἴσθησις,	then,	refers	to	perceived	πάθημα.	I	then	argued	that	emotions	and	sense	perceptions	are	all	particular	kinds	of	πάθημα	and	αἴσθησις.	Also	noteworthy	is	that	πάθημα	and	αἴσθησις	is	not	created	by	the	lesser	gods,	 thus	 nor	 do	 emotions	 and	 sense	 perceptions.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 lesser	 gods’s	 creative	activities	are	restricted	to,	 firstly,	selecting	particular	πάθημα	as	 ingredients	and	looking	ahead	how	 these	 will	 arise	 themselves	 from	 the	 embodiment	 of	 the	 immortal	 soul	 and	 later	 bodily	experiences;	secondly,	making	the	best	accommodation	for	there	ingredients	respectively.	Thus	Timaeus’	account	emphasizes	on	‘housing’	rather	than	‘mixing’.	I	 then	 explained	 what	 are	 the	 spirited	 and	 appetitive	 parts	 of	 soul	 and	 how	 they	communicate	with	the	immortal	soul	on	the	basis	of	my	interpretation	of	πάθημα	and	αἴσθησις.	The	 boundary	 between	 the	 immortal	 and	mortal	 soul	 is	 already	 blurred	 since	 the	 concept	 of	αἴσθησις	itself	involves	the	immortal	soul.	The	spirited	part	of	soul	is	able	to	communicate	with	the	 immortal	 soul	 by	 itself	while	 the	 appetitive	 part	 of	 soul	 needs	 the	 spirited	 part	 of	 soul	 as	intermediary.	 This	 is	 because,	 firstly,	 the	 circuit	 of	 bloodstream	 allows	πάθημα	 of	 the	 spirited	part	of	soul	reaches	 the	consciousness	of	 the	 immortal	soul	while	 the	appetitive	part	of	soul	 is	restricted	in	the	region	of	the	belly	and	thus	the	latter	can	only	communicate	with	the	immortal	soul	 through	 the	 help	 of	 the	 circuit	 of	 bloodstream,	 in	 other	words,	 the	 intermediation	 of	 the	spirited	part	of	soul.	Therefore,	we	can	see	that	 the	distinction	between	the	 immortal	and	mortal	soul	 is	not	an	absolute	 one.	 Firstly,	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 two	 mortal	 kinds	 of	 soul,	 examined	 in	 terms	 of	πάθημα	and	αἴσθησις,	already	contains	element	of	the	immortal	soul.	And	secondly,	the	spirited	part	of	soul	functions	not	only	as	an	intermediary	between	the	immortal	soul	and	body	but	also	between	 the	 immortal	 soul	 and	 the	 appetitive	 part	 of	 soul.	 Chapter	 5	 will,	 then,	 discuss	 how	should	we	think	of	the	teleology	operating	behind	the	cosmic	creation	as	well	as	the	creation	of	the	 human	 race,	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 immortal	 and	 mortal	 nature	 is	 not	unbridgeable	in	the	Timaeus.
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Chapter	5	The	teleological	mortality	
Introduction	
Chapter	2	and	3	have	argued	that	the	Forms	and	the	Receptacle	are	integral	components	in	the	 construction	 of	 immortal	 souls,	 including	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 and	 human	 individual	 immortal	souls,	 as	well	 as	mortal	 existence,	 including	 the	 elemental	 triangles	 and	 solids	 and	 the	 human	body	 that	 consists	 of	 the	 former.	 In	 this	 way,	 we	 can	 see	 Plato’s	 attempt	 at	 bridging	 the	 gap	between	 the	 immortal	 and	 mortal	 nature	 by	 seeking	 analogy	 between	 their	 respective	constructions.	Chapter	4	explained,	on	the	basis	of	the	knowledge	we	have	learned	in	Chapter	2	and	3,	with	regard	to	the	human	race,	the	ways	in	which	the	interactions	between	the	immortal	soul	 and	mortal	body	are	enabled	and	mediated	by	 the	 two	mortal	 kinds	of	 soul.	Then,	 in	 this	chapter,	 I	want	 to	 look	 at	 the	 teleology	operating	behind	 the	 creation	of	 the	human	 race,	with	regard	to	the	purposes	 for	which	the	human	race	are	created	as	possessing	such	 immortal	and	mortal	nature	 that	 is	demonstrated	 in	previous	chapters.	My	argument	will	 show	that	not	only	did	the	Plato	try	to	bridge	the	gap	between	immortal	and	mortal	nature	by	blurring	the	boundary	between	 their	 respective	 constitutions,	 but	 by	 doing	 so,	 the	 absolute	 gap	 between	 the	 divine	existence,	i.e.	the	cosmos	itself,	and	the	human	race	as	mortal	being	can	be	bridged	to	a	certain	extent.	As	 I	 have	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 the	 human	 race	 is	 a	 compositional	 part	 fashioned	 so	 as	 to	contribute	 to	 the	 goodness	 of	 the	 entire	 cosmos	 rather	 than	 the	 priority	 in	 the	 Demiurge’s	creative	 decisions.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 human	 race	 and	 the	 entire	cosmos	 can	 be	 understood	 referring	 to	 that	 of	 a	 jigsaw	 puzzle	 and	 its	 pieces.	 The	 pieces	 of	 a	jigsaw	puzzle	are	 supposed	 to	be	placed	 together	 to	 compose	a	picture.	This	means	 that	every	piece,	being	printed	with	a	distinctive	pattern	and	cut	into	a	certain	shape,	should	be	posited	in	harmony	 with	 other	 pieces	 according	 to	 their	 relative	 patterns	 and	 shapes,	 in	 order	 that	 the	jigsaw	puzzle	should	be	complete	and	perfect.	Analogously,	the	human	race,	being	a	constitutive	part	 of	 the	whole	 cosmos,	 is	 endowed	with	 such	 and	 such	 nature	 so	 as	 to	 benefit	 the	 overall	cosmic	 creation	 and	 well-being	 afterwards.	 This	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 human	 race	 was	
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brought	about	only	as	an	auxiliary	necessary	to	the	completion	of	cosmic	creation,	and	its	mortal	nature	was	 designed	 as	 supplementary	 to	 that	 auxiliary.	 For	 this	 reason,	 Timaeus’	 cosmology	seems	not	to	be	anthropocentric	whatsoever.	However,	to	say	that	the	cosmology	of	the	Timaeus	is	not	anthropocentric	is	not	equivalent	to	 saying	 that	 no	 concern	 for	 the	 human	 race	was	 taken	 into	 consideration	 during	 the	 cosmic	creation	at	all.	This	is	because	the	similarity	in	construction	between	the	cosmos	and	the	human	race	is	evident.	For	instance,	at	Timaeus	44d3-5,	the	lesser	gods	situated	the	immortal	soul	in	a	round	head,	imitating	the	revolving	shape	of	the	cosmos	and	the	combination	of	the	cosmic	soul	and	body,	which	shows	a	purposefully	crafted	structural	resemblance	between	the	human	race	and	 the	 cosmos.	 In	 addition,	 in	his	 cosmological	monologue,	Timaeus	has	occupied	quite	 some	length	 in	 covering	 the	constitution	of	various	bodily	organs	and	 their	 corresponding	 functions,	and	their	respective	benefits	for	the	immortal	souls	as	well.	Both	the	structural	affinity	between	the	 human	 race	 and	 the	 cosmos	 and	 the	 explicitly	 demonstrated	 characteristics	 of	 the	 human	body	 speak	 in	 favor	of	 the	 interpretation	 that	 the	Demiurge	designed	 the	human	race	 to	 come	into	being	as	it	is	because	he	wanted	us	also	to	strive	for	goodness	and	beauty,	like	the	cosmos	as	a	whole.	This	being	the	case,	we	can	say	that	there	are	indeed	some	particular	concerns	for	the	well-being	 of	 the	 human	 race	 in	 its	 creation,	 no	 matter	 how	 limited	 compared	 to	 the	 overall	goodness	of	the	cosmos	as	a	whole.1	Therefore,	my	argument	in	this	chapter	will	proceed	in	the	cosmological	context.	I	will	first	explain	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 human	 race	 and	 the	 cosmos	 by	 how	 the	 mortal	 nature	bestowed	 upon	 the	 human	 race	 is	 physically	 inevitable	 and	 necessary	 for	 the	 completion	 of	cosmic	creation.	 I	 then	demonstrate	mortality	as	being	a	necessary	and	beneficial	condition	for	the	 well-being	 of	 human	 individuals.	 I	 will	 draw	 structural	 similarities	 and	 dissimilarities	between	the	cosmos	and	the	human	race	in	order	to	show	how	individual	immortal	souls	benefit	from	the	immortal-mortal	structure	they	embodied	on	the	one	hand	and	how	human	individuals	can	avail	themselves	of	the	connection	between	the	cosmos	and	themselves.	
																																																								1	 For	a	discussion	about	the	limited	anthropocentricity	in	the	Timaeus,	see	Johansen	(2004)	2-3.	
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5.1	The	inevitability	and	necessity	of	mortality	
Chapter	 1	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 teleology	 operating	 behind	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 cosmos	 as	 a	whole	 and	 that	 of	 the	 human	 race	 is	 consistent.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 human	 race,	 being	 a	compositional	part	of	the	cosmos,	must	share	the	same	αἴτιον	with	the	latter,	no	matter	whether	it	 is	during	or	after	 the	creation	stage.	Therefore,	we	are	safe	 to	claim	that	 the	mortality	of	 the	human	race	is	designed	to	serve	the	cosmic	end	of	being	the	best	and	most	beautiful	creature.	But	such	a	statement	does	not	expand	our	understanding	about	the	particular	αἴτιον	of	mortality,	for	everything	in	the	cosmos	is	brought	into	being	for	the	sake	of	the	cosmic	end.	What,	then,	are	the	particular	 ends	 the	 Demiurge	 appointed	 to	 the	 human	 race	 that	 require	 its	 bodily	 mortality,	through	which	 the	 death	 of	 human	 beings	 can	 contribute	 to	 the	 overall	 cosmic	 goodness	 and	beauty?	I	have	 investigated	the	physical	process	of	death	 in	Chapter	2,	 ‘2.3	The	physical	process	of	death’:	 death	 starts	 with	 bodily	 decomposition,	 and	 bodily	 decomposition	 is	 the	 result	 of	 the	elemental	 solids’	 decomposition,	 that	 is,	 the	 solids’	 component	 triangles	 no	 longer	 hold	 on	 to	each	other,	which	is	the	result	of	being	overcome	and	cut	apart	by	the	food-and-drink-triangles.	However,	at	Timaeus	89c	Plato	says	that	‘the	triangles	are	so	made	up,	right	from	the	beginning,	as	
to	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 hold	 up	 for	 a	 limited	 time	 beyond	 which	 life	 cannot	 be	 prolonged	 any	
further’.	 Furthermore,	 as	 I	 have	 pointed	 out	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 ‘2.2	 The	 constitution	 of	 the	 human	body’,	 the	 bodily	 elemental	 solids	 are	 subject	 to	 the	 same	 nature	 as	 external	 elemental	 solids	because	 the	 human	body	 is	made	 of	materials	 borrowed	 from	 the	 cosmic	 body,	 and	when	 the	lesser	gods	borrowed	those	elemental	solids	from	the	cosmic	body,	they	fashioned	them	directly	into	bodily	parts	without	altering	 their	nature	(43a1-4).	And	the	 four	kinds	of	elemental	solids	are	 in	 constant	 inter-transformation	 (58c2-4)	 and	 thus	 would	 not	 aggregate	 as	 any	 unit	perpetually,	which	entails	the	fact	that	the	cosmic	elemental	solids	are	perishable,	and	so	are	the	bodily	 ones.	 This	 then	 necessitates	 the	 perishability	 of	 the	 human	 body.	 By	 the	 foregoing	observation,	we	can	conclude	that	the	decomposition	of	the	body	of	a	human	being	is	physically	inevitable,	 not	 only	 because	 the	 bodily	 elemental	 solids	 would	 be	 eventually	 overcome	 and	prevailed	over	by	the	external	ones,	but	also	because	such	an	end	is	decided	by	the	very	nature	of	its	compositional	materials	at	the	very	beginning	when	it	was	created.	
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Another	aspect	 that	 is	worth	stressing	 is	 that	Timaeus	claims	 that	 the	materials	 the	 lesser	gods	borrowed	from	the	cosmic	body	were	intended	to	be	returned	(43a1).	This	statement	is	an	apparent	 implication	 that,	 apart	 from	 the	 limitation	 in	material	nature,	death	has	also	been	an	intentional	arrangement	 for	 the	human	race.	Further	evidence	 in	 favor	of	 this	claim	is	 that	any	entity	created	by	the	Demiurge	himself	(41c2-3)	is	imperishable,	or2	 any	entity	that	is	endowed	with	 the	 nature	 of	 indestructibility	 through	 the	 will	 of	 the	 Demiurge	 (41b4-6)	 shall	 be	imperishable,	like	the	cosmic	body	as	a	whole	and	the	heavenly	stars	where	the	lesser	gods	dwell.	But	instead	of	intervening,	the	Demiurge	handed	over	the	task	of	creating	the	human	race	to	the	lesser	gods	(except	for	the	creation	of	immortal	souls).	Hence,	we	can	say	that	the	Demiurge	and	lesser	 gods	 took	 advantage	 of	 the	 elemental	 solids’	 nature	 of	 being	 perishable	 and	 employed	them	as	the	materials	for	the	construction	of	the	human	body	so	as	to	realize	the	mortality	of	the	human	race.	So	 far	we	 have	 examined	 that	 the	 bodily	mortality	 of	 human	 beings	 is	 inevitable	 for	 two	reasons:	one	is	that	the	materials	that	constitute	the	human	body	are	perishable,	and	another	is	that	 the	 Demiurge	 deliberately	 created	 the	 human	 race	 as	 being	mortal.	 So	 the	 question	 that	needs	to	be	addressed	now	is	 for	what	purpose	the	lesser	gods	chose	those	elemental	solids	to	create	the	human	race	as	being	mortal.	On	 Timaeus’	 account	 of	 the	 ordinances	 of	 the	 Demiurge	 to	 the	 lesser	 gods	 (42a-c),	 apart	from	 the	 human	 race,	 there	were	 still	 other	 kinds	 of	mortal	 being	 left	 to	 be	 created	 and	 they	would	come	 into	being	as	a	result	of	 the	corrupt	souls’	reincarnation.3	 When	death	occurs,	 the	soul	 is	released	 from	the	body	(81d4-e1).	And	the	released	soul,	 judging	 from	its	 former	 life,	 if	remaining	pure	and	good,	will	ascend	to	live	a	life	of	happiness	with	the	gods	in	one	of	the	stars	that	is	appropriate	for	it	(42b3-5);	if	otherwise,	determined	by	the	extent	to	which	it	is	corrupted,	the	 soul	 shall	 reincarnate	 into	 the	 forms	 of	 woman	 and	 wild	 animals	 accordingly	 and	hierarchically	 (42b5-c4):	 cowardly	 and	 unjust	 souls	 reincarnate	 as	 women,	 innocent	 but	simpleminded	souls	as	birds,	philosophy-less	souls	led	by	their	spirited	part	as	reptiles	and	more	mindless	 sort	 as	 snakes,	 and	 last	 the	 most	 stupid	 and	 ignorant	 souls	 into	 water	 creatures																																																									2	 I	use	‘or’	instead	of	‘and’	because	it	is	not	clear	from	the	text	whether	Demiurgic	creation	and	Demiurgic	will	are	both	necessary	for	a	created	product	to	be	indestructible	or	alternatively	sufficient	or	mutually	entailed.	3	 Cf.	Tim.	90e-92c.	
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(90e-92c3).	We	can	say	that	the	generation	of	the	other	kinds	of	mortal	creatures	would	not	have	taken	place	without	the	souls	being	released	from	human	bodies.	And	the	souls’	being	released	from	the	bodies	is	the	phenomenon	that	we	call	death,	which	would	not	have	occurred	without	the	decomposition	of	bodily	elemental	solids.	Therefore,	we	can	infer	that	 if	 it	were	not	 for	the	decomposition	 of	 bodily	 elemental	 solids,	 the	 other	 creatures,	 whose	 coming-into-being	 is	necessary	 to	 the	 completion	of	 the	 cosmos	 (41b7-8),	would	not	have	 come	 into	 existence,	 and	thus	 the	 cosmos	 would	 not	 have	 become	 the	 best	 and	 most	 beautiful	 creature	 the	 Demiurge	wanted	it	to	be.	For	this	reason,	the	Demiurge	or	the	lesser	gods	could	not	and	would	not	alter	the	 nature	 of	 the	 elemental	 solids	 that	 used	 to	 be	 the	materials	 for	 human	 bodies,	 but	 rather	employed	 such	 nature	 to	 bring	 mortality	 to	 the	 human	 race	 intentionally	 in	 order	 that	 the	cosmos	as	a	whole	should	become	completed.	In	conclusion,	the	decomposition	of	human	bodies	in	due	course	is	indispensably	required	for	the	sake	of	the	completion	and	goodness	and	beauty	of	the	entire	cosmic	creation.	What	we	should	bear	in	mind	as	the	most	ultimate	purpose	for	the	Demiurgic	creation	is	the	overall	 cosmic	 goodness;	 thus,	 it	 is	 then	 plausible	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 cause	 for	 the	 perishable	nature	of	the	elemental	solids	is	congruent	with	the	human	body’s	being	constructed	out	of	those	perishable	materials.	As	I	have	mentioned	above,	the	four	elemental	solids	within	the	cosmos	are	in	 constant	 inter-transformation.	 If	 those	 solids	 were	 indestructible,	 that	 is,	 their	 constituent	triangles	could	hold	up	together	forever	and	maintain	the	same	kind	of	elements	they	have	come	to	be,	as	 the	agitation	of	 the	Receptacle	separates	each	of	 the	kinds	of	elemental	solids	to	their	own	regions	(57b-c),	those	elemental	solids	would	eventually	‘reach	the	point	of	being	thoroughly	
separated	 from	each	other	kind	by	kind,	 so	 that	 their	movement	 towards	 their	own	region	would	
come	to	a	halt’	(58a),	and	the	cosmos	would	be	dead	inside.	But	such	point	has	not	been	reached,	as	 Plato	 claims	 at	 Tim.	 58a.	 The	 interaction	 among	 the	 elemental	 solids	 causes	 permanent	non-uniformity	among	them	and	thus	leads	to	changes	of	quantity	and	position	of	each	kind.	In	this	way,	 the	 cosmos	maintains	perpetual	motion	within	 itself	 and	 the	existence	of	 all	 kinds	of	things	as	designed.	What,	then,	 is	the	connection	between	the	elemental	solids	that	become	the	materials	of	the	human	body	and	the	rest?	As	we	have	learned,	the	bodily	solids	are	meant	to	be	returned	to	 the	cosmos;	on	 this	account,	we	can	suggest	 that	 the	bodily	solids	are	supposed	 to	participate	 in	 the	 inter-transformation	 with	 the	 other	 elemental	 solids	 after	 death,	 and	 some	
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solids	 or	 other	will,	 presumably,	 become	 the	materials	 of	 the	 bodies	 of	 newborns.	 This	means	that	 the	human	body	 is	 taking	part	of	 the	movement	of	 the	elemental	solids	 inside	the	cosmos.	Then,	what	if	the	elemental	solids	of	the	human	body	were	created	to	be	indestructible?	First	of	all,	the	four	kinds	of	elemental	solids	that	are	taken	up	to	constitute	the	body	of	the	human	race	would	 not	 be	 returned	 to	 the	 cosmic	 body.	 Then	 given	 a	 sufficiently	 long	 peried	 of	 time,	with	numerous	newborns	taking	up	the	solids	 from	the	cosmic	body	and	at	 the	same	time	no	solids	returned,	there	would	not	be	enough	of	the	four	kinds	left	available	for	the	coming-into-being	of	other	kinds	of	 corporeal	 entities,	 like	plants,	 or	mountains,	 etc.4	 This	 is	because	 the	 cosmos	 is	designed	to	be	a	sphere	(33b4),	which	means	the	cosmos	has	a	limitation,	though	so	extreme	as	to	 be	 humanly	 impossible	 to	 reach	 or	 even	 imagine,	 and	 thus	 the	 materials	 within	 it	 should	amount	 to	a	 limitation	 in	principle.	 In	 this	hypothetical	 case,	 the	 cosmos	would	become	not	as	complete	 and	 good	 and	 beautiful	 as	 it	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 because	 it	 might	 lack	 entities	 or	creatures	 that	 are	 integral	 to	 its	 completion	 and	 hence	 would	 suffer	 from	 an	 absence	 of	proportionality.	Therefore,	the	opposite	case	being	preferable,	the	elemental	solids	that	used	to	be	the	materials	of	human	bodies	must	retain	their	nature	of	being	destructible	and	in	constant	inter-transformation	 in	order	 to	maintain	 the	movement	of	elemental	solids	 in	 the	cosmos	and	prevent	it	from	being	short	of	materials	for	other	corporeal	entities’	coming-into-being.	In	conclusion,	due	to	the	perishable	nature	of	the	materials	that	the	lesser	gods	used	to	build	the	human	body,	the	decomposition	of	the	human	body	is,	on	the	one	hand,	physically	inevitable	and	 thus	 so	 is	 death,	 and	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 both	 the	 internal	 and	 eternal	inter-transformation	among	the	four	kinds	of	elemental	solids	and	the	generation	of	other	mortal	kinds	 and	 thus	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 cosmos	 as	 a	 whole,	 of	 which	 the	 decomposition	 of	 our	bodies	 is	 the	 essential	 condition,	 death	 is	 a	 necessary	 requirement.	 Additionally,	 after	 the	fulfillment	 of	 cosmic	 creation,	 the	 death	 of	 humans	 shall	 also	 play	 an	 irreplaceable	 role	 in	 the	continuous	generation	of	mortal	kinds	and	the	maintenance	of	the	best	state	of	the	cosmos	as	a	whole,	for	the	same	reasons	I	have	presented	above.	 	
																																																								4	 I	didn’t	mention	other	kinds	of	animals	because	there	wouldn’t	be	other	kinds	of	animals	if	the	human	race	were	immortal.	
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5.2	The	combination	of	immortal	soul	and	body	
The	most	evident	resemblance	 in	construction	between	the	cosmos	and	the	human	race	 is	that	both	were	created	as	binding	 the	 immortal	soul	with	a	physical	body.	The	similarities	and	dissimilarities	in	the	combination	of	the	soul	and	body	between	the	cosmos	and	the	human	race	can	be	investigated	in	three	aspects:	the	constitution	of	the	body	and	that	of	the	immortal	soul,	and	the	combination	of	those	two.	In	previous	argument	I	have	mentioned	that	the	materials	the	lesser	gods	used	to	construct	the	human	body	were	 the	 four	 elemental	 solids	borrowed	 from	 the	 cosmic	body,	 and	 thus	 the	body	 of	 the	 human	 race	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 four	 elemental	 solids.	 The	 similarity	between	the	cosmic	body	and	the	human	body	lies	in	the	fact	that	the	four	elemental	solids,	that	is,	fire,	water,	air,	and	earth,	are	used	to	construct	both	bodies.	Moreover	the	cosmic	body	and	the	human	body	are	both	constructed	by	bonds	that	connect	the	four	elemental	solids.	Whereas	the	dissimilarity	lies	in	the	fact	that	the	ways	in	which	the	four	elemental	solids	were	bound	together	to	create	the	cosmic	body	and	human	body	differ	noticeably	from	each	other,	and	as	a	result,	the	cosmic	 body	 came	 into	 being	 as	 indissoluble	 whereas	 the	 human	 body	 possesses	 the	 mortal	nature.	First	of	all,	the	agency	that	brought	about	the	cosmic	body	is	the	Demiurge	himself,	while	the	 task	of	 constructing	 the	human	body	was	handed	 to	 the	 lesser	gods.	Since	both	 the	cosmic	and	human	body	are	things	that	are	bound,	and	according	to	Timaeus	41b-c,	that	 ‘it	 is	true	that	
anything	that	is	bound	(δεθὲν)	is	liable	to	be	undone	(λυτόν)’,	but	for	those	who	have	received	the	guarantee	of	the	Demiurge’s	will	(βουλήσεως)	a	greater,	more	sovereign	bond	(δεσμοῦ)	shall	not	be	 undone,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 claim	 that	 the	 cosmic	 body,	 being	 constructed	 by	 the	Demiurge	himself,	must	be	indestructible	unless	the	Demiurge	himself	decided	to	undo	the	bond	(32c),	and	in	contrast,	the	human	body,	being	created	by	the	lesser	gods,	who	themselves	are	brought	into	being	by	the	Demiurge,5	 must	be	susceptible	to	decomposition.	Secondly,	the	cosmic	body’s	being	indestructible	and	the	human	body’s	being	decomposable	is	 entailed	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 former’s	 constituent	 materials	 were	 bound	 proportionately	whereas	the	latter’s	four	elemental	solids	are	riveted	together	by	external	forces	(43a).	How	the	Demiurge	bound	together	the	four	elements	is	as	follows	(32b3-c8).																																																									5	 Cf.	Tim.	40a.	
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Hence	the	god	set	water	and	air	between	fire	and	earth,	and	made	them	as	proportionate	to	one	another	as	was	possible,	so	that	what	fire	is	to	air,	air	is	to	water,	and	what	air	is	to	water,	water	is	to	earth.	He	then	bound	them	together	and	thus	he	constructed	the	visible	and	tangible	heavens.	This	is	the	reason	why	these	four	particular	constituents	were	used	to	beget	the	body	of	the	world,	making	it	a	symphony	of	proportion.	They	bestowed	friendship	upon	it,	so	that,	having	come	 together	 into	 a	unity	with	 itself,	 it	 could	not	 be	undone	by	 anyone	but	 the	one	who	had	bound	it	together.		 Now	each	one	of	the	four	constituents	was	entirely	used	up	in	the	process	of	building	the	world.	The	builder	built	 it	 from	all	 the	 fire,	water,	 air,	 and	earth	 there	was,	and	 left	no	part	or	power	of	any	of	them.6	What’s	worth	stressing	is	that	the	constituent	elements	of	fire,	water,	air,	and	earth	here	are	referred	to	as	an	entity	of	each	kind,	 for	 instance,	 fire	 is	a	collective	name	for	all	 the	elemental	solids	 of	 fire	 within	 the	 cosmos.	 Hence,	 in	 the	 macroscopic	 sense,	 the	 Demiurge	 created	 the	cosmic	body,	he	established	a	proportion	among	fire,	water,	air,	and	earth,	to	bind	them	together	so	 that	 the	 body	 of	 the	 cosmos	 would	 be	 indestructible.	 And	 in	 the	 microscopic	 sense,	 the	Demiurge	 gave	 the	 chaotic	 pre-cosmos	 forms	 and	 numbers,	 shaping	 it,	 arranging	 proportion	within	 it,7	 which,	 however,	 does	 not	 equate	 with	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 Demiurge	 created	 every	single	 elemental	 solid	 by	 himself.	 The	 relationship	 between	 the	 elements	 as	 entities	 and	elemental	 solids	 is	 analogous	 to	 the	 role	 cells	 play	 in	 the	 human	 body,	 that	 is,	 every	 second,	countless	cells	die	and	are	born,	whilst	the	overall	number	of	each	kind	of	cells	remains	balanced,	and	the	human	body	appears	to	be	unchanged.	 In	this	case,	every	single	elemental	solid	within	the	 cosmos	 can	 be	 destructible,	 whereas	 the	 collective	 of	 each	 kind	 of	 elemental	 solids	 lasts	forever.	 In	 this	 case,	 that	 the	 elemental	 solids	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 being	 both	 indestructible	 and	destructible,	observing	from	respective	perspectives.	The	relationship	between	the	cosmic	body	and	the	human	body	is	analogous	to	that	of	a	single	elemental	solids	and	the	kind	it	belongs.	In	this	 sense,	we	 can	 say	 that	 the	mortality	 of	 the	 human	 body	 contributes	 to	 the	 cosmic	 body’s	being	everlasting	by	being	a	part	of	the	cosmic	body.	The	 cosmic	 body	 was	 shaped	 as	 round,	 which	 is	 the	 most	 appropriate	 shape	 since	 the																																																									6	 οὕτω	δὴ	πυρός	τε	καὶ	γῆς	ὕδωρ	ἀέρα	τε	ὁ	θεὸς	ἐν	μέσῳ	θείς͵	καὶ	πρὸς	ἄλληλα	καθ΄	ὅσον	ἦν	δυνατὸν	ἀνὰ	τὸν	αὐτὸν	λόγον	ἀπεργασάμενος͵	ὅτιπερ	πῦρ	πρὸς	ἀέρα͵	τοῦτο	ἀέρα	πρὸς	ὕδωρ͵	καὶ	ὅτι	ἀὴρ	πρὸς	ὕδωρ͵	ὕδωρ	πρὸς	γῆν͵	συνέδησεν	καὶ	συνεστήσατο	οὐρανὸν	ὁρατὸν	καὶ	ἁπτόν.	[32c]	καὶ	διὰ	ταῦτα	ἔκ	τε	δὴ	τούτων	τοιούτων	καὶ	τὸν	ἀριθμὸν	τεττάρων	τὸ	τοῦ	κόσμου	σῶμα	ἐγεννήθη	δι΄	ἀναλογίας	ὁμολογῆσαν͵	φιλίαν	τε	ἔσχεν	ἐκ	τούτων͵	ὥστε	εἰς	ταὐτὸν	αὑτῷ	συνελθὸν	ἄλυτον	ὑπό	του	ἄλλου	πλὴν	ὑπὸ	τοῦ	συνδήσαντος	γενέσθαι.	Τῶν	δὲ	δὴ	τεττάρων	ἓν	ὅλον	ἕκαστον	εἴληφεν	ἡ	τοῦ	κόσμου	σύστασις.	ἐκ	γὰρ	πυρὸς	παντὸς	ὕδατός	τε	καὶ	ἀέρος	καὶ	γῆς	συνέστησεν	αὐτὸν	ὁ	συνιστάς͵	μέρος	οὐδὲν	οὐδενὸς	οὐδὲ	δύναμιν	ἔξωθεν	ὑπολιπών……	7	 Cf.	Tim.	53a-c.	
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cosmos	contains	within	itself	all	other	kinds	of	things	(33b-d),	and	endowed	with	circular	motion	alone	 (33b-34a),	which	 is	 especially	 associated	with	 understanding	 and	 intelligence	 (νοῦν	 καὶ	φρόνησιν,	34a)	that	can	be	possessed	only	by	soul	(30b).	In	this	case,	we	can	say	that	the	shape	and	 motion	 of	 the	 cosmic	 body	 were	 fashioned	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	 most	 congruent	 with	 the	revolutions	of	the	cosmic	soul,	which	prevents	the	revolutions	within	the	cosmic	soul	from	being	disturbed	 by	 rectilinear	 motions	 caused	 by	 the	 interaction	 among	 elemental	 solids.	 On	 the	contrary,	 though,	 imitating	 the	 revolving	 shape	 of	 the	 cosmic	 body,	 the	 lesser	 gods	 bound	 the	individual	 immortal	 souls	 to	 a	 roughly	 round	 head	 (44d)	 through	 the	marrow,8	 and	 they	 also	created	other	bodily	parts	so	as	to	carry	the	head	around	(44d-45b).	This	being	the	case,	not	only	the	human	body	as	a	whole,	but	also	the	bodily	elemental	solids	that	are	 in	constant	motion	of	inter-transformation	within	the	body	and	with	the	external	elemental	solids,	move	in	a	way	that	involves	 all	 six	 kinds	 of	 motions.	 Those	 motions	 are	 rectilinear	 and	 have	 no	 connection	 with	understanding	 and	 intelligence,	 and	 thus	 are	 not	 compatible	 with	 the	 revolutions	 within	 the	immortal	 souls.	 The	 conflict	 between	 the	 revolutions	 of	 the	 immortal	 soul	 and	 the	 rectilinear	motions	 of	 the	 bodily	 elemental	 solids	 will	 lead	 to	 disturbance	 within	 the	 former.9	 As	 a	consequence,	 a	 newly	 embodied	 immortal	 soul	 is	 deprived	 of	 intelligence.	 Therefore,	 even	though	 the	 lesser	 gods	 imitated	 the	 cosmic	 soul-body	 combination	 to	 situate	 the	 individual	immortal	souls	in	round	heads,	the	combination	of	the	human	soul	and	body	does	not	remotely	resemble	that	of	the	cosmic	soul	and	body	in	that	the	latter	results	 in	the	motion	of	the	cosmic	soul	 is	 compatible	with	 the	 cosmic	 body	 as	 a	whole	whereas	 the	 revolutions	 of	 the	 individual	immortal	souls	are	disturbed	by	the	human	body.	Another	dissimilarity	between	the	cosmos	and	the	human	race	in	terms	of	the	combination	of	soul	and	body	is	that	the	combination	of	the	cosmic	soul	and	body	is	unique	and	once	for	all	where	as	that	the	combination	of	the	individual	immortal	souls	and	human	bodies	varies	not	only	in	the	stage	when	the	human	race	was	first	created	but	also	at	a	later	time	when	the	individual	immortal	souls	reincarnate	after	death.	Among	all	sorts	of	combination	of	the	immortal	souls	and	bodies,	 an	 appropriate	 proportion	 between	 the	 immortal	 soul10	 and	 body	 is	 most	 preferable																																																									8	 Cf.	Tim.	73b-d.	9	 Cf.	Tim.	43b-44b.	For	discussion	on	the	occurrence	of	the	‘disturbance’	within	the	body	and	the	immortal	soul,	see	Chapter	3,	section	3.2.1Πάθημα	and	αἴσθησις.	10	 I	take	ψυχήν	here	as	indicating	the	immortal	soul,	for	the	reasons	that	the	other	two	mortal	parts	of	soul	
	 97	
(87c	d),	for	all	that	is	good	is	well-proportioned	(87c4-5).	This	being	said,	according	to	Timaeus	87d1-88b5,	neither	the	combination	of	a	vigorous	and	excellent	soul	and	a	 frail	and	puny	body	nor	 the	 combination	 in	a	 converse	way	 is	desirable,	 for	 in	 the	 former	 situation	 the	 soul	would	wear	 out	 the	 body	 and	 in	 the	 latter	 the	 body	would	 become	predominant	 and	 thus	 the	whole	living	being	would	be	driven	mostly	by	the	natural	desire	of	the	body,	that	is,	for	food	rather	than	for	wisdom.	 I	will	 focus	on	examining	 factors	 that	affect	 the	combination	of	 the	 immortal	souls	and	bodies	as	follows.	When	the	individual	immortal	souls	were	first	embodied,	the	variation	of	the	combination	of	the	individual	immortal	souls	and	the	bodies	is	determined	by	the	individuality	of	the	immortal	souls	themselves	and	that	of	the	human	bodies	the	former	was	bound	with.	The	individuality	of	the	 immortal	 souls	 was	 generated	when	 the	 Demiurge	 allotted	 those	 newly	 created	 immortal	souls	into	diverse	stars	and	showed	them	the	nature	of	the	cosmos.11	 The	individuality	of	human	bodies	 can	 be	 inferred	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 four	 elemental	 solids	 that	 constitute	 the	 human	body	 are	 in	 constant	 interactions	without	 proportionality,	 from	which	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 infer	that	the	condition	in	which	the	elemental	solids	interact	within	human	bodies	and	with	external	solids	is	very	likely	to	vary	from	one	body	to	another.	Therefore,	to	what	extent	the	revolutions	of	an	immortal	soul,	when	first	embodied,	would	be	distorted	depends	on	the	individuality	of	this	immortal	soul	and	on	the	motions	of	bodily	elemental	solids.	The	distorted	revolutions	within	an	immortal	soul	can	be	restored	at	a	later	time,	and	the	restoration	is	subject	to	the	condition	of	the	body	with	which	 this	 immortal	 soul	was	bound	as	well	 as	 the	 education	 it	 received	 later.	This	being	the	case,	the	corruption	of	some	immortal	souls	that	was	required	for	the	generation	of	the	other	kinds	of	mortal	creatures,	is	in	fact	a	result	of	one	or	another	undesirable	condition	of	the	bodies	 those	 immortal	 souls	were	 bound	with	 and	 an	 uneducated	 upbringing.12	 In	 this	 sense,	Timaeus	claims	that	no	one	is	wilfully	bad	(86d7-e1).	However,	if	we	consider	the	combination	of	the	 immortal	 souls	 and	 body	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 cosmic	 creation,	we	 have	 to	admit	 there	must	be	a	portion	of	 individuals	 in	 the	human	race	whose	 immortal	 souls	became	corrupt	in	order	that	they	can	reincarnate	into	other	kinds	of	mortal	bodies	so	that	the	cosmos																																																																																																																																																															are	generated	when	the	immortal	soul	is	embodied	and	the	condition	of	the	latter	are	thus	affected	by	the	interaction	between	the	immortal	soul	and	the	body,	though	this	very	interaction	is	realized	by	the	mortal	parts.	Cf.	Chapter	3,	section	3.2	The	creation	of	the	mortal	parts.	11	 Cf.	Chapter	3,	3.3	The	allotment	of	the	individual	immortal	souls	and	the	cause	of	evils.	12	 Cf.	Tim.	86e.	
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came	to	be	as	complete	as	possible,	containing	all	kinds	of	mortal	creatures.	Likewise,	 in	 order	 to	 maintain	 the	 completion	 and	 perfection	 of	 the	 cosmos	 after	 the	creation	stage,	there	must	continuously	and	always	be	a	portion	of	individuals	in	the	human	race	whose	 corrupt	 immortal	 souls	 take	 part	 in	 the	 cycle	 of	 reincarnation.	 In	 that	 case,	 the	individuality	of	an	 immortal	soul	 is	determined	by	how	it	used	to	be	 interacting	with	the	other	two	 mortal	 parts	 of	 soul,	 which	 are	 generated	 once	 the	 immortal	 soul	 is	 embodied,13	 and	affected	by	this	very	interaction	when	embodied	in	the	last	body.	And	the	condition	of	the	human	bodies	that	are	not	made	by	the	lesser	gods	themselves	after	the	creation	stage	is	determined	by	the	condition	of	the	four	elemental	solids	that	constitute	them.	According	to	Timaeus’	account	on	the	 origination	 of	 diseases	 at	 82a-86a,	 it	 will	 happen	 now	 and	 then	 that	 the	 body	 is	disproportionately	composed	of	the	four	kinds	of	elemental	solids	via,	for	instance,	inadequate	or	excessive	amounts,	dislocation,	or	 incorrect	variety	of	 the	 four	kinds	(82a2-6)	 in	certain	bodily	parts.	Such	disproportionality	among	the	bodily	elemental	solids	will	result	in	many	and	various	diseases.	That	it	is	possible	that	the	human	body	can	come	to	be	and	become	disproportionately	constituted	guarantees	that	a	portion	of	immortal	souls	are	incline	to	be	corrupt	if	reincarnated	into	 ill-proportioned	bodies.	 In	 this	way,	when	death	occurs,	 those	 corrupt	 immortal	 souls	 can	then	participate	 in	the	cycle	of	reincarnation	so	as	to	sustain	the	generation	of	all	other	mortal	creatures	within	the	cosmos.	
5.3	The	Demiurgic	concerns	for	humans	
Having	 the	 observation	 of	 the	 dissimilarities	 in	 the	 soul-body	 combination	 between	 the	cosmos	and	the	human	race,	the	fact	that	human	bodies	were	inevitably	and	necessarily	created	to	be	mortal	and	that	the	individual	immortal	soul	are	embodied	in	and	thus	disturbed	by	those	mortal	bodies	seems	put	us	 in	a	much	 less	 favorable	position	 to	ever	succeed	 in	 the	pursuit	of	goodness	and	beauty.	This	is	because	mortality	makes	human	beings	greatly	different	in	essence	from	the	cosmos.	As	said	 in	previous	discussion,	 in	order	 that	mortality	would	be	realized,	 the	four	elemental	solids	were	used	to	construct	 the	human	body.	And	the	 four	elemental	solids,	 if	not	regarded	collectively,	are	in	constant	interactions	with	one	another	disproportionately.	The																																																									13	 Cf.	Chapter	4.	
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four	elemental	solids,	used	as	the	material	to	create	the	cosmic	body	and	referred	to	as	collective	entities,	 were	 bound	 proportionately.	 However,	 there	 is	 no	 trace	 in	 Timaeus’	 monologue	indicating	that	the	Demiurge	had	ever	endowed	the	interactions	among	elemental	solids	with	any	sort	 of	 proportion.	 These	 very	 disproportionate	 interactions	 among	 elemental	 solids	 entails,	firstly,	the	eventual	decomposition	of	the	human	body	that	leads	to	death,14	 which	comes	to	be	as	a	barrier	of	 temporality	 that	 constrains	human	beings’	pursuit	of	 goodness	and	beauty,	 and	secondly,	the	distorted	revolutions	within	the	immortal	souls,	which,	if	not	restored	afterwards,	prevent	 us	 from	 understanding	 the	 cosmic	 surroundings	 correctly.15	 It	 is	 not	 possible	 for	 any	human	 individual	 to	 strive	 for	 goodness	 and	 beauty	 if	 he	 or	 she	 cannot	 understand	 what	 is	goodness	and	beauty	in	the	first	place.	Foreseeing	the	troubles	the	mortal	body	might	bring	about	to	the	embodied	immortal	souls,	the	Demiurge	made	 compensatory	arrangement	 for	humans	 in	order	 to	benefit	 their	 immortal	souls.	Briefly	speaking,	mortality	and	reincarnation	ensures	the	opportunity	for	every	individual	immortal	soul	to	become	as	good	and	pure	as	possible.	My	argument	proceeds	as	follows.	When	first	created,	every	individual	immortal	soul	was	equally	good	and	pure	(41e3-4),	which	entails	that,	 in	 principle,	 every	 individual	 immortal	 soul	 is	 able	 to	 restore	 its	 original	 good	 and	 pure	status	 and	 ascend	 to	 its	 dwelling	 star	 sooner	or	 later	 (42b).	As	 I	 have	pointed	out	 in	previous	discussion,	the	hamonious	combination	of	soul	and	body	is	most	preferable,	and	in	addition	the	only	 way	 to	 preserve	 oneself	 from	 becoming	 soul-body-disproportionate	 is	 to	 make	 the	 soul	balanced	by	 the	body	and	vice	versa	 at	 the	 same	 time.	This	being	 said,	 the	 extent	 to	which	an	immortal	 soul	 is	 able	 to	 regain	 its	 original	 goodness	 and	 purity	 by	 restoring	 the	 revolutions	within	itself	is	limited	by	the	condition	of	the	body	into	which	it	is	embodied.	And	the	occurrence	of	 disproportion	 in	 the	 constitution	 of	 a	 body	 is	 random,	 which	 means	 that,	 in	 principle,	 the	chance	 that	every	 individual	 immortal	 soul	may	be	 incarnated	 in	a	disordered	body	 (innate	or	becoming)	 is	 the	 same.	 This	 is	 equivalent	 to	 saying	 that	 the	 chance	 that	 every	 individual	immortal	 soul	maybe	 incarnated	 in	 a	 body	 of	 good	 condition	 is	 the	 same.	 This	 being	 the	 case,	even	if	an	immortal	soul	was	embodied	into	a	diseased	body	in	one	life,	it	is	still	possible	that	this	very	immortal	soul	can	reincarnate	into	a	healthy	body	in	the	next	life	and	then	restore	a	greater																																																									14	 Cf.	Chapter	2,	2.3	The	physical	process	of	death.	15	 Cf.	Tim.	37a-c,	the	cognitional	function	of	the	revolutions	within	the	immortal	soul;	and	43b-44a,	how	distorted	revolutions	within	the	immortal	soul	affect	our	understanding.	
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extent	of	goodness	and	purity.	If	human	beings	were	created	to	be	immortal,	immortality	would	then	 preserve	 an	 immortal	 soul’s	 being	 incarnated	 in	 one	 body	 and	 thus	 prevent	 it	 from	becoming	ever	as	good	and	pure	as	it	used	to	be,	if	the	body	it	embodied	was	disproportionately	constituted.	In	that	case,	mortality	becomes	desirable	since	it	provides	individuals	the	chance	to	reincarnate	 into	a	healthy	body	and	become	as	good	and	pure	as	possible,	 or	 even	as	 its	birth	status.	In	other	words,	without	mortality,	some	immortal	souls	would	be	deprived	of	the	chance	of	restoring	the	revolutions	within	them	to	their	original	state	and	then	living	a	life	of	happiness	with	the	gods	in	one	of	the	stars	that	is	appropriate	for	them.	Therefore,	we	can	say	that	although	human	 individual	 immortal	 souls’	 embodiment	 in	mortal	 bodies	 is	 undesirable	 but	 inevitable,	individuals	 can	 take	 the	 advantage	 of	 their	 mortality	 as	 using	 different	 incarnation	 as	intermediary	steps	towards	the	perfection	and	purification	of	their	souls.	We	 can	 also	 see	 Demiurgic	 arrangement	 as	 compensation	 for	 the	 embodiment	 of	 the	individual	 immortal	 souls	 from	 the	 structural	 similarities	 between	 the	 cosmos	 and	 the	 human	race	as	discussed	earlier	and	from	that	the	human	body	is	designed	to	help	the	improvement	of	the	embodied	 immortal	souls.	 I	will	 then	examine	 the	ends	of	 the	affinity	 in	structure	between	the	 cosmos	 and	 the	human	 race	 and	 the	purposes	 of	 the	 construction	 of	 bodily	 organs	 from	a	causal	 perspective,16	 that	 is,	 for	 what	 purpose	 that	 is	 of	 benefit	 to	 the	 well-being	 of	 human	beings	was	the	human	race	created	as	such.	Take	 the	 eyes	 for	 instance.	 According	 to	Timaeus	 47b5-c4,	 the	Demiurge	 gave	 the	 human	race	 sight	 so	 that	 we	 can	 observe	 the	 heavenly	 revolutions	 and	 practice	 these	 revolutions	 in	ourselves	by	imitating	them	in	our	own	souls	in	order	that	the	disturbed	revolutions	of	our	own	souls	 shall	 be	 restored.	 For	 there	 is	 a	 kinship	 between	 the	 heavenly	 revolutions	 and	 the	revolutions	within	our	immortal	souls,	that	is,	the	planets	were	placed	into	the	orbits	traced	by	the	revolution	of	the	Different	within	the	cosmic	soul	(38c-d),	and	the	individual	immortal	souls	have	their	origin	in	the	cosmic	soul,17	 and	thus	the	revolutions	of	the	planets	can	help	to	stabilize	the	 straying	 revolutions	within	 ourselves.	 Furthermore,	 the	 celestial	motions	 are	 supposed	 to	provide	measurement	 for	 time	 that	 represents	 the	 sempiternity	 of	 the	 Forms	 in	 the	 corporeal	realm	(38b-c,	39b-e),	whereby	we	could	learn	numbers	by	the	revolution	of	the	Same	within	our																																																									16	 Cf.	Chapter	1,	1.2	Αἰτία	and	intentional	teleology.	17	 Cf.	Chapter	3,	3.2	The	creation	of	individual	immortal	souls.	
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immortal	souls,	which	is	akin	to	that	of	the	cosmic	soul.	Therefore,	it	is	plausible	to	suggest	that	the	eyes,	though	constructed	using	materials	that	are	perishable,18	 are	designed	to	bring	about	supreme	benefit	to	human	beings,	as	Timaeus	describes	(46e7-47b2).	We	must	next	speak	of	that	supremely	beneficial	function	for	which	the	god	gave	them	to	us.	As	my	account	has	it,	our	sight	has	indeed	proved	to	be	a	source	of	supreme	benefit	to	us,	in	that	none	of	our	present	 statements	 about	 the	 cosmos	 could	ever	have	been	made	 if	we	had	never	seen	any	stars,	sun,	or	heaven.	As	it	is,	however,	our	ability	to	see	the	periods	of	day-and-night,	of	months	 and	 of	 years,	 of	 equinoxes	 and	 solstices,	 has	 lead	 to	 the	 invention	 of	 number	 and	 has	given	 us	 the	 idea	 of	 time	 opened	 the	 path	 to	 inquiry	 into	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 universe.	 These	pursuits	have	given	us	philosophy,	a	gift	 from	the	gods	 to	 the	mortal	 race	whose	value	neither	has	been	nor	ever	will	be	surpassed.19	Likewise,	hearing	is	also	invented	for	the	human	race	to	acquire	knowledge	about	harmony	by	 listening	 to	 proportionate	 sound,	 like	 speech	 and	 rhythm	 (47d1).	 At	 47d,	 the	 studying	 of	harmony	 is	also	 for	 the	purpose	of	achieving	goodness	and	purity	within	 the	 immortal	 soul.	 In	view	 of	 our	 earlier	 discussion	 about	 the	 proportional	 combination	 of	 soul	 and	 body,	 the	knowledge	of	heavenly	revolutions	and	harmony	can	also	be	applied	to	 the	harmonizing	of	 the	combination	of	soul	and	body	by	understanding	the	extent	to	which	the	revolutions	of	the	soul	should	be	stabilized	so	that	the	soul	becomes	proportionate	to	the	body.	In	addition,	other	bodily	organs,	such	as	heart,	lungs,	and	liver,	are	designed	to	be	associated	with	the	mortal	parts	of	soul	in	order	that	the	communication	with	the	 immortal	soul	and	the	body	can	be	realized,20	 which	then	keeps	a	balance	between	the	immortal	soul	and	the	body	and	in	this	way	the	combination	of	the	two	can	remain	well-proportioned.	For	 instance,	 the	 lesser	 gods	 even	 bestow	 divination	 upon	 the	 human	 race	 by	 setting	 the	receiver	 of	 the	divination	 in	 the	 region	where	 the	 appetitive	part	 of	 soul	 is	 situated.21	 For	 the	appetitive	 part	 of	 soul	 lacks	 the	 capacity	 of	 understanding	 and	 reasoning	 but	 is	 inclined	 to	 be	affected	in	an	imagistic	manner;22	 in	that	case,	the	lesser	gods	invented	the	liver	to	receive	and	return	visible	images	coming	from	the	immortal	soul.	When	this	process	takes	place	either	in	our																																																									18	 Cf.	Tim.	45b-46a.	19	 τὸ	δὲ	μέγιστον	αὐτῶν	εἰς	ὠφελίαν	ἔργον͵	δι΄	ὃ	θεὸς	αὔθ΄	ἡμῖν	δεδώρηται͵	μετὰ	τοῦτο	ῥητέον.	ὄψις	δὴ	κατὰ	τὸν	ἐμὸν	λόγον	αἰτία	τῆς	μεγίστης	ὠφελίας	γέγονεν	ἡμῖν͵	ὅτι	τῶν	νῦν	λόγων	περὶ	τοῦ	παντὸς	λεγομένων	οὐδεὶς	ἄν	ποτε	ἐρρήθη	μήτε	ἄστρα	μήτε	ἥλιον	μήτε	οὐρανὸν	ἰδόντων.	νῦν	δ΄	ἡμέρα	τε	καὶ	νὺξ	ὀφθεῖσαι	μῆνές	τε	καὶ	ἐνιαυτῶν	περίοδοι	καὶ	ἰσημερίαι	καὶ	τροπαὶ	μεμηχάνηνται	μὲν	ἀριθμόν͵	χρόνου	δὲ	ἔννοιαν	περί	τε	τῆς	τοῦ	παντὸς	φύσεως	ζήτησιν	ἔδοσαν·	ἐξ	ὧν	ἐπορισάμεθα	φιλοσοφίας	γένος͵	οὗ	μεῖζον	ἀγαθὸν	οὔτ΄	ἦλθεν	οὔτε	ἥξει	ποτὲ	τῷ	θνητῷ	γένει	δωρηθὲν	ἐκ	θεῶν.	20	 For	the	discussion	about	the	creation	of	heart,	lungs,	and	liver,	and	their	association	with	the	mortal	parts	of	soul,	see	Chapter	4,	4.2.1	Anger	and	the	spirited	part	of	soul	and	4.2.2	The	appetitive	part	of	soul.	21	 Cf.	Tim.	71d-e.	22	 Cf.	Chapter	4,	4.2.2	The	appetitive	part	of	soul.	
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dreams	or	by	sickness,	it	is	called	divination.	In	my	opinion,	what	the	liver	receives	in	the	form	of	divination	 might	 be	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 cosmos	 and	 the	 destined	 laws	 that	 the	 Demiurge	 had	showed	the	individual	immortal	souls	before	their	initial	embodiment,	the	trace	of	which	might	have	been	left	in	the	immortal	souls.	This	explains	why	only	a	man	with	sound	mind	(σώφρονι,	72a5)	 is	 competent	 to	 render	 judgment	 on	 his	 own	 divination	 (72a),	 for	when	 embodied,	 the	revolutions	 of	 his	 immortal	 soul	 are	 not	 in	 their	 best	 condition	whereas	 the	 understanding	 of	cosmic	nature	and	 laws	would	 require	 the	well	 functioning	of	 the	 revolutions	of	 the	Same	and	Different	 of	 the	 immortal	 souls.23 	 In	 this	 way,	 analyzing	 divination	 is	 of	 benefit	 for	 the	restoration	of	the	revolutions	of	the	immortal	souls.	This	being	the	case,	we	can	now	understand	why	Timaeus	thinks	of	divination	as	a	gift	(71e2-3)	compensating	for	the	appetitive	part	of	soul’s	being	devoid	of	understanding	and	reasoning	(71d5-71e1).	In	 short,	 the	 affinity	 of	 structure	 between	 the	 cosmos	 and	 the	 human	 race	 and	 the	construction	and	functions	of	bodily	organs	demonstrates	the	compensatory	arrangement	of	the	Demiurge	 for	 the	purpose	of	 the	 restoration	of	 the	 revolutions	 in	 the	 individual	 immortal	 soul	that	are	disrupted	in	the	first	embodiment.	The	affinity	between	the	cosmos	and	the	human	race	allows	humans	as	mortal	beings	to	imitate	the	structural	similarities,	while	the	construction	and	function	of	bodily	organs	enables	the	actual	practice	of	imitation.	In	this	way,	the	human	race	is	able	 to	 bridge	 their	 own	 gap	 between	 the	 cosmos	 that	 is	 a	 divine	 and	 immortal	 being	 and	themselves	as	mortal	creature	by	practicing	and	enhance	the	similarities	between	these	two.	
Conclusion	 	
In	this	chapter,	I	have	first	argued	the	inevitability	of	necessity	of	the	mortality	of	the	human	race	bestowed	by	the	Demiurge	with	regard	to	the	relationship	between	the	cosmic	and	human	body.	 I	 then	 demonstrated	 Demiurge’s	 compensatory	 arrangement	 for	 humans	 in	 order	 to	benefit	 their	 immortal	 souls	 by,	 firstly,	 showing	 the	 structural	 similarities	 and	 dissimilarities	between	the	cosmos	and	the	human	race;	secondly,	arguing	that	the	dissimilarities	are	denoted	by	mortality,	which	can	be	seen	as	 teleological	 in	 that	 it	ensures	the	opportunity	 for	 individual	immortal	 soul	 to	 regain	 perfection	 and	 purity;	 thirdly,	 demonstrating	 how	 bodily	 organs	 are																																																									23	 Cf.	Tim.	37a-c.	
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created	to	function	as	auxiliaries	so	as	to	be	of	benefit	for	the	individual	immortal	souls.	In	the	knowledge	of	Chapter	2,	3,	and	4,	that	is,	how	the	gap	of	immortality	and	mortality	can	be	 bridged	 in	 humans.	 This	 chapter	 has	 shown	 how	 humans,	 as	 mortal	 creatures,	 can	 avail	themselves	of	their	own	immortality	and	mortality	so	as	to	bridge	the	gap	between	the	cosmos	as	immortal	being	and	themselves.
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Conclusion	
In	this	thesis,	I	have	argued	how	Plato	tries	to	bridge	the	gap	between	immortal	and	mortal	nature	in	the	Timaeus.	There	are	three	aspects	from	which	this	thesis	observes	Plato’s	bridging.	Firstly,	 Timaeus’	 cosmological	 account	 introduces	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 Demiurge,	 who	 was	 the	active	 agent	 and	 cause	 of	 the	 cosmos’	 coming	 into	 being.	 The	 interference	 from	 the	Demiurge	enables	the	‘interaction’	between	the	Forms	and	the	Receptacle:	the	images	of	the	Forms	imprint	impressions	 in	 the	Receptacle.	Secondly,	 in	 this	way,	 the	Receptacle	receives	distinctive	shapes	and	so	come	 into	being	 the	 triangles	and	elemental	 solids	 that	are	 the	ultimate	components	of	physical	 bodies.	 Forms	 and	 the	 Receptacle	 are	 integral	 components	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 the	cosmic	 soul	 and	 the	 individual	 immortal	 soul	 as	 well.	 But	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 Demiurge	created	the	souls	and	bodies	are	utterly	different.	It	entails	that,	on	the	one	hand,	the	immortal	existents,	 i.e.	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 and	 individual	 immortal	 souls,	 can	 be	 connected	 to	 and	communicate	with	 the	mortal	 existents,	 i.e.	 the	 cosmic	 body	 and	 human	 bodies,	 for	 they	 have	common	constituent	components;	and	on	the	other	hand,	the	immortal	souls	and	mortal	bodies	appear	 to	be	utterly	different	 existents,	 for	 they	differ	 in	both	 structure	 and	modes	of	motion.	Knowing	 that	 there	 is	 indeed	 similarity	 between	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 immortal	 souls	 and	mortal	bodies,	the	separation	of	the	former	from	the	latter	no	longer	seems	to	be	an	absolute	one.	Thirdly,	 the	 combination	of	 the	 cosmic	 soul	 and	body	 is	 very	different	 from	 that	of	 the	human	immortal	 soul	 and	 body.	 The	 former	 yields	 an	 everlasting	 creature	 that	 is	most	 beautiful	 and	perfect.	Whereas	the	embodiment	of	the	individual	immortal	souls	in	human	bodies	renders	the	revolutions	of	the	immortal	souls	disrupted	and	also	gives	rise	to	the	two	kinds	of	mortal	souls.	Since	the	constitution	of	the	two	kinds	of	mortal	souls	already	contains	elements	of	the	immortal	soul	at	the	very	beginning,	the	mortal	kind	of	souls	are	created	to	be	the	intermediary	between	the	immortal	soul	and	the	mortal	body.	From	 those	 three	 aspects,	 we	 can	 see	 that	 Plato’s	 attempt	 at	 bridging	 the	 gap	 between	immortality	and	mortality	is	consistent	throughout	Timaeus’	account	of	cosmic	creation.	That	is,	the	 Demiurge	 interfered	 the	 relationship	 among	 the	 pre-cosmic	 existents:	 the	 Forms,	 the	pre-cosmic	 becoming,	 and	 the	 Receptacle	 by	 imprinting	 the	 images	 of	 the	 Forms	 in	 the	
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Receptacle	in	order	to	transform	the	pre-cosmic	becoming	into	proportionate	cosmic	becoming.	In	this	way,	the	Demiurge	then	created	the	cosmic	soul	and	body	employing	respective	modes	of	construction.	The	cosmic	soul	is	immortal,	and	so	does	the	cosmic	body	as	a	whole.	Whereas	the	individual	 elemental	 triangles	 and	 solids	 that	 compose	 the	 cosmic	 body	 are	 perishable.	 The	Demiurge	 then	 created	 the	 individual	 immortal	 souls	 for	 the	 human	 race	 and	 handed	 the	 rest	creative	tasks	over	to	the	lesser	gods.	The	lesser	gods	embodied	the	individual	immortal	soul	in	mortal	 bodies	 that	 they	 created	 out	 of	 materials	 borrowed	 from	 the	 cosmic	 body,	 i.e.	 the	elemental	 triangles	 and	 solids.	 Thus	 the	 human	 body	 is	 constructed	 to	 be	 mortal.	 The	embodiment	brings	about	the	generation	of	the	ingredients,	out	of	which	the	lesser	gods	created	the	two	mortal	kinds	of	souls	as	 intermediary	between	the	 immortal	soul	and	body.	Therefore,	we	 can	 say	 that	 the	 Demiurge’s	 creating	 the	 cosmos	 is	 his	 creating	 the	 immortal	 and	 mortal	existents	as	well	as	connecting	them	to	each	other	respectively.	As	we	can	see,	 the	 teleology	operating	behind	 the	Demiurgic	creation	of	 the	 immortal	and	mortal	existents	is	also	consistent	throughout	Timaeus’	cosmology,	that	is,	the	completion	of	the	cosmic	 creation	 and	 the	 goodness	 of	 the	 cosmos	 as	 a	 whole.	 The	 Demiurge	 introduced	proportionality	to	pre-cosmos	because	he	decided	order	is	better	than	disorder.	And	he	endowed	the	cosmic	body	with	round	shape	and	rotation	in	order	it	is	compatible	with	the	revolutions	of	the	cosmic	soul,	and	in	this	way,	the	cosmic	soul	and	body	can	be	connected	to	and	interact	with	each	 other.	 The	 lesser	 gods,	 following	 the	 Demiurge’s	 commands,	 intentionally	 created	 the	human	race	 to	be	mortal	 creatures	so	 that	death	can	 lead	 to	 the	release	of	 the	 immortal	 souls.	The	 reincarnation	 of	 the	 released	 immortal	 souls	 then	 brought	 about	 the	 generation	 of	 other	mortal	creatures.	In	this	way,	the	cosmos	becomes	and	will	continue	to	be	complete	and	perfect.	But	 even	 in	 this	 cosmic-centric	 teleology,	 there	 are	 indeed	 concerns	 for	 the	 well-being	 of	 the	human	race.	The	lesser	gods	constructed	the	human	race	by	imitating	the	combination	between	the	cosmic	soul	and	body:	the	individual	immortal	souls	are	embodied	in	but	thus	disrupted	by	the	 mortal	 bodies,	 whose	 parts	 and	 organs	 are	 purposefully	 designed	 as	 compensatory	arrangement	in	order	to	benefit	the	disrupted	immortal	souls.	The	structural	affinity	between	the	cosmos	 and	 humans	 allows	 the	 latter	 to	 practice	 and	 promote	 the	 imitation	 by	 availing	themselves	of	the	purposefully	designed	mortal	body	to	benefit	their	immortal	souls.	In	this	way,	humans,	as	mortal	beings,	are	able	to	bridge	their	own	gap	with	the	everlasting	cosmos.	
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Noteworthy	 is	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Plato	 has	 succeeded	 in	 bridging	 the	 gap	 between	immortality	 and	 mortality.	 The	 role	 of	 a	 craftsman,	 such	 as	 the	 Demiurge	 himself,	 is	 indeed	indispensable	 to	 Plato’s	 bridging-the-gap	 attempt	 in	 Timaeus	 cosmological	 account,	 for	 the	‘interaction’	 between	 the	 Forms	 and	 Receptacle	 requires	 the	 interference	 from	 the	 Demiurge.	This	 thesis	 holds	 on	 to	 a	 literal	 reading	 of	 the	 Timaeus	 that	 allows	 craftsmanship	 and	 thus	intentional	 teleology,	 as	 I	 have	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 1.	Whereas	 I	 am	 aware	 that	 a	metaphorical	reading	of	 the	Timaeus,	which	reduces	or	eliminate	altogether	 the	role	of	 the	Demiurge,	would	weaken	 the	 argument	 of	 this	 thesis	 in	 that,	 without	 the	 interference	 and	 creative	 plan	 of	 the	Demiurge,	 the	 interpretation	 that	 the	 Forms	 and	 Receptacle	 are	 integral	 components	 in	fashioning	both	immortal	and	mortal	existents	would	be	challenged	by	a	question:	how	come	the	immortal	 existents	 comes	 to	 be	 automatically	 different	 from	 the	 mortal	 ones	 if	 they	 are	composed	of	common	components?	A	literal	reading	can	answer	the	question	by	suggesting	the	difference	to	be	as	the	result	of	creative	choice	made	by	the	Demiurge	with	regard	to	the	overall	goodness	 of	 the	 cosmos	 as	whole.	 But	 nevertheless,	 Plato	 offers	 no	 further	 explanation	 of	 the	nature	 of	 the	 Demiurge.	 Maybe	 Plato	 thinks	 introducing	 the	 Demiurge	 is	 sufficient	 for	 the	cosmological	account	in	the	Timaeus,	or	maybe	he	thinks	the	nature	of	the	divine	craftsmanship	is	 beyond	 human	 capacity.	 Apart	 from	 the	 Demiurge’s	 indispensable	 role	 in	 Plato’s	bridging-the-gap	 attempt,	 it	 is	 also	 worth	 paying	 attention	 to	 what	 Plato	 thinks	 human	 can	actually	avail	themselves	of	the	bridgeable	relationship	between	immortal	and	mortal	existents.	It	is	that	humans	can	balance	the	interaction	between	their	own	souls	and	bodies	by	the	means	of	imitating	the	proportionality	of	the	cosmos	so	as	to	bridge	their	own	gap	with	the	cosmos.
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